1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6223 OF 2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED .....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 29105-29106 OF 2011) W.P. (C) NO. 64 OF 2012 W.P. (C) NO. 848 OF 2013 W.P. (C) NO. 385 OF 2014 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6569 OF 2014 T.P. (C) NO. 342 OF 2014 T.C. (C) NO. 29 OF 2015 W.P. (C) NO. 174 OF 2016 W.P. (C) NO. 311 OF 2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6571 OF 2014 T.C. (C) NO. 38 OF 2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26363 OF 2016)
2 W.P. (C) NO. 698 OF 2016 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26330 OF 2016) J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011, SLP (C) No. 26363 of 2016 and SLP (C) No. 26330 of 2016. Since pure question of law is involved, we allow the transfer petition and transfer cases and also take up, along with these appeals, the writ petitions which were filed before the respective High Courts. 2. These appeals are filed by the appellants challenging the orders passed by different High Courts i.e. High Court of Allahabad, High Court of Orissa, High Court of Madhya Pradesh and High Court of Karnataka. These High Courts, however, are unanimous in their approach and have reached the same conclusion. In all these cases, appellants were issued show cause notices by the concerned authorities under the provisions of the Building And Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'BOCW Act') and Buildings And Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Welfare
3 Cess Act'). They had challenged those notices by filing writ petitions in the High Courts on the ground that the provisions of BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act were not applicable to them because of the reason that they were registered under the Factories Act, 1948. It may be mentioned that at the relevant time no manufacturing operation had commenced by the appellants. In fact, all these appellants were in the process of construction of civil works/factory buildings etc. wherein they had planned to set up their factories. As the process of construction of civil works was undertaken by the appellants wherein construction workers were engaged, the respondent authorities took the view that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts which were meant for construction workers became applicable and the appellants were supposed to pay the cess for the welfare of the said workers engaged in the construction work. The appellants had submitted that Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act which defines 'building or other construction work' specifically states that it does not include any building or construction work to which the provision of the Factories Act, 1948 or the Mines Act, 1952 apply. Since the appellants stood registered under the Factories Act, they were not covered by the definition of building or other construction work as contained in Section 2(d) of the Act and, therefore, said Act was not applicable to them by virtue of Section 1(4) thereof. All the High Courts have negated the aforesaid plea of the appellants on the ground that the
4 appellants would not be covered by the definition of factory defined under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act in the absence of any operations/ manufacturing process and, therefore, mere obtaining a licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act would not suffice and rescue them from their liability to pay cess under the Welfare Cess Act. This is, in nutshell, the subject matter of all these appeals. However, in order to understand the full implication of the issue involved and to answer the said issue, it would be apt to take note of certain facts from one of these appeals. This factual canvass is suitably available in the events that have occurred leading to the filing of Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016. 3. In this appeal, the appellant proposed to set up a 2X600 Megawatt capacity coal-based thermal power project namely “Anpara C” at Anpara in District Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh (“the Project”), pursuant to being selected in a tariff-based competitive bidding initiated by the Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (UPRVUNL) on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (UPPCL). The project consists of two Steam Turbine Generators (STG) each having capacity of 600 MW and two pulverised coal fired steam generators and the balance of plant. The appellant, in respect of the aforesaid project, made an application to the Director of Factories, Uttar Pradesh, submitting the layout/drawings of the proposed plants and requesting for registration of the project as a
5 factory under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Uttar Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950. The appellant was granted registration and licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with Uttar Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950 for the said Project, as a factory. Respondent No. 1 notified the Uttar Pradesh Building and other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2009 (for short 'BOCW Rules') on 04.02.2009. Immediately thereafter, the appellant received a notice of even date issued by respondent No. 2, intimating that the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh had directed that “establishments” engaged in construction activities were required to get themselves registered under the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules. Simultaneously, a letter of even date was also received from the District Collector, Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh, calling upon the appellant to get itself/its contractors registered under the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules. The appellant, vide its letter of even date, replied to the aforesaid communication dated 19.04.2010 of the District Collector, Sonebhadra, stating that the appellant was undertaking the construction activity of the Project under the provisions of the Factories Act and as such, in view of Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act, the Project was exempted from the application of the BOCW Act, and consequently the Welfare Cess Act and BOCW Rules inasmuch as the provisions of
6 the Factories Act apply to the Project. 4. The respondents were not satisfied with the aforesaid stand taken by the appellant. Thus, show cause notice dated 17.02.2011 was issued by respondent No. 2 as to why action be not taken against the appellant for failing to get itself registered under BOCW Act. It was followed by another notice of even date stating that the appellant had not furnished requisite information relating to construction activities undertaken by it as required under Section 4 of the Welfare Cess Act read with Rule 6 of the Welfare Cess Rules. Some more notices were issued to the similar effect with regard to the construction activities in respect of the township in Anpara, undertaken by the appellant. Insofar as township is concerned, appellant got itself registered through its principal contractors under Welfare Cess Act and started paying the cess. However, in respect of construction activity and factory premises, the appellant reiterated its stand that by virtue of Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act, it was excluded from the coverage thereof. The contention of the appellant was rejected by the respondents which led to issuance of further notices demanding cess. 5. At this juncture, the appellant filed the writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging the validity of notices dated 14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011 demanding payment of cess, on the following grounds:
7 (i) That the appellant is not amenable to assessment of liability under the Welfare Cess Act inasmuch as the Factories Act is applicable to the Project, and the Project is as such, exempt from the applicability of the said Act by virtue of the exclusionary cause contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act. (ii) That respondent No. 2, vide impugned notice dated 02.04.2011, was proceeding to calculate the alleged cess payable by the appellant on the basis of the cost of the Project, and not on the cost of construction of the said Project, whereas under the scheme of the Cess Act, cess is payable only on the cost of construction incurred annually, and not on the entire project cost, which includes several other components apart from civil construction works. 6. The respondents filed their counter affidavit contesting the petition. After hearing, the writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide judgment dated 28.04.2015, gist whereof has already been taken note of above. 7. Emphatic submissions were made by Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing in some of these appeals, questioning the approach and conclusion reached by the High Court. Other senior counsel Mr. Gaurab Banerji and Mr. Akhil Sibal supplemented those submissions
8 lending their candour thereto. These submissions were further supplemented by M/s. Prashant Shukla, Arunabh Chowdhury and K. Raghava Charyulu, Advocates. It may not be necessary to take note of individual submissions made by these counsel. Instead, for the sake of brevity, we are reproducing the submissions of these counsel in consolidated form hereinafter. 8. These counsel have led two prong attacks on the demands raised by the respondents for payment of cess under BOCW Act read with Welfare Cess Act, which is as under: i) In the first instance, it is argued that BOCW Act does not apply to those undertakings which are registered under the Factories Act. To support this submission, emphasis was laid on the definition of “building or other construction work” as contained in Section 2(1)(d) of BOCW Act, which reads as under: “ Section 2(1)(d) : “ building or other construction work” means the construction, alternation, repairs, maintenance or demolition of or, in relation to, buildings, streets, roads, railways, tramways, airfields, irrigation, drainage, embankment and navigation works, flood control works (including storm water drainage works), generation, transmission and distribution of power, water works (including channels for distribution of water), oil and gas installations, electric lines, wireless, radio, television, telephone, telegraph and overseas communication dams, canals, reservoirs, watercourses, tunnels, bridges, viaducts, aquaducts, pipelines, towers, cooling towers, transmission towers and such other work as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, by notification but does not
9 include any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), or the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), apply. (emphasis added)” (ii) Second submission, which in fact flows from first submission noted above, was that the approach of the High Court in dealing with the matter was contrary to law. In this behalf, it was pointed out that the High Court has rejected the case of the appellants herein on the ground that even if the appellants had obtained a licence under the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, the appellants were still not excluded from the provisions of Welfare Cess Act as no manufacturing process or factory operation had started by the appellants and, therefore, appellants did not answer the description of 'factory' within the meaning of Factories Act. As per the High Court, since the appellants had only undertaken the process of construction of premises which are to be ultimately used as factories, and since such power project has not started and there was no operation for which the licence was obtained under the Factories Act till the production commences, it could not be said that “factory” has come into existence and, therefore, the appellants were not entitled to take advantage of mere registration under the Factories Act. Dubbing the aforesaid approach as erroneous, it was the argument of the appellants that the High Court ignored the pertinent aspect that even when the building was under construction, the establishments
10 which were covered by the Factories Act stood excluded by virtue of definition contained in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act which pertained to construction of building and, therefore, specifically covered the stage of construction itself. It was argued that matter should have been seen from that angle. Advancing this argument further, it was also submitted that the Legislature is alive to the fact that the factory is not running at the stage when building or other construction work is going on. However, it still chose to exclude those buildings or other construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act apply. 9. Expanding the aforesaid submissions, the appellants even gave the rationale in couching the definition of Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act in that specific manner by submitting that once the provisions of Factories Act apply, all the benefits which are admissible to the workers under the BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are granted under the Factories Act as well. This submission was buttressed by pointing out the provisions/conditions stipulated while granting the permission under the Factories Act. It was submitted that the safety measures and facilities which the appellants were obligated under those conditions were the same as stipulated in BOCW Act. 10. Taking support of interpretative tools to support the aforesaid twin submissions, it was submitted by the counsel for the appellants that
11 Section 2(d) had to be given literal meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity in the said provision and number of judgments were cited in this behalf. Some of those judgments are as under: i) In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others 1 , this Court while interpreting the word 'means' observed that if the definition has used the word 'means', it shall include certain things or acts and the definition has used the word 'means', it shall include certain things or acts and the definition is a hard-and-fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition. This Court further observed that if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the law. This Court after making reference to its judgment in B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi 2 observed that “the Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense”. It was further observed that “the cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, 1 (1990) 3 SCC 682 2 (1979) 1 SCC 361
12 natural and grammatical meaning.” ii) In Shri Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla and another v. Shri A.D. Divelkar and others 3 , it was held that “there is no doubt that when the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, we must look into that dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute. We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the legislature; our task is to get at the intention as expressed in the statute”. iii) In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries 4 , the Court pointed out that “there is no doubt that beneficial legislations should have liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme”. iv) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and Others 5 , this Court, while interpreting the provisions that fell for consideration, made the following observations in paragraph 13: “ 13. …. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it 3 1957 SCR 121 4 (1985) 1 SCC 218 5 (2001) 7 SCC 71
13 intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.” v) In Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and another 6 , this Court explained as to how to interpret the provisions of an enactment in the following words: “ ... when the words used in a statute are capable of only one meaning. In such a situation, the courts have been hesitant to apply the rule of benevolent construction. But if it is found that the words used in the statute give rise to more than one meaning, in such circumstances, the courts are not precluded from applying such rule of construction. The third situation is when there is no ambiguity in a provision of a statute so construed. If the provision of a statute is plain, unambiguous and does not give rise to any doubt, in such circumstances the rule of benevolent construction has no application.” vi) Similarly in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay 7 , the Constitution Bench of this Court explained the principle of literal interpretation as under: “ 10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting 6 (2001) 8 SCC 24 7 (2002) 4 SCC 297
14 any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating ( sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1 : 4 MIA 179] “we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747], Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312] and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India [(2002) 3 SCC 722 : JT (2002) 3 SC 21])” vii) In Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda 8 , while interpreting the provisions that fell for consideration, the principle was applied even in the context of beneficial legislation, when the language was plain, depicting clear intention of the legislature, in the following terms: “ 53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its 8 (2004) 5 SCC 385
15 own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. (See Regional Director, ESI Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries [(1985) 1 SCC 218 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 213 : AIR 1985 SC 278]).” Relying upon all the aforesaid judgments, the forceful exhortation was to follow this literal construction while interpreting Section 2(d) of BOCW Act in the manner appellants suggested to us. 11. Mr. Rana and Mr. Srivastava countered the aforesaid submissions giving equally salubrious response. Their fervent plea was that the view taken by the High Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 2(d) of BOCW Act was perfectly justified and any other interpretation as suggested by the appellants would defeat the very purpose of these Acts. It was argued that mere registration under the Factories Act would be of no consequence inasmuch as definition of 'factory' contained in Section 2(m) of the Act unambiguously suggest that the provisions of the said Act would apply only when manufacturing process is actually carried on. It was further submitted that the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act does not include construction workers and, therefore, construction workers would not be entitled to various benefits which are contained in different provisions of the Factories Act. It is for this reason at the stage of construction of the building, which is to be ultimately used as a factory, the provisions of BOCW Act would be applied. It was also
16 emphasised that while interpreting the provisions of these two Acts, “superior purpose” behind therein had to be kept in mind and this enactment which is for the welfare of the weaker section, i.e. workers of unorganised sector, had to be liberally construed by giving that construction which accords them the benefit eschewing the other approach which would preclude them from getting the benefit under the Acts. In this hue, the learned counsel strongly urged upon this Court to invoke the principle of purposive interpretation, which is in vogue, to do complete justice in the matter. It was also argued that exclusion provision contained in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act had to be construed narrowly as per the settled proposition of law. 12. We have bestowed our due and serious consideration to the submissions made of both sides, which these submissions deserve. The central issue is the meaning that is to be assigned to the language of Section 2(d) of the Act, particularly that part which is exclusionary in nature, i.e. which excludes such building and construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act apply. Before coming to the grip of this central issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to the objectives with which the Factories Act and BOCW Act were enacted, as that would be the guiding path to answer the core issue delineated above. 13. Insofar as Factories Act is concerned, its Preamble mentions that it is an
17 Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is enacted primarily with the object of protecting workers employed in factories against industrial and occupational hazards. For that purpose it seeks to impose upon the owners or occupiers certain obligations to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure for them employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. This Act also requires that the workers should work in healthy and sanitary conditions and for that purpose it provides that precautions should be taken for the safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Incidental provisions in Factories Act are made for securing information necessary to ensure that the objects are carried out and the State Governments are empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reports and to inspect the prescribed registers with a view to maintain effective supervision. The duty of the employer under this Act is to secure the health and safety of workers and extends to providing adequate plant, machinery and appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises, proper system of working and extends to giving reasonable restrictions. Detailed provisions are, therefore, made in diverse chapters of the Act imposing obligations upon the owners of the factories to maintain inspecting staff and for maintenance of health, cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and provision for amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. Provisions are also made for safety of workers and their
18 welfare, such as restrictions on working hours and on the employment of young persons and females, and grant of annual leave with wages. In Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and another 9 , this Court highlighted the necessity and rationale behind legislating this Act and the objectives which it sought to achieve, in the following manner: “ 9. The Factories Act, as the preamble recites, is an Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. The Act is enacted primarily with the object of protecting workers employed in factories against industrial and occupational hazards. For that purpose it seeks to impose upon the owners or the occupiers certain obligations to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure for them employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. The Act requires that the workers should work in healthy and sanitary conditions and for that purpose it provides that precautions should be taken for the safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Incidental provisions are made for securing information necessary to ensure that the objects are carried out and the State Governments are empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reports and to inspect the prescribed registers with a view to maintain effective supervision. The duty of the employer is to secure the health and safety of workers and extends to providing adequate plant, machinery and appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises, proper system of working and extends to giving reasonable instructions. Detailed provisions are therefore made in diverse chapters of the Act imposing obligations upon the owners of the factories to maintain inspecting staff and for maintenance of health, cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and provision for amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. etc. Provisions are also made for safety of workers and their welfare, such as restrictions on working hours and on the employment of young persons and females, and grant of annual leave with wages. Employment in a manufacturing process was at one time regarded as a matter of contract between the employer and the 9 1964 SCR (1) 860
19 employee and the State was not concerned to impose any duties upon the employer. It is however now recognised that the State has a vital concern in preventing exploitation of labour and in insisting upon proper safeguards for the health and safety of the workers. The Factories Act undoubtedly imposes numerous restrictions upon the employers to secure to the workers adequate safeguards for their health and physical well-being. But imposition of such restrictions is not and cannot be regarded, in the context of the modem outlook on industrial relations, as unreasonable....” 14. Coming to BOCW Act, its Statement of Objects and Reasons, depicting the legislative intent, reads as under: “ (1) It is estimated that about 8.5 million workers in the country are engaged in building and other construction works. Building and other construction workers are one of the most numerous and vulnerable segments of the unorganised labour in India. The building and other construction works are characterized by their inherent risk to the life and limb of the workers. The work is also characterised by its casual nature, temporary relationship between employer and employee, uncertain working hours, lack of basic amenities and inadequacy of welfare facilities. In the absence of adequate statutory provisions, the requisite information regarding the number and nature of accidents is also not forthcoming. In the absence of such information, it is difficult to fix responsibility or to take any corrective action. (2) Although the provisions of certain Central Acts are applicable to the building and other construction workers yet a need has been felt for a comprehensive Central Legislation for regulating their safety, health, welfare and other conditions of service. It had been considered necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the employers on the building and other construction works for ensuring sufficient funds for the Welfare Boards to undertake the social security schemes and welfare measures.” 15. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act itself, it was
20 considered necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the employers while constructing building etc. This led to passing of Welfare Cess Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons behind this Act was to provide for the levy and collection of a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the employers for augmenting the resources of the Building, and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Boards constituted by the State Governments under the Building and Other Construction Workers' (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1995. 16. Scheme of BOCW Act came up for consideration by this Court in the Dewan Chand Builders and Contractors v. Union of India and Others 10 . Recognising that the noble purpose behind the said Act is to ensure welfare of the building and construction workers in order to provide basic human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court observed as under: “ 10. It is thus clear from the scheme of the BOCW Act that its sole aim is the welfare of building and construction workers, directly relatable to their constitutionally recognised right to live with basic human dignity, enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It envisages a network of authorities at the Central and State levels to ensure that the benefit of the legislation is made available 'to every building and construction worker, by constituting Welfare Boards and clothing them with sufficient powers to ensure enforcement of the primary purpose of the BOCW Act. The means of generating revenues for making effective the welfare provisions of the BOCW Act is through the 10 (2012) 1 SCC 101
21 Cess Act, which is questioned in these appeals as unconstitutional. xx xx xx 17. It is manifest from the overarching schemes of the BOCW Act, the Cess Act and the Rules made thereunder that their sole object is to regulate the employment and conditions of service of building and other construction workers, traditionally exploited sections in the society and to provide for their safety, health and other welfare measures. The BOCW Act and the Cess Act break new ground in that, the liability to pay cess falls not only on the owner of a building or establishment, but under Section 2(1)(i)(iii) of the BOCW Act “ in relation to a building or other construction work carried on by or through a contractor, or by the employment of building workers supplied by a contractor, the contractor”; The extension of the liability on to the contractor is with a view to ensure that, if for any reason it is not possible to collect cess from the owner of the building at a stage subsequent to the completion of the construction, it can be recovered from the contractor. The Cess Act and the Cess Rules ensure that the cess is collected at source from the bills of the contractors to whom payments are made by the owner. In short, the burden of cess is passed on from the owner to the contractor.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Keeping in view the aforesaid objective of the respective Acts, we now deal with the scope and ambit of Section 2(d) of BOCW Act. As noticed above, one of the submissions of the appellants is that literal interpretation needs to be given to the said provision as it categorically excludes those building or construction work to which Factories Act apply. In this very hue, it is argued that as the benefit under the Factories Act are already given to the construction workers who are
22 involved in the construction work, there is no need for covering the construction workers who are engaged in building or construction work of the appellants under BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act. 18. Before dealing with the argument predicated on literal construction, we would like to deal with the second aspect as the answer to that would facilitate the answer to this aspect as well. Section 2(m) of the Factories Act defines 'factory' in the following manner: “ (m) "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) Whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of [the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952)] or [a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place]. [ Explanation [ I ] - For computing the number of workers for the purposes of this clause all the workers in [different groups and relays] in a day shall be taken into account;] [Explanation II - For the purposes of this clause, the mere fact that an Electronic Data Processing Unit or a Computer Unit is installed in any premises or part thereof, shall not be construed to make it a factory if no manufacturing process is being carried on in such premises or part thereof;]...”
23 19. Section 2(k) of the Factories Act defines 'manufacturing process' in the following manner: (k) "manufacturing process" means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) [pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or] (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) [composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding;] [or] (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels;[or] (vi) [preserving or storing any article in cold storage;] 20. It is also necessary to take note of the definition of 'worker', which is contained in Section 2(l) of the Factories Act. It reads as under: (l) "worker" means a person 8[employed, directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not], in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process 7[but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union]; 21. On the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that “factory” is that establishment where manufacturing process is carried
24 on with or without the aid of power. Carrying on this manufacturing process or manufacturing activity is thus a prerequisite. It is equally pertinent to note that it covers only those workers who are engaged in the said manufacturing process. Insofar as these appellants are concerned, construction of building is not their business activity or manufacturing process. In fact, the building is being constructed for carrying out the particular manufacturing process, which, in most of these appeals, is generation, transmission and distribution of power. Obviously, the workers who are engaged in construction of the building also do not fall within the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act. On these two aspects there is no cleavage and both parties are at ad idem . What follows is that these construction workers are not covered by the provisions of the Factories Act. 22. Having regard to the above, if the contention of the appellants is accepted, the construction workers engaged in the construction of building undertaken by the appellants which is to be used ultimately as factory, would stand excluded from the provisions of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act as well. Could this be the intention while providing the definition of 'building and other construction work' in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act? Clear answer to this has to be in the negative. 23. We may mention at this stage that High Court is right in observing that
25 merely because the appellants have obtained a licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, it would not follow therefrom that they answer the description of the “factory” within the meaning of the Factories Act. We have reproduced the definition of 'factory' and a bare reading thereof makes it abundantly clear that before this stage, when construction of the project is completed and the manufacturing process starts, 'factory' within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories Act does not come into existence so as to be covered by the said Act. 24. We now advert to the core issue touching upon the construction of Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act. The argument of the appellants is that language thereof is unambiguous and literal construction is to be accorded to find the legislative intent. To our mind, this submission is of no avail. Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act dealing with the building or construction work is in three parts. In the first part, different activities are mentioned which are to be covered by the said expression, namely, construction, alterations, repairs, maintenance or demolition. Second part of the definition is aimed at those buildings or works in relation to which the aforesaid activities are carried out. The third part of the definition contains exclusion clause by stipulating that it does not include 'any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), or the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952),
26 applies'. Thus, first part of the definition contains the nature of activity; second part contains the subject matter in relation to which the activity is carried out and third part excludes those building or other construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act or Mines Act apply. 25. It is not in dispute that construction of the projects of the appellants is covered by the definition of “building or other construction work” as it satisfies first two elements of the definition pointed out above. In order to see whether exclusion clause applies, we need to interpret the words 'but does not include any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act …......... apply' . The question is as to whether the provisions of the Factories Act apply to the construction of building/project of the appellants. We are of the firm opinion that they do not apply. The provisions of the Factories Act would “apply” only when the manufacturing process starts for which the building/project is being constructed and not to the activity of construction of the project. That is how the exclusion clause is to be interpreted and that would be the plain meaning of the said clause. This meaning to the exclusion clause ascribed by us is in tune with the approach adopted by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India 11 . Two separate, but concurring, opinions were given by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice A.P. Sen, and we reproduce here 11 (1979) 4 SCC 573
27 below some excerpts from both opinions: “ Justice A.P. Sen (para 23) Each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of general purpose of the Act itself. A bare mechanical interpretation of the words 'devoid of concept or purpose' will reduce much of legislation to futility. It is a salutary rule, well established, that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (para 241) A policy-oriented interpretation, when a welfare legislation falls for determination, especially in the context of a developing country, is sanctioned by principle and precedent and is implicit in Article 37 of the Constitution since the judicial branch is, in a sense, part of the State. So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfilling meaning.” 26. The aforesaid meaning attributed to the exclusion clause of the definition is also in consonance with the objective and purpose which is sought to be achieved by the enactment of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act. As pointed out above, if the construction of this provision as suggested by the appellants is accepted, the construction workers who are engaged in the construction of buildings/projects will neither get the benefit of the Factories Act nor of BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature. BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are pieces of social security legislation to provide for certain benefits to the construction workers. 27. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an
28 imperative, irrespective of anything else. This is so eloquently brought out in the following passage in the case of Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia 12 : “ 9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. (emphasis by the court) See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st Edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274 : 1953 SCR 677 : 1953 Cri LJ 1105: (1953) 4 STC 188] said that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Judge Learned Hand, a long time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislature has used and the true meaning of what words [ Ed. : Lord Reid in the aforecited case had observed: (All ER p. 814) “We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but this is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said.”] as was said by Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G [1975 AC 591, 613 : (1975) 1 All ER 810: (1975) 2 WLR 513] . We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law.” 28. How labour legislations are to be interpreted has been stated and restated by this Court time and again. In M.P. Mineral Industry 12 (1988) 4 SCC 284
29 Association v. Regional Labour Commr. (Central) 13 , this Court while dealing with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed that this Act is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen employed the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them, and so in construing the said provisions the court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction. In Surendra Kumar Verma v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal 14 , this Court reminded that semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. 29. We would also like to reproduce a passage from Workmen of American Express v. Management of American Express 15 , which provides complete answer to the argument of the appellants based on literal construction: “ 4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. 13 AIR 1960 SC 1068 14 (1980) 4 SCC 443 15 (1985) 4 SCC 71
30 Judges ought to be more concerned with the “colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds [(1971) 3 All ER 237] ). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations...” 30. In equal measure is the message contained in Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 16 : “ 21. The law is not “a brooding omnipotence in the sky” but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate...” 31. The sentiments were echoed in Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Anr. 17 in the following words: “ 20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge which would defeat the provisions of social legislation and the courts must even, if necessary, strain the language of the Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act, therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to promote its objects. 16 (1975) 2 SCC 791 17 (2009) 9 SCC 61
31 32. In taking the aforesaid view, we also agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that 'superior purpose' contained in BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments – the Factories Act on the one hand and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act on the other hand, are involved, both of which are welfare legislations. (See Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank 18 , which has been followed in Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v. M/s. Haryana Concast Limited & Anr. 19 in the context of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 1956. Here the concept of 'felt necessity' would get triggered and as per the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in BOCW Act, since the purpose of this Act is to take care of a particular necessity i.e. welfare of unorganised labour class involved in construction activity, that needs to be achieved and not to be discarded. Here the doctrine of Purposive Interpretation also gets attracted which is explained in recent judgments of this Court in Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others 20 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla 21 . 33. We are left to deal with the argument of the appellants that while 18 (2000) 4 SCC 406 19 2016 (1) SCALE 1 20 (2016) 4 SCC 179 at Page No. 197 21 (2016) 3 SCC 619 – Para 31
32 granting permission under the Factories Act, various conditions are imposed which the appellants are required to fulfill and these conditions are almost the same which are contained in BOCW Act. We are not convinced with this submission either. It is already held that provisions of Factories Act are not applicable to these construction workers. Registration under the Factories Act becomes necessary in view of provisions contained in Section 6 of the said Act as this Section requires taking of approval and registration of factories even at preparatory stage i.e. at the stage when the premises where factory is to operate has to ensure that construction will be done in such a manner that it takes care of safety measures etc. which are provided in the Factories Act. This means to ensure that construction is carried out in such a manner that provisions in the Factories Act to ensure health, safety and provisions relating to hazardous process as well as welfare measures are taken care of. It is for this reason that even after the building is completed before it is occupied, notice under Section 7 is to be given by the occupier to the Chief Inspector of Factories so that a necessary inspection is carried out to verify that all such measures are in place. Therefore, when the permissions for construction of factories is given, the purpose is altogether different. 34. It is stated at the cost of repetition that construction workers are not covered by the Factories Act and, therefore, welfare measures
33 specifically provided for such workers under the BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act cannot be denied. 35. We, thus, hold that all these appeals are bereft of any merit. Accordingly, these appeals, along with the writ petitions filed before this Court as also those which are the subject matter of the transfer petition and transfer cases, are dismissed with cost. We, however, make it clear that insofar as objection to the calculation of cess as contained in the show cause notices is concerned, it would be open to the appellants to agitate the same before the adjudicating authorities. No costs. .............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI) .............................................J. (N.V. RAMANA) NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 18, 2016
34 ITEM NO.1D COURT NO.9 SECTION III (For Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 6223/2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 10187-10188/2016, W.P.(C) No. 64/2012, W.P.(C) No. 848/2013, W.P.(C) No. 385/2014, C.A. No. 6569/2014, T.P.(C) No. 342/2014, T.C.(C) No. 29/2015, W.P.(C) No. 174/2016, W.P.(C) No. 311/2016, C.A. No. 6571/2014, T.C.(C) No. 38/2016, C.A. No. 10186/2016, W.P.(C) No. 698/2016, C.A. No. 10189/2016. Date : 18/10/2016 These matters were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Appellant(s) Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia,Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Ms. Anushree Mishra, Adv. Mr. Kush Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar,Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv. Mr. T. G. Narayanan Nair,Adv. Mr. K.N. Madhusoodhanan, Adv. Mr. K. Raghvacharyulu, Adv. Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv. Mr. Ranjeet Singh, Adv. Ms. Joolie Kataria, Adv. Mr. K. V. Sreekumar,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, SR. Adv.
35 Mr. Rajeev Dubey, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv. Kumar Dushyant Singh,Adv. Mr. Puneet Taneja,Adv. Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv. Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana. “.... We, thus, hold that all these appeals are bereft of any merit. Accordingly, these appeals, along with the writ petitions filed before this Court as also those which are the subject matter of the transfer petition and transfer cases, are dismissed with cost. We, however, make it clear that insofar as objection to the calculation of cess as contained in the show cause notices is concerned, it would be open to the appellants to agitate the same before the adjudicating authorities.” (Ashwani Thakur) (Mala Kumari Sharma ) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6223 OF 2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED .....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S) W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 29105-29106 OF 2011) W.P. (C) NO. 64 OF 2012 W.P. (C) NO. 848 OF 2013 W.P. (C) NO. 385 OF 2014 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6569 OF 2014 T.P. (C) NO. 342 OF 2014 T.C. (C) NO. 29 OF 2015 W.P. (C) NO. 174 OF 2016 W.P. (C) NO. 311 OF 2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6571 OF 2014 T.C. (C) NO. 38 OF 2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26363 OF 2016)
2 W.P. (C) NO. 698 OF 2016 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26330 OF 2016) J U D G M E N T A.K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011, SLP (C) No. 26363 of 2016 and SLP (C) No. 26330 of 2016. Since pure question of law is involved, we allow the transfer petition and transfer cases and also take up, along with these appeals, the writ petitions which were filed before the respective High Courts. 2. These appeals are filed by the appellants challenging the orders passed by different High Courts i.e. High Court of Allahabad, High Court of Orissa, High Court of Madhya Pradesh and High Court of Karnataka. These High Courts, however, are unanimous in their approach and have reached the same conclusion. In all these cases, appellants were issued show cause notices by the concerned authorities under the provisions of the Building And Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'BOCW Act') and Buildings And Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Welfare
3 Cess Act'). They had challenged those notices by filing writ petitions in the High Courts on the ground that the provisions of BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act were not applicable to them because of the reason that they were registered under the Factories Act, 1948. It may be mentioned that at the relevant time no manufacturing operation had commenced by the appellants. In fact, all these appellants were in the process of construction of civil works/factory buildings etc. wherein they had planned to set up their factories. As the process of construction of civil works was undertaken by the appellants wherein construction workers were engaged, the respondent authorities took the view that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts which were meant for construction workers became applicable and the appellants were supposed to pay the cess for the welfare of the said workers engaged in the construction work. The appellants had submitted that Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act which defines 'building or other construction work' specifically states that it does not include any building or construction work to which the provision of the Factories Act, 1948 or the Mines Act, 1952 apply. Since the appellants stood registered under the Factories Act, they were not covered by the definition of building or other construction work as contained in Section 2(d) of the Act and, therefore, said Act was not applicable to them by virtue of Section 1(4) thereof. All the High Courts have negated the aforesaid plea of the appellants on the ground that the
4 appellants would not be covered by the definition of factory defined under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act in the absence of any operations/ manufacturing process and, therefore, mere obtaining a licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act would not suffice and rescue them from their liability to pay cess under the Welfare Cess Act. This is, in nutshell, the subject matter of all these appeals. However, in order to understand the full implication of the issue involved and to answer the said issue, it would be apt to take note of certain facts from one of these appeals. This factual canvass is suitably available in the events that have occurred leading to the filing of Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016. 3. In this appeal, the appellant proposed to set up a 2X600 Megawatt capacity coal-based thermal power project namely “Anpara C” at Anpara in District Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh (“the Project”), pursuant to being selected in a tariff-based competitive bidding initiated by the Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (UPRVUNL) on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (UPPCL). The project consists of two Steam Turbine Generators (STG) each having capacity of 600 MW and two pulverised coal fired steam generators and the balance of plant. The appellant, in respect of the aforesaid project, made an application to the Director of Factories, Uttar Pradesh, submitting the layout/drawings of the proposed plants and requesting for registration of the project as a
5 factory under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Uttar Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950. The appellant was granted registration and licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with Uttar Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950 for the said Project, as a factory. Respondent No. 1 notified the Uttar Pradesh Building and other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2009 (for short 'BOCW Rules') on 04.02.2009. Immediately thereafter, the appellant received a notice of even date issued by respondent No. 2, intimating that the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh had directed that “establishments” engaged in construction activities were required to get themselves registered under the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules. Simultaneously, a letter of even date was also received from the District Collector, Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh, calling upon the appellant to get itself/its contractors registered under the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules. The appellant, vide its letter of even date, replied to the aforesaid communication dated 19.04.2010 of the District Collector, Sonebhadra, stating that the appellant was undertaking the construction activity of the Project under the provisions of the Factories Act and as such, in view of Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act, the Project was exempted from the application of the BOCW Act, and consequently the Welfare Cess Act and BOCW Rules inasmuch as the provisions of
6 the Factories Act apply to the Project. 4. The respondents were not satisfied with the aforesaid stand taken by the appellant. Thus, show cause notice dated 17.02.2011 was issued by respondent No. 2 as to why action be not taken against the appellant for failing to get itself registered under BOCW Act. It was followed by another notice of even date stating that the appellant had not furnished requisite information relating to construction activities undertaken by it as required under Section 4 of the Welfare Cess Act read with Rule 6 of the Welfare Cess Rules. Some more notices were issued to the similar effect with regard to the construction activities in respect of the township in Anpara, undertaken by the appellant. Insofar as township is concerned, appellant got itself registered through its principal contractors under Welfare Cess Act and started paying the cess. However, in respect of construction activity and factory premises, the appellant reiterated its stand that by virtue of Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act, it was excluded from the coverage thereof. The contention of the appellant was rejected by the respondents which led to issuance of further notices demanding cess. 5. At this juncture, the appellant filed the writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging the validity of notices dated 14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011 demanding payment of cess, on the following grounds:
7 (i) That the appellant is not amenable to assessment of liability under the Welfare Cess Act inasmuch as the Factories Act is applicable to the Project, and the Project is as such, exempt from the applicability of the said Act by virtue of the exclusionary cause contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act. (ii) That respondent No. 2, vide impugned notice dated 02.04.2011, was proceeding to calculate the alleged cess payable by the appellant on the basis of the cost of the Project, and not on the cost of construction of the said Project, whereas under the scheme of the Cess Act, cess is payable only on the cost of construction incurred annually, and not on the entire project cost, which includes several other components apart from civil construction works. 6. The respondents filed their counter affidavit contesting the petition. After hearing, the writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide judgment dated 28.04.2015, gist whereof has already been taken note of above. 7. Emphatic submissions were made by Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing in some of these appeals, questioning the approach and conclusion reached by the High Court. Other senior counsel Mr. Gaurab Banerji and Mr. Akhil Sibal supplemented those submissions
8 lending their candour thereto. These submissions were further supplemented by M/s. Prashant Shukla, Arunabh Chowdhury and K. Raghava Charyulu, Advocates. It may not be necessary to take note of individual submissions made by these counsel. Instead, for the sake of brevity, we are reproducing the submissions of these counsel in consolidated form hereinafter. 8. These counsel have led two prong attacks on the demands raised by the respondents for payment of cess under BOCW Act read with Welfare Cess Act, which is as under: i) In the first instance, it is argued that BOCW Act does not apply to those undertakings which are registered under the Factories Act. To support this submission, emphasis was laid on the definition of “building or other construction work” as contained in Section 2(1)(d) of BOCW Act, which reads as under: “ Section 2(1)(d) : “ building or other construction work” means the construction, alternation, repairs, maintenance or demolition of or, in relation to, buildings, streets, roads, railways, tramways, airfields, irrigation, drainage, embankment and navigation works, flood control works (including storm water drainage works), generation, transmission and distribution of power, water works (including channels for distribution of water), oil and gas installations, electric lines, wireless, radio, television, telephone, telegraph and overseas communication dams, canals, reservoirs, watercourses, tunnels, bridges, viaducts, aquaducts, pipelines, towers, cooling towers, transmission towers and such other work as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, by notification but does not
9 include any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), or the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), apply. (emphasis added)” (ii) Second submission, which in fact flows from first submission noted above, was that the approach of the High Court in dealing with the matter was contrary to law. In this behalf, it was pointed out that the High Court has rejected the case of the appellants herein on the ground that even if the appellants had obtained a licence under the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, the appellants were still not excluded from the provisions of Welfare Cess Act as no manufacturing process or factory operation had started by the appellants and, therefore, appellants did not answer the description of 'factory' within the meaning of Factories Act. As per the High Court, since the appellants had only undertaken the process of construction of premises which are to be ultimately used as factories, and since such power project has not started and there was no operation for which the licence was obtained under the Factories Act till the production commences, it could not be said that “factory” has come into existence and, therefore, the appellants were not entitled to take advantage of mere registration under the Factories Act. Dubbing the aforesaid approach as erroneous, it was the argument of the appellants that the High Court ignored the pertinent aspect that even when the building was under construction, the establishments
10 which were covered by the Factories Act stood excluded by virtue of definition contained in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act which pertained to construction of building and, therefore, specifically covered the stage of construction itself. It was argued that matter should have been seen from that angle. Advancing this argument further, it was also submitted that the Legislature is alive to the fact that the factory is not running at the stage when building or other construction work is going on. However, it still chose to exclude those buildings or other construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act apply. 9. Expanding the aforesaid submissions, the appellants even gave the rationale in couching the definition of Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act in that specific manner by submitting that once the provisions of Factories Act apply, all the benefits which are admissible to the workers under the BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are granted under the Factories Act as well. This submission was buttressed by pointing out the provisions/conditions stipulated while granting the permission under the Factories Act. It was submitted that the safety measures and facilities which the appellants were obligated under those conditions were the same as stipulated in BOCW Act. 10. Taking support of interpretative tools to support the aforesaid twin submissions, it was submitted by the counsel for the appellants that
11 Section 2(d) had to be given literal meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity in the said provision and number of judgments were cited in this behalf. Some of those judgments are as under: i) In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others 1 , this Court while interpreting the word 'means' observed that if the definition has used the word 'means', it shall include certain things or acts and the definition has used the word 'means', it shall include certain things or acts and the definition is a hard-and-fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition. This Court further observed that if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the law. This Court after making reference to its judgment in B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi 2 observed that “the Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense”. It was further observed that “the cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, 1 (1990) 3 SCC 682 2 (1979) 1 SCC 361
12 natural and grammatical meaning.” ii) In Shri Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla and another v. Shri A.D. Divelkar and others 3 , it was held that “there is no doubt that when the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, we must look into that dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute. We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the legislature; our task is to get at the intention as expressed in the statute”. iii) In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries 4 , the Court pointed out that “there is no doubt that beneficial legislations should have liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own there is no warrant for the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered by the scheme”. iv) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and Others 5 , this Court, while interpreting the provisions that fell for consideration, made the following observations in paragraph 13: “ 13. …. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it 3 1957 SCR 121 4 (1985) 1 SCC 218 5 (2001) 7 SCC 71
13 intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.” v) In Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and another 6 , this Court explained as to how to interpret the provisions of an enactment in the following words: “ ... when the words used in a statute are capable of only one meaning. In such a situation, the courts have been hesitant to apply the rule of benevolent construction. But if it is found that the words used in the statute give rise to more than one meaning, in such circumstances, the courts are not precluded from applying such rule of construction. The third situation is when there is no ambiguity in a provision of a statute so construed. If the provision of a statute is plain, unambiguous and does not give rise to any doubt, in such circumstances the rule of benevolent construction has no application.” vi) Similarly in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay 7 , the Constitution Bench of this Court explained the principle of literal interpretation as under: “ 10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting 6 (2001) 8 SCC 24 7 (2002) 4 SCC 297
14 any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating ( sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1 : 4 MIA 179] “we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747], Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312] and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India [(2002) 3 SCC 722 : JT (2002) 3 SC 21])” vii) In Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda 8 , while interpreting the provisions that fell for consideration, the principle was applied even in the context of beneficial legislation, when the language was plain, depicting clear intention of the legislature, in the following terms: “ 53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its 8 (2004) 5 SCC 385
15 own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. (See Regional Director, ESI Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries [(1985) 1 SCC 218 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 213 : AIR 1985 SC 278]).” Relying upon all the aforesaid judgments, the forceful exhortation was to follow this literal construction while interpreting Section 2(d) of BOCW Act in the manner appellants suggested to us. 11. Mr. Rana and Mr. Srivastava countered the aforesaid submissions giving equally salubrious response. Their fervent plea was that the view taken by the High Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 2(d) of BOCW Act was perfectly justified and any other interpretation as suggested by the appellants would defeat the very purpose of these Acts. It was argued that mere registration under the Factories Act would be of no consequence inasmuch as definition of 'factory' contained in Section 2(m) of the Act unambiguously suggest that the provisions of the said Act would apply only when manufacturing process is actually carried on. It was further submitted that the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act does not include construction workers and, therefore, construction workers would not be entitled to various benefits which are contained in different provisions of the Factories Act. It is for this reason at the stage of construction of the building, which is to be ultimately used as a factory, the provisions of BOCW Act would be applied. It was also
16 emphasised that while interpreting the provisions of these two Acts, “superior purpose” behind therein had to be kept in mind and this enactment which is for the welfare of the weaker section, i.e. workers of unorganised sector, had to be liberally construed by giving that construction which accords them the benefit eschewing the other approach which would preclude them from getting the benefit under the Acts. In this hue, the learned counsel strongly urged upon this Court to invoke the principle of purposive interpretation, which is in vogue, to do complete justice in the matter. It was also argued that exclusion provision contained in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act had to be construed narrowly as per the settled proposition of law. 12. We have bestowed our due and serious consideration to the submissions made of both sides, which these submissions deserve. The central issue is the meaning that is to be assigned to the language of Section 2(d) of the Act, particularly that part which is exclusionary in nature, i.e. which excludes such building and construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act apply. Before coming to the grip of this central issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to the objectives with which the Factories Act and BOCW Act were enacted, as that would be the guiding path to answer the core issue delineated above. 13. Insofar as Factories Act is concerned, its Preamble mentions that it is an
17 Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is enacted primarily with the object of protecting workers employed in factories against industrial and occupational hazards. For that purpose it seeks to impose upon the owners or occupiers certain obligations to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure for them employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. This Act also requires that the workers should work in healthy and sanitary conditions and for that purpose it provides that precautions should be taken for the safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Incidental provisions in Factories Act are made for securing information necessary to ensure that the objects are carried out and the State Governments are empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reports and to inspect the prescribed registers with a view to maintain effective supervision. The duty of the employer under this Act is to secure the health and safety of workers and extends to providing adequate plant, machinery and appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises, proper system of working and extends to giving reasonable restrictions. Detailed provisions are, therefore, made in diverse chapters of the Act imposing obligations upon the owners of the factories to maintain inspecting staff and for maintenance of health, cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and provision for amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. Provisions are also made for safety of workers and their
18 welfare, such as restrictions on working hours and on the employment of young persons and females, and grant of annual leave with wages. In Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and another 9 , this Court highlighted the necessity and rationale behind legislating this Act and the objectives which it sought to achieve, in the following manner: “ 9. The Factories Act, as the preamble recites, is an Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. The Act is enacted primarily with the object of protecting workers employed in factories against industrial and occupational hazards. For that purpose it seeks to impose upon the owners or the occupiers certain obligations to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure for them employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. The Act requires that the workers should work in healthy and sanitary conditions and for that purpose it provides that precautions should be taken for the safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Incidental provisions are made for securing information necessary to ensure that the objects are carried out and the State Governments are empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reports and to inspect the prescribed registers with a view to maintain effective supervision. The duty of the employer is to secure the health and safety of workers and extends to providing adequate plant, machinery and appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises, proper system of working and extends to giving reasonable instructions. Detailed provisions are therefore made in diverse chapters of the Act imposing obligations upon the owners of the factories to maintain inspecting staff and for maintenance of health, cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and provision for amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. etc. Provisions are also made for safety of workers and their welfare, such as restrictions on working hours and on the employment of young persons and females, and grant of annual leave with wages. Employment in a manufacturing process was at one time regarded as a matter of contract between the employer and the 9 1964 SCR (1) 860
19 employee and the State was not concerned to impose any duties upon the employer. It is however now recognised that the State has a vital concern in preventing exploitation of labour and in insisting upon proper safeguards for the health and safety of the workers. The Factories Act undoubtedly imposes numerous restrictions upon the employers to secure to the workers adequate safeguards for their health and physical well-being. But imposition of such restrictions is not and cannot be regarded, in the context of the modem outlook on industrial relations, as unreasonable....” 14. Coming to BOCW Act, its Statement of Objects and Reasons, depicting the legislative intent, reads as under: “ (1) It is estimated that about 8.5 million workers in the country are engaged in building and other construction works. Building and other construction workers are one of the most numerous and vulnerable segments of the unorganised labour in India. The building and other construction works are characterized by their inherent risk to the life and limb of the workers. The work is also characterised by its casual nature, temporary relationship between employer and employee, uncertain working hours, lack of basic amenities and inadequacy of welfare facilities. In the absence of adequate statutory provisions, the requisite information regarding the number and nature of accidents is also not forthcoming. In the absence of such information, it is difficult to fix responsibility or to take any corrective action. (2) Although the provisions of certain Central Acts are applicable to the building and other construction workers yet a need has been felt for a comprehensive Central Legislation for regulating their safety, health, welfare and other conditions of service. It had been considered necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the employers on the building and other construction works for ensuring sufficient funds for the Welfare Boards to undertake the social security schemes and welfare measures.” 15. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act itself, it was
20 considered necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the employers while constructing building etc. This led to passing of Welfare Cess Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons behind this Act was to provide for the levy and collection of a cess on the cost of construction incurred by the employers for augmenting the resources of the Building, and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Boards constituted by the State Governments under the Building and Other Construction Workers' (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1995. 16. Scheme of BOCW Act came up for consideration by this Court in the Dewan Chand Builders and Contractors v. Union of India and Others 10 . Recognising that the noble purpose behind the said Act is to ensure welfare of the building and construction workers in order to provide basic human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court observed as under: “ 10. It is thus clear from the scheme of the BOCW Act that its sole aim is the welfare of building and construction workers, directly relatable to their constitutionally recognised right to live with basic human dignity, enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It envisages a network of authorities at the Central and State levels to ensure that the benefit of the legislation is made available 'to every building and construction worker, by constituting Welfare Boards and clothing them with sufficient powers to ensure enforcement of the primary purpose of the BOCW Act. The means of generating revenues for making effective the welfare provisions of the BOCW Act is through the 10 (2012) 1 SCC 101
21 Cess Act, which is questioned in these appeals as unconstitutional. xx xx xx 17. It is manifest from the overarching schemes of the BOCW Act, the Cess Act and the Rules made thereunder that their sole object is to regulate the employment and conditions of service of building and other construction workers, traditionally exploited sections in the society and to provide for their safety, health and other welfare measures. The BOCW Act and the Cess Act break new ground in that, the liability to pay cess falls not only on the owner of a building or establishment, but under Section 2(1)(i)(iii) of the BOCW Act “ in relation to a building or other construction work carried on by or through a contractor, or by the employment of building workers supplied by a contractor, the contractor”; The extension of the liability on to the contractor is with a view to ensure that, if for any reason it is not possible to collect cess from the owner of the building at a stage subsequent to the completion of the construction, it can be recovered from the contractor. The Cess Act and the Cess Rules ensure that the cess is collected at source from the bills of the contractors to whom payments are made by the owner. In short, the burden of cess is passed on from the owner to the contractor.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Keeping in view the aforesaid objective of the respective Acts, we now deal with the scope and ambit of Section 2(d) of BOCW Act. As noticed above, one of the submissions of the appellants is that literal interpretation needs to be given to the said provision as it categorically excludes those building or construction work to which Factories Act apply. In this very hue, it is argued that as the benefit under the Factories Act are already given to the construction workers who are
22 involved in the construction work, there is no need for covering the construction workers who are engaged in building or construction work of the appellants under BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act. 18. Before dealing with the argument predicated on literal construction, we would like to deal with the second aspect as the answer to that would facilitate the answer to this aspect as well. Section 2(m) of the Factories Act defines 'factory' in the following manner: “ (m) "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) Whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of [the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952)] or [a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place]. [ Explanation [ I ] - For computing the number of workers for the purposes of this clause all the workers in [different groups and relays] in a day shall be taken into account;] [Explanation II - For the purposes of this clause, the mere fact that an Electronic Data Processing Unit or a Computer Unit is installed in any premises or part thereof, shall not be construed to make it a factory if no manufacturing process is being carried on in such premises or part thereof;]...”
23 19. Section 2(k) of the Factories Act defines 'manufacturing process' in the following manner: (k) "manufacturing process" means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) [pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or] (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) [composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding;] [or] (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels;[or] (vi) [preserving or storing any article in cold storage;] 20. It is also necessary to take note of the definition of 'worker', which is contained in Section 2(l) of the Factories Act. It reads as under: (l) "worker" means a person 8[employed, directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not], in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process 7[but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union]; 21. On the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that “factory” is that establishment where manufacturing process is carried
24 on with or without the aid of power. Carrying on this manufacturing process or manufacturing activity is thus a prerequisite. It is equally pertinent to note that it covers only those workers who are engaged in the said manufacturing process. Insofar as these appellants are concerned, construction of building is not their business activity or manufacturing process. In fact, the building is being constructed for carrying out the particular manufacturing process, which, in most of these appeals, is generation, transmission and distribution of power. Obviously, the workers who are engaged in construction of the building also do not fall within the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act. On these two aspects there is no cleavage and both parties are at ad idem . What follows is that these construction workers are not covered by the provisions of the Factories Act. 22. Having regard to the above, if the contention of the appellants is accepted, the construction workers engaged in the construction of building undertaken by the appellants which is to be used ultimately as factory, would stand excluded from the provisions of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act as well. Could this be the intention while providing the definition of 'building and other construction work' in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act? Clear answer to this has to be in the negative. 23. We may mention at this stage that High Court is right in observing that
25 merely because the appellants have obtained a licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, it would not follow therefrom that they answer the description of the “factory” within the meaning of the Factories Act. We have reproduced the definition of 'factory' and a bare reading thereof makes it abundantly clear that before this stage, when construction of the project is completed and the manufacturing process starts, 'factory' within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Factories Act does not come into existence so as to be covered by the said Act. 24. We now advert to the core issue touching upon the construction of Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act. The argument of the appellants is that language thereof is unambiguous and literal construction is to be accorded to find the legislative intent. To our mind, this submission is of no avail. Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act dealing with the building or construction work is in three parts. In the first part, different activities are mentioned which are to be covered by the said expression, namely, construction, alterations, repairs, maintenance or demolition. Second part of the definition is aimed at those buildings or works in relation to which the aforesaid activities are carried out. The third part of the definition contains exclusion clause by stipulating that it does not include 'any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), or the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952),
26 applies'. Thus, first part of the definition contains the nature of activity; second part contains the subject matter in relation to which the activity is carried out and third part excludes those building or other construction work to which the provisions of Factories Act or Mines Act apply. 25. It is not in dispute that construction of the projects of the appellants is covered by the definition of “building or other construction work” as it satisfies first two elements of the definition pointed out above. In order to see whether exclusion clause applies, we need to interpret the words 'but does not include any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act …......... apply' . The question is as to whether the provisions of the Factories Act apply to the construction of building/project of the appellants. We are of the firm opinion that they do not apply. The provisions of the Factories Act would “apply” only when the manufacturing process starts for which the building/project is being constructed and not to the activity of construction of the project. That is how the exclusion clause is to be interpreted and that would be the plain meaning of the said clause. This meaning to the exclusion clause ascribed by us is in tune with the approach adopted by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India 11 . Two separate, but concurring, opinions were given by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice A.P. Sen, and we reproduce here 11 (1979) 4 SCC 573
27 below some excerpts from both opinions: “ Justice A.P. Sen (para 23) Each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of general purpose of the Act itself. A bare mechanical interpretation of the words 'devoid of concept or purpose' will reduce much of legislation to futility. It is a salutary rule, well established, that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (para 241) A policy-oriented interpretation, when a welfare legislation falls for determination, especially in the context of a developing country, is sanctioned by principle and precedent and is implicit in Article 37 of the Constitution since the judicial branch is, in a sense, part of the State. So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfilling meaning.” 26. The aforesaid meaning attributed to the exclusion clause of the definition is also in consonance with the objective and purpose which is sought to be achieved by the enactment of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act. As pointed out above, if the construction of this provision as suggested by the appellants is accepted, the construction workers who are engaged in the construction of buildings/projects will neither get the benefit of the Factories Act nor of BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature. BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are pieces of social security legislation to provide for certain benefits to the construction workers. 27. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an
28 imperative, irrespective of anything else. This is so eloquently brought out in the following passage in the case of Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia 12 : “ 9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. (emphasis by the court) See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st Edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274 : 1953 SCR 677 : 1953 Cri LJ 1105: (1953) 4 STC 188] said that each word, phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must be construed with imagination of purpose behind them said Judge Learned Hand, a long time ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are concerned with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislature has used and the true meaning of what words [ Ed. : Lord Reid in the aforecited case had observed: (All ER p. 814) “We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but this is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said.”] as was said by Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G [1975 AC 591, 613 : (1975) 1 All ER 810: (1975) 2 WLR 513] . We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law.” 28. How labour legislations are to be interpreted has been stated and restated by this Court time and again. In M.P. Mineral Industry 12 (1988) 4 SCC 284
29 Association v. Regional Labour Commr. (Central) 13 , this Court while dealing with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed that this Act is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen employed the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them, and so in construing the said provisions the court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction. In Surendra Kumar Verma v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal 14 , this Court reminded that semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. 29. We would also like to reproduce a passage from Workmen of American Express v. Management of American Express 15 , which provides complete answer to the argument of the appellants based on literal construction: “ 4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. 13 AIR 1960 SC 1068 14 (1980) 4 SCC 443 15 (1985) 4 SCC 71
30 Judges ought to be more concerned with the “colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds [(1971) 3 All ER 237] ). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations...” 30. In equal measure is the message contained in Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 16 : “ 21. The law is not “a brooding omnipotence in the sky” but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate...” 31. The sentiments were echoed in Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Anr. 17 in the following words: “ 20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge which would defeat the provisions of social legislation and the courts must even, if necessary, strain the language of the Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act, therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to promote its objects. 16 (1975) 2 SCC 791 17 (2009) 9 SCC 61
31 32. In taking the aforesaid view, we also agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that 'superior purpose' contained in BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments – the Factories Act on the one hand and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act on the other hand, are involved, both of which are welfare legislations. (See Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank 18 , which has been followed in Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v. M/s. Haryana Concast Limited & Anr. 19 in the context of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 1956. Here the concept of 'felt necessity' would get triggered and as per the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in BOCW Act, since the purpose of this Act is to take care of a particular necessity i.e. welfare of unorganised labour class involved in construction activity, that needs to be achieved and not to be discarded. Here the doctrine of Purposive Interpretation also gets attracted which is explained in recent judgments of this Court in Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others 20 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla 21 . 33. We are left to deal with the argument of the appellants that while 18 (2000) 4 SCC 406 19 2016 (1) SCALE 1 20 (2016) 4 SCC 179 at Page No. 197 21 (2016) 3 SCC 619 – Para 31
32 granting permission under the Factories Act, various conditions are imposed which the appellants are required to fulfill and these conditions are almost the same which are contained in BOCW Act. We are not convinced with this submission either. It is already held that provisions of Factories Act are not applicable to these construction workers. Registration under the Factories Act becomes necessary in view of provisions contained in Section 6 of the said Act as this Section requires taking of approval and registration of factories even at preparatory stage i.e. at the stage when the premises where factory is to operate has to ensure that construction will be done in such a manner that it takes care of safety measures etc. which are provided in the Factories Act. This means to ensure that construction is carried out in such a manner that provisions in the Factories Act to ensure health, safety and provisions relating to hazardous process as well as welfare measures are taken care of. It is for this reason that even after the building is completed before it is occupied, notice under Section 7 is to be given by the occupier to the Chief Inspector of Factories so that a necessary inspection is carried out to verify that all such measures are in place. Therefore, when the permissions for construction of factories is given, the purpose is altogether different. 34. It is stated at the cost of repetition that construction workers are not covered by the Factories Act and, therefore, welfare measures
33 specifically provided for such workers under the BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act cannot be denied. 35. We, thus, hold that all these appeals are bereft of any merit. Accordingly, these appeals, along with the writ petitions filed before this Court as also those which are the subject matter of the transfer petition and transfer cases, are dismissed with cost. We, however, make it clear that insofar as objection to the calculation of cess as contained in the show cause notices is concerned, it would be open to the appellants to agitate the same before the adjudicating authorities. No costs. .............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI) .............................................J. (N.V. RAMANA) NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 18, 2016
Jò1REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 6223 OF 2016LANCO ANPARA POWER LIMITED .....APPELLANT(S)VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)W I T HCIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 29105-29106 OF 2011)W.P. (C) NO. 64 OF 2012W.P. (C) NO. 848 OF 2013W.P. (C) NO. 385 OF 2014CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6569 OF 2014T.P. (C) NO. 342 OF 2014T.C. (C) NO. 29 OF 2015W.P. (C) NO. 174 OF 2016W.P. (C) NO. 311 OF 2016CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6571 OF 2014T.C. (C) NO. 38 OF 2016CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26363 OF 2016)2W.P. (C) NO. 698 OF 2016ANDCIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2016(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26330 OF 2016)J U D G M E N TA.K. SIKRI, J.Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011, SLP (C) No.26363 of 2016 and SLP (C) No. 26330 of 2016. Since pure question oflaw is involved, we allow the transfer petition and transfer cases andalso take up, along with these appeals, the writ petitions which werefiled before the respective High Courts.2. These appeals are filed by the appellants challenging the orders passedby different High Courts i.e. High Court of Allahabad, High Court ofOrissa, High Court of Madhya Pradesh and High Court of Karnataka.These High Courts, however, are unanimous in their approach and havereached the same conclusion. In all these cases, appellants wereissued show cause notices by the concerned authorities under theprovisions of the Building And Other Construction Workers (Regulationof Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (hereinafterreferred to as 'BOCW Act') and Buildings And Other ConstructionWorkers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Welfare3Cess Act'). They had challenged those notices by filing writ petitions inthe High Courts on the ground that the provisions of BOCW Act orWelfare Cess Act were not applicable to them because of the reasonthat they were registered under the Factories Act, 1948. It may bementioned that at the relevant time no manufacturing operation hadcommenced by the appellants. In fact, all these appellants were in theprocess of construction of civil works/factory buildings etc. wherein theyhad planned to set up their factories. As the process of construction ofcivil works was undertaken by the appellants wherein constructionworkers were engaged, the respondent authorities took the view that theprovisions of the aforesaid Acts which were meant for constructionworkers became applicable and the appellants were supposed to paythe cess for the welfare of the said workers engaged in the constructionwork. The appellants had submitted that Section 2(d) of the BOCW Actwhich defines 'building or other construction work' specifically states thatit does not include any building or construction work to which theprovision of the Factories Act, 1948 or the Mines Act, 1952 apply. Sincethe appellants stood registered under the Factories Act, they were notcovered by the definition of building or other construction work ascontained in Section 2(d) of the Act and, therefore, said Act was notapplicable to them by virtue of Section 1(4) thereof. All the High Courts
have negated the aforesaid plea of the appellants on the ground that the4appellants would not be covered by the definition of factory definedunder Section 2(m) of the Factories Act in the absence of anyoperations/ manufacturing process and, therefore, mere obtaining alicence under Section 6 of the Factories Act would not suffice andrescue them from their liability to pay cess under the Welfare Cess Act.This is, in nutshell, the subject matter of all these appeals. However, inorder to understand the full implication of the issue involved and toanswer the said issue, it would be apt to take note of certain facts fromone of these appeals. This factual canvass is suitably available in theevents that have occurred leading to the filing of Civil Appeal No.6223/2016.3. In this appeal, the appellant proposed to set up a 2X600 Megawattcapacity coal-based thermal power project namely ⬠SAnpara C⬠\235 at Anparain District Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh (⬠Sthe Project⬠\235), pursuant to beingselected in a tariff-based competitive bidding initiated by the UttarPradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (UPRVUNL) on behalf of theUttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (UPPCL). The project consists oftwo Steam Turbine Generators (STG) each having capacity of 600 MWand two pulverised coal fired steam generators and the balance of plant.The appellant, in respect of the aforesaid project, made an application tothe Director of Factories, Uttar Pradesh, submitting the layout/drawingsof the proposed plants and requesting for registration of the project as a5factory under the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the UttarPradesh Factories Rules, 1950. The appellant was granted registrationand licence under Section 6 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with UttarPradesh Factories Rules, 1950 for the said Project, as a factory.Respondent No. 1 notified the Uttar Pradesh Building and otherConstruction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions ofService) Rules, 2009 (for short 'BOCW Rules') on 04.02.2009.Immediately thereafter, the appellant received a notice of even dateissued by respondent No. 2, intimating that the Chief Secretary,Government of Uttar Pradesh had directed that ⬠Sestablishments⬠\235engaged in construction activities were required to get themselvesregistered under the provisions of the BOCW Act and the BOCW Rules.Simultaneously, a letter of even date was also received from the DistrictCollector, Sonebhadra, Uttar Pradesh, calling upon the appellant to getitself/its contractors registered under the provisions of the BOCW Actand the BOCW Rules. The appellant, vide its letter of even date, repliedto the aforesaid communication dated 19.04.2010 of the DistrictCollector, Sonebhadra, stating that the appellant was undertaking theconstruction activity of the Project under the provisions of the FactoriesAct and as such, in view of Section 2(1)(d) of the BOCW Act, the Projectwas exempted from the application of the BOCW Act, and consequentlythe Welfare Cess Act and BOCW Rules inasmuch as the provisions of6the Factories Act apply to the Project. 4. The respondents were not satisfied with the aforesaid stand taken by theappellant. Thus, show cause notice dated 17.02.2011 was issued byrespondent No. 2 as to why action be not taken against the appellant forfailing to get itself registered under BOCW Act. It was followed byanother notice of even date stating that the appellant had not furnishedrequisite information relating to construction activities undertaken by itas required under Section 4 of the Welfare Cess Act read with Rule 6 ofthe Welfare Cess Rules. Some more notices were issued to the similareffect with regard to the construction activities in respect of the townshipin Anpara, undertaken by the appellant. Insofar as township isconcerned, appellant got itself registered through its principalcontractors under Welfare Cess Act and started paying the cess.However, in respect of construction activity and factory premises, theappellant reiterated its stand that by virtue of Section 2(1)(d) of theBOCW Act, it was excluded from the coverage thereof. The contentionof the appellant was rejected by the respondents which led to issuanceof further notices demanding cess.
5. At this juncture, the appellant filed the writ petition in the High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad challenging the validity of notices dated14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011 demanding payment of cess, on thefollowing grounds:7(i) That the appellant is not amenable to assessment of liability underthe Welfare Cess Act inasmuch as the Factories Act is applicable to theProject, and the Project is as such, exempt from the applicability of thesaid Act by virtue of the exclusionary cause contained in Section 2(1)(d)of the BOCW Act.(ii) That respondent No. 2, vide impugned notice dated 02.04.2011,was proceeding to calculate the alleged cess payable by the appellanton the basis of the cost of the Project, and not on the cost ofconstruction of the said Project, whereas under the scheme of the CessAct, cess is payable only on the cost of construction incurred annually,and not on the entire project cost, which includes several othercomponents apart from civil construction works. 6. The respondents filed their counter affidavit contesting the petition. Afterhearing, the writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court videjudgment dated 28.04.2015, gist whereof has already been taken noteof above.7. Emphatic submissions were made by Mr. Sundaram, learned seniorcounsel appearing in some of these appeals, questioning the approachand conclusion reached by the High Court. Other senior counsel Mr.Gaurab Banerji and Mr. Akhil Sibal supplemented those submissions8lending their candour thereto. These submissions were furthersupplemented by M/s. Prashant Shukla, Arunabh Chowdhury and K.Raghava Charyulu, Advocates. It may not be necessary to take note ofindividual submissions made by these counsel. Instead, for the sake ofbrevity, we are reproducing the submissions of these counsel inconsolidated form hereinafter.8. These counsel have led two prong attacks on the demands raised by therespondents for payment of cess under BOCW Act read with WelfareCess Act, which is as under:i) In the first instance, it is argued that BOCW Act does not apply tothose undertakings which are registered under the Factories Act. Tosupport this submission, emphasis was laid on the definition of ⬠Sbuildingor other construction work⬠\235 as contained in Section 2(1)(d) of BOCWAct, which reads as under: ⬠S Section 2(1)(d) : ⬠S building or other construction work⬠\235means the construction, alternation, repairs,maintenance or demolition of or, in relation to, buildings,streets, roads, railways, tramways, airfields, irrigation,drainage, embankment and navigation works, floodcontrol works (including storm water drainage works),generation, transmission and distribution of power,water works (including channels for distribution ofwater), oil and gas installations, electric lines, wireless,radio, television, telephone, telegraph and overseascommunication dams, canals, reservoirs, watercourses,tunnels, bridges, viaducts, aquaducts, pipelines, towers,cooling towers, transmission towers and such otherwork as may be specified in this behalf by theappropriate Government, by notification but does not9include any building or other construction work to whichthe provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), orthe Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), apply.(emphasis added)⬠\235(ii) Second submission, which in fact flows from first submission notedabove, was that the approach of the High Court in dealing with thematter was contrary to law. In this behalf, it was pointed out that theHigh Court has rejected the case of the appellants herein on the ground
that even if the appellants had obtained a licence under the FactoriesAct for registration to work a factory, the appellants were still notexcluded from the provisions of Welfare Cess Act as no manufacturingprocess or factory operation had started by the appellants and,therefore, appellants did not answer the description of 'factory' within themeaning of Factories Act. As per the High Court, since the appellantshad only undertaken the process of construction of premises which areto be ultimately used as factories, and since such power project has notstarted and there was no operation for which the licence was obtainedunder the Factories Act till the production commences, it could not besaid that ⬠Sfactory⬠\235 has come into existence and, therefore, the appellantswere not entitled to take advantage of mere registration under theFactories Act.Dubbing the aforesaid approach as erroneous, it was the argumentof the appellants that the High Court ignored the pertinent aspect thateven when the building was under construction, the establishments10which were covered by the Factories Act stood excluded by virtue ofdefinition contained in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act which pertained toconstruction of building and, therefore, specifically covered the stage ofconstruction itself. It was argued that matter should have been seenfrom that angle. Advancing this argument further, it was also submittedthat the Legislature is alive to the fact that the factory is not running atthe stage when building or other construction work is going on.However, it still chose to exclude those buildings or other constructionwork to which the provisions of Factories Act apply. 9. Expanding the aforesaid submissions, the appellants even gave therationale in couching the definition of Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act inthat specific manner by submitting that once the provisions of FactoriesAct apply, all the benefits which are admissible to the workers under theBOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are granted under the Factories Act aswell. This submission was buttressed by pointing out theprovisions/conditions stipulated while granting the permission under theFactories Act. It was submitted that the safety measures and facilitieswhich the appellants were obligated under those conditions were thesame as stipulated in BOCW Act.10. Taking support of interpretative tools to support the aforesaid twinsubmissions, it was submitted by the counsel for the appellants that11Section 2(d) had to be given literal meaning, in the absence of anyambiguity in the said provision and number of judgments were cited inthis behalf. Some of those judgments are as under:i) In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd.,Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh andOthers 1, this Court while interpreting the word 'means' observed that ifthe definition has used the word 'means', it shall include certain things oracts and the definition has used the word 'means', it shall include certainthings or acts and the definition is a hard-and-fast definition and no othermeaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down indefinition. This Court further observed that if the words of the statute arein themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can benecessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinarysense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare theintention of the law. This Court after making reference to its judgment inB.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi 2 observed that ⬠Sthe Court has to determine theintention as expressed by the words used. If the words of a statute arethemselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessarythan to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense⬠\235. It wasfurther observed that ⬠Sthe cardinal rule of construction of statute is toread statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary,1(1990) 3 SCC 6822(1979) 1 SCC 361
12natural and grammatical meaning.⬠\235ii) In Shri Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla and another v. ShriA.D. Divelkar and others 3, it was held that ⬠Sthere is no doubt that whenthe Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, we must look intothat dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute.We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the legislature;our task is to get at the intention as expressed in the statute⬠\235.iii) In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation,Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries 4, the Court pointed out that⬠Sthere is no doubt that beneficial legislations should have liberalconstruction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but wheresuch beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own there is no warrantfor the Court to travel beyond the scheme and extend the scope of thestatute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who arenot covered by the scheme⬠\235.iv) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu and Others 5, thisCourt, while interpreting the provisions that fell for consideration, madethe following observations in paragraph 13:⬠S 13. ⬠¦. The settled principles of interpretation are thatthe court must proceed on the assumption that thelegislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it31957 SCR 1214(1985) 1 SCC 2185(2001) 7 SCC 7113intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopta construction which will carry out the obvious intentionof the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or anomission in the words used by the legislature, the courtwould not go to its aid to correct or make up thedeficiency. The court could not add words to a statute orread words into it which are not there, especially whenthe literal reading produces an intelligible result. Thecourt cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing ofan Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make updeficiencies which are there.⬠\235v) In Shyam Sunder and others v. Ram Kumar and another 6, this Courtexplained as to how to interpret the provisions of an enactment in thefollowing words:⬠S ... when the words used in a statute are capable of onlyone meaning. In such a situation, the courts have beenhesitant to apply the rule of benevolent construction. Butif it is found that the words used in the statute give riseto more than one meaning, in such circumstances, thecourts are not precluded from applying such rule ofconstruction. The third situation is when there is noambiguity in a provision of a statute so construed. If theprovision of a statute is plain, unambiguous and doesnot give rise to any doubt, in such circumstances therule of benevolent construction has no application.⬠\235vi) Similarly in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,Bombay 7, the Constitution Bench of this Court explained the principle ofliteral interpretation as under:⬠S 10. No words or expressions used in any statute canbe said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters ofinterpretation one should not concentrate too much onone word and pay too little attention to other words. Noprovision in the statute and no word in any section can
be construed in isolation. Every provision and everyword must be looked at generally and in the context inwhich it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict ofthe legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting6(2001) 8 SCC 247(2002) 4 SCC 29714any word while considering a statute is to gather themens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where thewords are clear and there is no obscurity, and there isno ambiguity and the intention of the legislature isclearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to takeupon itself the task of amending or alternating( sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever thelanguage is clear the intention of the legislature is to begathered from the language used. While doing so, whathas been said in the statute as also what has not beensaid has to be noted. The construction which requiresfor its support addition or substitution of words or whichresults in rejection of words has to be avoided. Asstated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner[(1846) 6 Moore PC 1 : 4 MIA 179] ⬠Swe cannot aid thelegislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot addor mend and, by construction make up deficiencieswhich are left there⬠\235. In case of an ordinary word thereshould be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase ofgeneral application. Attention should be confined to whatis necessary for deciding the particular case. Thisprinciple is too well settled and reference to a fewdecisions of this Court would suffice. (See: GwaliorRayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of VestedForests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747],Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp(1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219: AIR 1992 SC 96] , Institute of Chartered Accountants ofIndia v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312] andHarbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India [(2002) 3SCC 722 : JT (2002) 3 SC 21])⬠\235vii) In Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd., Baroda 8, while interpreting the provisions that fell forconsideration, the principle was applied even in the context of beneficiallegislation, when the language was plain, depicting clear intention of thelegislature, in the following terms:⬠S 53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus,deserves liberal construction with a view toimplementing the legislative intent but it is trite thatwhere such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its8(2004) 5 SCC 38515own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, thecourt would not travel beyond the same and extend thescope of the statute on the pretext of extending thestatutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby.(See Regional Director, ESI Corpn. v. Ramanuja MatchIndustries [(1985) 1 SCC 218 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 213 :AIR 1985 SC 278]).⬠\235Relying upon all the aforesaid judgments, the forceful exhortationwas to follow this literal construction while interpreting Section 2(d) ofBOCW Act in the manner appellants suggested to us.11. Mr. Rana and Mr. Srivastava countered the aforesaid submissions givingequally salubrious response. Their fervent plea was that the view takenby the High Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 2(d) ofBOCW Act was perfectly justified and any other interpretation as
suggested by the appellants would defeat the very purpose of theseActs. It was argued that mere registration under the Factories Act wouldbe of no consequence inasmuch as definition of 'factory' contained inSection 2(m) of the Act unambiguously suggest that the provisions of thesaid Act would apply only when manufacturing process is actuallycarried on. It was further submitted that the definition of 'worker' underthe Factories Act does not include construction workers and, therefore,construction workers would not be entitled to various benefits which arecontained in different provisions of the Factories Act. It is for this reasonat the stage of construction of the building, which is to be ultimately usedas a factory, the provisions of BOCW Act would be applied. It was also16emphasised that while interpreting the provisions of these two Acts,⬠Ssuperior purpose⬠\235 behind therein had to be kept in mind and thisenactment which is for the welfare of the weaker section, i.e. workers ofunorganised sector, had to be liberally construed by giving thatconstruction which accords them the benefit eschewing the otherapproach which would preclude them from getting the benefit under theActs. In this hue, the learned counsel strongly urged upon this Court toinvoke the principle of purposive interpretation, which is in vogue, to docomplete justice in the matter. It was also argued that exclusionprovision contained in Section 2(d) of BOCW Act had to be construednarrowly as per the settled proposition of law. 12. We have bestowed our due and serious consideration to thesubmissions made of both sides, which these submissions deserve.The central issue is the meaning that is to be assigned to the languageof Section 2(d) of the Act, particularly that part which is exclusionary innature, i.e. which excludes such building and construction work to whichthe provisions of Factories Act apply. Before coming to the grip of thiscentral issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to the objectives withwhich the Factories Act and BOCW Act were enacted, as that would bethe guiding path to answer the core issue delineated above.13. Insofar as Factories Act is concerned, its Preamble mentions that it is an17Act to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It isenacted primarily with the object of protecting workers employed infactories against industrial and occupational hazards. For that purposeit seeks to impose upon the owners or occupiers certain obligations toprotect workers unwary as well as negligent and to secure for thememployment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. This Actalso requires that the workers should work in healthy and sanitaryconditions and for that purpose it provides that precautions should betaken for the safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Incidentalprovisions in Factories Act are made for securing information necessaryto ensure that the objects are carried out and the State Governmentsare empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reports and to inspectthe prescribed registers with a view to maintain effective supervision.The duty of the employer under this Act is to secure the health andsafety of workers and extends to providing adequate plant, machineryand appliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safe premises,proper system of working and extends to giving reasonable restrictions.Detailed provisions are, therefore, made in diverse chapters of the Actimposing obligations upon the owners of the factories to maintaininspecting staff and for maintenance of health, cleanliness, prevention ofovercrowding and provision for amenities such as lighting, drinkingwater, etc. Provisions are also made for safety of workers and their18welfare, such as restrictions on working hours and on the employment ofyoung persons and females, and grant of annual leave with wages. InBhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and another 9,this Court highlighted the necessity and rationale behind legislating thisAct and the objectives which it sought to achieve, in the followingmanner:
⬠S 9. The Factories Act, as the preamble recites, is an Actto consolidate and amend the law regulating labour infactories. The Act is enacted primarily with the object ofprotecting workers employed in factories againstindustrial and occupational hazards. For that purpose itseeks to impose upon the owners or the occupierscertain obligations to protect workers unwary as well asnegligent and to secure for them employment inconditions conducive to their health and safety. The Actrequires that the workers should work in healthy andsanitary conditions and for that purpose it provides thatprecautions should be taken for the safety of workersand prevention of accidents. Incidental provisions aremade for securing information necessary to ensure thatthe objects are carried out and the State Governmentsare empowered to appoint Inspectors, to call for reportsand to inspect the prescribed registers with a view tomaintain effective supervision. The duty of the employeris to secure the health and safety of workers andextends to providing adequate plant, machinery andappliances, supervision over workers, healthy and safepremises, proper system of working and extends togiving reasonable instructions. Detailed provisions aretherefore made in diverse chapters of the Act imposingobligations upon the owners of the factories to maintaininspecting staff and for maintenance of health,cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and provisionfor amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. etc.Provisions are also made for safety of workers and theirwelfare, such as restrictions on working hours and onthe employment of young persons and females, andgrant of annual leave with wages. Employment in amanufacturing process was at one time regarded as amatter of contract between the employer and the91964 SCR (1) 86019employee and the State was not concerned to imposeany duties upon the employer. It is however nowrecognised that the State has a vital concern inpreventing exploitation of labour and in insisting uponproper safeguards for the health and safety of theworkers. The Factories Act undoubtedly imposesnumerous restrictions upon the employers to secure tothe workers adequate safeguards for their health andphysical well-being. But imposition of such restrictions isnot and cannot be regarded, in the context of themodem outlook on industrial relations, asunreasonable....⬠\23514. Coming to BOCW Act, its Statement of Objects and Reasons, depictingthe legislative intent, reads as under:⬠S (1) It is estimated that about 8.5 million workers in thecountry are engaged in building and other constructionworks. Building and other construction workers are oneof the most numerous and vulnerable segments of theunorganised labour in India. The building and otherconstruction works are characterized by their inherentrisk to the life and limb of the workers. The work is alsocharacterised by its casual nature, temporaryrelationship between employer and employee, uncertainworking hours, lack of basic amenities and inadequacyof welfare facilities. In the absence of adequatestatutory provisions, the requisite information regardingthe number and nature of accidents is also notforthcoming. In the absence of such information, it isdifficult to fix responsibility or to take any correctiveaction. (2) Although the provisions of certain Central Acts are
applicable to the building and other construction workersyet a need has been felt for a comprehensive CentralLegislation for regulating their safety, health, welfare andother conditions of service. It had been considerednecessary to levy a cess on the cost of constructionincurred by the employers on the building and otherconstruction works for ensuring sufficient funds for theWelfare Boards to undertake the social securityschemes and welfare measures.⬠\23515. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act itself, it was20considered necessary to levy a cess on the cost of construction incurredby the employers while constructing building etc. This led to passing ofWelfare Cess Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons behind thisAct was to provide for the levy and collection of a cess on the cost ofconstruction incurred by the employers for augmenting the resources ofthe Building, and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Boardsconstituted by the State Governments under the Building and OtherConstruction Workers' (Regulation of Employment and Conditions ofService) Ordinance, 1995.16. Scheme of BOCW Act came up for consideration by this Court in theDewan Chand Builders and Contractors v. Union of India andOthers 10. Recognising that the noble purpose behind the said Act is toensure welfare of the building and construction workers in order toprovide basic human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution,the Court observed as under:⬠S 10. It is thus clear from the scheme of the BOCW Actthat its sole aim is the welfare of building andconstruction workers, directly relatable to theirconstitutionally recognised right to live with basic humandignity, enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution ofIndia. It envisages a network of authorities at theCentral and State levels to ensure that the benefit of thelegislation is made available 'to every building andconstruction worker, by constituting Welfare Boards andclothing them with sufficient powers to ensureenforcement of the primary purpose of the BOCW Act.The means of generating revenues for making effectivethe welfare provisions of the BOCW Act is through the10(2012) 1 SCC 10121Cess Act, which is questioned in these appeals asunconstitutional. xx xx xx17. It is manifest from the overarching schemes of theBOCW Act, the Cess Act and the Rules madethereunder that their sole object is to regulate theemployment and conditions of service of building andother construction workers, traditionally exploitedsections in the society and to provide for their safety,health and other welfare measures. The BOCW Act andthe Cess Act break new ground in that, the liability topay cess falls not only on the owner of a building orestablishment, but under Section 2(1)(i)(iii) of theBOCW Act ⬠S in relation to a building or other construction workcarried on by or through a contractor, or by theemployment of building workers supplied by acontractor, the contractor⬠\235;The extension of the liability on to the contractor is witha view to ensure that, if for any reason it is not possibleto collect cess from the owner of the building at a stagesubsequent to the completion of the construction, it canbe recovered from the contractor. The Cess Act and the
Cess Rules ensure that the cess is collected at sourcefrom the bills of the contractors to whom payments aremade by the owner. In short, the burden of cess ispassed on from the owner to the contractor.⬠\235(emphasis supplied)17. Keeping in view the aforesaid objective of the respective Acts, we nowdeal with the scope and ambit of Section 2(d) of BOCW Act. As noticedabove, one of the submissions of the appellants is that literalinterpretation needs to be given to the said provision as it categoricallyexcludes those building or construction work to which Factories Actapply. In this very hue, it is argued that as the benefit under theFactories Act are already given to the construction workers who are22involved in the construction work, there is no need for covering theconstruction workers who are engaged in building or construction workof the appellants under BOCW Act or Welfare Cess Act.18. Before dealing with the argument predicated on literal construction, wewould like to deal with the second aspect as the answer to that wouldfacilitate the answer to this aspect as well. Section 2(m) of the FactoriesAct defines 'factory' in the following manner:⬠S (m) "factory" means any premises including theprecincts thereof-(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or wereworking on any day of the preceding twelve months, andin any part of which a manufacturing process is beingcarried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily socarried on, or(ii) Whereon twenty or more workers are working, orwere working on any day of the preceding twelvemonths, and in any part of which a manufacturingprocess is being carried on without the aid of power, oris ordinarily so carried on,-but does not include a mine subject to the operation of[the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952)] or [a mobile unitbelonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railwayrunning shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place].[ Explanation [ I ] - For computing the number of workersfor the purposes of this clause all the workers in[different groups and relays] in a day shall be taken intoaccount;][Explanation II - For the purposes of this clause, themere fact that an Electronic Data Processing Unit or aComputer Unit is installed in any premises or partthereof, shall not be construed to make it a factory if nomanufacturing process is being carried on in suchpremises or part thereof;]...⬠\2352319. Section 2(k) of the Factories Act defines 'manufacturing process' in thefollowing manner:(k) "manufacturing process" means any process for-(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing,packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up,demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting anyarticle or substance with a view to its use, sale,transport, delivery or disposal, or(ii) [pumping oil, water, sewage or any othersubstance; or](iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or(iv) [composing types for printing, printing by letterpress, lithography, photogravure or other similar processor book binding;] [or](v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting,finishing or breaking up ships or vessels;[or](vi) [preserving or storing any article in cold storage;]
20. It is also necessary to take note of the definition of 'worker', which iscontained in Section 2(l) of the Factories Act. It reads as under:(l) "worker" means a person 8[employed, directly orby or through any agency (including a contractor) withor without the knowledge of the principal employer,whether for remuneration or not], in any manufacturingprocess, or in cleaning any part of the machinery orpremises used for a manufacturing process, or in anyother kind of work incidental to, or connected with, themanufacturing process, or the subject of themanufacturing process 7[but does not include anymember of the armed forces of the Union];21. On the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that⬠Sfactory⬠\235 is that establishment where manufacturing process is carried24on with or without the aid of power. Carrying on this manufacturingprocess or manufacturing activity is thus a prerequisite. It is equallypertinent to note that it covers only those workers who are engaged inthe said manufacturing process. Insofar as these appellants areconcerned, construction of building is not their business activity ormanufacturing process. In fact, the building is being constructed forcarrying out the particular manufacturing process, which, in most ofthese appeals, is generation, transmission and distribution of power.Obviously, the workers who are engaged in construction of the buildingalso do not fall within the definition of 'worker' under the Factories Act.On these two aspects there is no cleavage and both parties are at adidem . What follows is that these construction workers are not coveredby the provisions of the Factories Act.22. Having regard to the above, if the contention of the appellants isaccepted, the construction workers engaged in the construction ofbuilding undertaken by the appellants which is to be used ultimately asfactory, would stand excluded from the provisions of BOCW Act andWelfare Cess Act as well. Could this be the intention while providing thedefinition of 'building and other construction work' in Section 2(d) ofBOCW Act? Clear answer to this has to be in the negative.23. We may mention at this stage that High Court is right in observing that25merely because the appellants have obtained a licence under Section 6of the Factories Act for registration to work a factory, it would not followtherefrom that they answer the description of the ⬠Sfactory⬠\235 within themeaning of the Factories Act. We have reproduced the definition of'factory' and a bare reading thereof makes it abundantly clear that beforethis stage, when construction of the project is completed and themanufacturing process starts, 'factory' within the meaning of Section2(m) of the Factories Act does not come into existence so as to becovered by the said Act. 24. We now advert to the core issue touching upon the construction ofSection 2(d) of the BOCW Act. The argument of the appellants is thatlanguage thereof is unambiguous and literal construction is to beaccorded to find the legislative intent. To our mind, this submission is ofno avail. Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act dealing with the building orconstruction work is in three parts. In the first part, different activities arementioned which are to be covered by the said expression, namely,construction, alterations, repairs, maintenance or demolition. Secondpart of the definition is aimed at those buildings or works in relation towhich the aforesaid activities are carried out. The third part of thedefinition contains exclusion clause by stipulating that it does not include'any building or other construction work to which the provisions of theFactories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), or the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952),
26applies'. Thus, first part of the definition contains the nature of activity;second part contains the subject matter in relation to which the activity iscarried out and third part excludes those building or other constructionwork to which the provisions of Factories Act or Mines Act apply. 25. It is not in dispute that construction of the projects of the appellants iscovered by the definition of ⬠Sbuilding or other construction work⬠\235 as itsatisfies first two elements of the definition pointed out above. In orderto see whether exclusion clause applies, we need to interpret the words'but does not include any building or other construction work to whichthe provisions of the Factories Act ⬠¦......... apply' . The question isas to whether the provisions of the Factories Act apply to theconstruction of building/project of the appellants. We are of the firmopinion that they do not apply. The provisions of the Factories Act would⬠Sapply⬠\235 only when the manufacturing process starts for which thebuilding/project is being constructed and not to the activity ofconstruction of the project. That is how the exclusion clause is to beinterpreted and that would be the plain meaning of the said clause. Thismeaning to the exclusion clause ascribed by us is in tune with theapproach adopted by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v.Union of India 11. Two separate, but concurring, opinions were given byJustice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice A.P. Sen, and we reproduce here11(1979) 4 SCC 57327below some excerpts from both opinions:⬠S Justice A.P. Sen (para 23)Each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in thelight of general purpose of the Act itself. A baremechanical interpretation of the words 'devoid of conceptor purpose' will reduce much of legislation to futility. It is asalutary rule, well established, that the intention of thelegislature must be found by reading the statute as awhole.Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer (para 241)A policy-oriented interpretation, when a welfare legislationfalls for determination, especially in the context of adeveloping country, is sanctioned by principle andprecedent and is implicit in Article 37 of the Constitutionsince the judicial branch is, in a sense, part of the State.So it is reasonable to assign to 'damages' a larger, fulfillingmeaning.⬠\23526. The aforesaid meaning attributed to the exclusion clause of the definitionis also in consonance with the objective and purpose which is sought tobe achieved by the enactment of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act. Aspointed out above, if the construction of this provision as suggested bythe appellants is accepted, the construction workers who are engaged inthe construction of buildings/projects will neither get the benefit of theFactories Act nor of BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act. That could not havebeen the intention of the Legislature. BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Actare pieces of social security legislation to provide for certain benefits tothe construction workers.27. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an28imperative, irrespective of anything else. This is so eloquently broughtout in the following passage in the case of Atma Ram Mittal v. IshwarSingh Punia 12:⬠S 9. Judicial time and energy is more often than notconsumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament orin other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us
that the fairest and most rational method to interpret thewill of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at thetime when the law was made, by signs most natural andprobable. And these signs are either the words, thecontext, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence,or the spirit and reason of the law. (emphasis by the court)See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of1st Edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol.1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice thenwas, in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [AIR 1953 SC274 : 1953 SCR 677 : 1953 Cri LJ 1105: (1953) 4 STC188] said that each word, phrase or sentence was to beconstrued in the light of purpose of the Act itself. But wordsmust be construed with imagination of purpose behindthem said Judge Learned Hand, a long time ago. Itappears, therefore, that though we are concerned withseeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaningof the words that the legislature has used and the truemeaning of what words [ Ed. : Lord Reid in the aforecitedcase had observed: (All ER p. 814) ⬠SWe often say that weare looking for the intention of Parliament, but this is notquite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the wordswhich Parliament used. We are seeking not whatParliament meant but the true meaning of what they said.⬠\235]as was said by Lord Reid in Black-Clawson InternationalLtd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G [1975 AC591, 613 : (1975) 1 All ER 810: (1975) 2 WLR 513] . Weare clearly of the opinion that having regard to thelanguage we must find the reason and the spirit of thelaw.⬠\23528. How labour legislations are to be interpreted has been stated andrestated by this Court time and again. In M.P. Mineral Industry12(1988) 4 SCC 28429Association v. Regional Labour Commr. (Central) 13, this Court whiledealing with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observedthat this Act is intended to achieve the object of doing social justice toworkmen employed the scheduled employments by prescribingminimum rates of wages for them, and so in construing the saidprovisions the court should adopt what is sometimes described as abeneficent rule of construction. In Surendra Kumar Verma v. TheCentral Government Industrial Tribunal 14, this Court reminded thatsemantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread andbutter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broadinterpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certainkinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by makingetymological excursions. 29. We would also like to reproduce a passage from Workmen ofAmerican Express v. Management of American Express 15, whichprovides complete answer to the argument of the appellants based onliteral construction:⬠S 4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled.Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as socialwelfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not tobe put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputiandimensions. In construing these legislations the impostureof literal construction must be avoided and the prodigalityof its misapplication must be recognised and reduced.13AIR 1960 SC 106814(1980) 4 SCC 44315
(1985) 4 SCC 7130Judges ought to be more concerned with the ⬠Scolour⬠\235, the⬠Scontent⬠\235 and the ⬠Scontext⬠\235 of such statutes (we haveborrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion inPrenn v. Simmonds [(1971) 3 All ER 237] ). In the sameopinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to beleft behind in some island of literal interpretation but is toenquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrixof facts in which they are set; the law is not to beinterpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations...⬠\23530. In equal measure is the message contained in Carew and Co. Ltd. v.Union of India 16:⬠S 21. The law is not ⬠Sa brooding omnipotence in the sky⬠\235but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is anoperational art controlling economic life, and interpretativeeffort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. Nodoubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a badmaster to dictate...⬠\23531. The sentiments were echoed in Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v.Deputy Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Anr. 17in the following words:⬠S 20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficiallegislation. The main purpose of the enactment as thePreamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits toemployees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity andemployment injury and to make provision for certain othermatters in relation thereto. The Employees' StateInsurance Act is a social security legislation and thecanons of interpreting a social legislation are different fromthe canons of interpretation of taxation law. The courtsmust not countenance any subterfuge which would defeatthe provisions of social legislation and the courts musteven, if necessary, strain the language of the Act in orderto achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placingthis legislation on the statute book. The Act, therefore,must receive a liberal construction so as to promote itsobjects.16(1975) 2 SCC 79117(2009) 9 SCC 613132. In taking the aforesaid view, we also agree with the learned counsel forthe respondents that 'superior purpose' contained in BOCW Act andWelfare Cess Act has to be kept in mind when two enactments ⬠theFactories Act on the one hand and BOCW Act/Welfare Cess Act on theother hand, are involved, both of which are welfare legislations. (SeeAllahabad Bank v. Canara Bank 18, which has been followed inPegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v. M/s. Haryana ConcastLimited & Anr. 19 in the context of Securitization and Reconstruction ofFinancial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 andCompanies Act, 1956. Here the concept of 'felt necessity' would gettriggered and as per the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained inBOCW Act, since the purpose of this Act is to take care of a particularnecessity i.e. welfare of unorganised labour class involved inconstruction activity, that needs to be achieved and not to be discarded.Here the doctrine of Purposive Interpretation also gets attracted which isexplained in recent judgments of this Court in Richa Mishra v. State ofChhattisgarh and Others 20 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v. MohanBalkrishna Lulla 21.
33. We are left to deal with the argument of the appellants that while18(2000) 4 SCC 406192016 (1) SCALE 120(2016) 4 SCC 179 at Page No. 19721(2016) 3 SCC 619 ⬠Para 3132granting permission under the Factories Act, various conditions areimposed which the appellants are required to fulfill and these conditionsare almost the same which are contained in BOCW Act. We are notconvinced with this submission either. It is already held that provisionsof Factories Act are not applicable to these construction workers.Registration under the Factories Act becomes necessary in view ofprovisions contained in Section 6 of the said Act as this Section requirestaking of approval and registration of factories even at preparatory stagei.e. at the stage when the premises where factory is to operate has toensure that construction will be done in such a manner that it takes careof safety measures etc. which are provided in the Factories Act. Thismeans to ensure that construction is carried out in such a manner thatprovisions in the Factories Act to ensure health, safety and provisionsrelating to hazardous process as well as welfare measures are takencare of. It is for this reason that even after the building is completedbefore it is occupied, notice under Section 7 is to be given by theoccupier to the Chief Inspector of Factories so that a necessaryinspection is carried out to verify that all such measures are in place.Therefore, when the permissions for construction of factories is given,the purpose is altogether different. 34. It is stated at the cost of repetition that construction workers are notcovered by the Factories Act and, therefore, welfare measures33specifically provided for such workers under the BOCW Act and WelfareCess Act cannot be denied.35. We, thus, hold that all these appeals are bereft of any merit. Accordingly,these appeals, along with the writ petitions filed before this Court as alsothose which are the subject matter of the transfer petition and transfercases, are dismissed with cost. We, however, make it clear that insofaras objection to the calculation of cess as contained in the show causenotices is concerned, it would be open to the appellants to agitate thesame before the adjudicating authorities.No costs..............................................J.(A.K. SIKRI).............................................J.(N.V. RAMANA)NEW DELHI;OCTOBER 18, 201634ITEM NO.1D COURT NO.9 SECTION III(For Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSCivil Appeal No(s). 6223/2016LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s)WITHC.A. No. 10187-10188/2016, W.P.(C) No. 64/2012, W.P.(C) No.848/2013, W.P.(C) No. 385/2014, C.A. No. 6569/2014, T.P.(C) No.
342/2014, T.C.(C) No. 29/2015, W.P.(C) No. 174/2016, W.P.(C) No.311/2016, C.A. No. 6571/2014, T.C.(C) No. 38/2016, C.A. No.10186/2016, W.P.(C) No. 698/2016, C.A. No. 10189/2016. Date : 18/10/2016 These matters were called on for pronouncement ofjudgment today.For Appellant(s) Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia,Adv.Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Ms. Anushree Mishra, Adv. Mr. Kush Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar,Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv.Mr. T. G. Narayanan Nair,Adv.Mr. K.N. Madhusoodhanan, Adv. Mr. K. Raghvacharyulu, Adv. Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv. Mr. Ranjeet Singh, Adv. Ms. Joolie Kataria, Adv. Mr. K. V. Sreekumar,Adv.For Respondent(s) Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv.Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, SR. Adv.35Mr. Rajeev Dubey, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv. Kumar Dushyant Singh,Adv. Mr. Puneet Taneja,Adv. Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv. Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri pronounced the judgment of theBench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana.⬠S.... We, thus, hold that all these appeals are bereft of anymerit. Accordingly, these appeals, along with the writ petitionsfiled before this Court as also those which are the subject matterof the transfer petition and transfer cases, are dismissed withcost. We, however, make it clear that insofar as objection to thecalculation of cess as contained in the show cause notices isconcerned, it would be open to the appellants to agitate the samebefore the adjudicating authorities.⬠\235(Ashwani Thakur) (Mala Kumari Sharma ) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.10 SECTION IIIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for bringing on record additional documents) WITH SLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 64/2012 (With appln.(s) for permission to file addl. documents, for stay and Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 848/2013 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 385/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 6569/2014 (With Office Report) T.P.(C) No. 342/2014 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) T.C.(C) No. 29/2015 W.P.(C) No. 174/2016 W.P.(C) No. 311/2016 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) C.A. No. 6571/2014 T.C.(C) No. 38/2016 SLP(C) No. 26363/2016 (With Interim Relief and Office Report) 1
Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc. W.P.(C) No. 698/2016 (With appln.(s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay and Office Report) SLP(C) No. 26330/2016 (With Interim Relief and Office Report) Date : 27/09/2016 These matters were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA For Appellant(s) C. A. No. 6223/16 Mr. Akhil Sibal, Adv. Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Adv. W.P.(C)No.64/12 Mr. C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv. W.P.(C)No.385/14 Mr. Amar Dave, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee, Adv. Mr. Satyendra Kumar, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Adv. SLP(C)Nos.29105-106/11 Mr. Gaurab Banerji, Sr. Adv. W.P.(C)No.848/2013 Mr. Vikrant Panchnanada, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Ms. Neha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Shashank Manish, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Adv. Ms. Vaidehi Misra, Adv. Mr. Sahil Tagotra, Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia, Adv. C.A. No. 6569/14 Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. T.P.(C)No. 342/14 Mr. Alok Hoonka, Adv. Mr. Nitin Gupta, Adv. Mr. Kush Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, Adv. W.P.(C)No.698/16 Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv. W.P.(C)No.311/16 Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. W.P.(C)No.174/16 2
Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc. C.A. No. 6571/14 Mr. C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv. Mr. Parshanto Chandra Sen, Adv. Mr. Shivanshu Singh, Adv. Mr. Udayan Verma, Adv. Ms. Sana Batta, Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan, Adv. Mr. T. G. Narayanan Nair, Adv. SLP (C) No.26330/16 Mr. K. Raghava Charyulu, Adv. SLP (C) No.26363/16 Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv. Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Adv. Mr. Ranjeet Singh, Adv. Ms. J. Kataria, Adv. Mr. K. V. Sreekumar, Adv. For Respondent(s) State of U.P. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, Sr. Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. Rajeev Dubey, Adv. Mr. Pulkit Tare, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv. W.P.(C)No.174/16 Mr. Alok K. Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Sanjeev Kr. Singh, Adv. Kumar Dushyant Singh, Adv. W.P.(C)No.311/16 Mr. Puneet Taneja, Adv. State of M.P. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv. Mr. Ankit Kr. Lal, Adv. C.A. No. 6223/06 Mr. Rana Mukherji, Sr. Adv. Ms. Alka Agarwal, Adv. Mr. R. R. Rajesh, Adv. Mr. A. K. Sharma, Adv. C.A. No. 6223/06 Mr. Franklin Caesar Thomas, Adv. W.P. (C)No. 848/13 Mr. Chand Qureshi, Adv. Mr. M. P. Siddiqui, Adv. Mr. Sibashish Misra, Adv. W.P. (C)No. 174/16 Mr. Alok K. Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Upendra Prasad, Adv. Mr. Naveen Chawla, Adv. 3
Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc. Mr. T. Mahipal, Adv. C.B.I. Ms . Pinki Anand, ASG. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Adv. Mr. T. A. Khan, Adv. Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, Adv. Mr. Mukhesh Kumar Maroria, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Heard. Arguments concluded. Judgment reserved. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master 4
TITEM NO.1 COURT NO.10 SECTION IIIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSCivil Appeal No. 6223/2016LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s)VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for bringing on record additional documents)WITHSLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011(With Office Report)W.P.(C) No. 64/2012(With appln.(s) for permission to file addl. documents, for stayand Office Report)W.P.(C) No. 848/2013(With Office Report)W.P.(C) No. 385/2014(With Office Report)C.A. No. 6569/2014(With Office Report)T.P.(C) No. 342/2014(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report)T.C.(C) No. 29/2015W.P.(C) No. 174/2016W.P.(C) No. 311/2016(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report)C.A. No. 6571/2014T.C.(C) No. 38/2016SLP(C) No. 26363/2016(With Interim Relief and Office Report)1Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc.W.P.(C) No. 698/2016(With appln.(s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay and Office Report)SLP(C) No. 26330/2016(With Interim Relief and Office Report)Date : 27/09/2016 These matters were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANAFor Appellant(s)C. A. No. 6223/16 Mr. Akhil Sibal, Adv.Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv.Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv.Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Adv.W.P.(C)No.64/12 Mr. C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv.W.P.(C)No.385/14 Mr. Amar Dave, Adv.Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv.Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee, Adv.Mr. Satyendra Kumar, Adv.Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Adv.SLP(C)Nos.29105-106/11 Mr. Gaurab Banerji, Sr. Adv.W.P.(C)No.848/2013 Mr. Vikrant Panchnanada, Adv.Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.Ms. Neha Nagpal, Adv.Mr. Shashank Manish, Adv.Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Adv.Ms. Vaidehi Misra, Adv.Mr. Sahil Tagotra, Adv.Mr. B. S. Banthia, Adv.C.A. No. 6569/14 Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv.T.P.(C)No. 342/14 Mr. Alok Hoonka, Adv.Mr. Nitin Gupta, Adv.Mr. Kush Agrawal, Adv.Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv.Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, Adv.W.P.(C)No.698/16 Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv.
W.P.(C)No.311/16 Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv.W.P.(C)No.174/16 2Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc.C.A. No. 6571/14 Mr. C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv.Mr. Parshanto Chandra Sen, Adv.Mr. Shivanshu Singh, Adv.Mr. Udayan Verma, Adv.Ms. Sana Batta, Adv.Mr. A. Venayagam Balan, Adv.Mr. T. G. Narayanan Nair, Adv.SLP (C) No.26330/16 Mr. K. Raghava Charyulu, Adv.SLP (C) No.26363/16 Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv.Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Adv.Mr. Ranjeet Singh, Adv.Ms. J. Kataria, Adv.Mr. K. V. Sreekumar, Adv.For Respondent(s)State of U.P. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, Sr. Adv.Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Adv.Mr. Rajeev Dubey, Adv.Mr. Pulkit Tare, Adv.Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv.W.P.(C)No.174/16 Mr. Alok K. Agarwal, Adv.Mr. Sanjeev Kr. Singh, Adv.Kumar Dushyant Singh, Adv.W.P.(C)No.311/16 Mr. Puneet Taneja, Adv.State of M.P. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv.Mr. Ankit Kr. Lal, Adv.C.A. No. 6223/06 Mr. Rana Mukherji, Sr. Adv.Ms. Alka Agarwal, Adv.Mr. R. R. Rajesh, Adv.Mr. A. K. Sharma, Adv.C.A. No. 6223/06 Mr. Franklin Caesar Thomas, Adv.W.P. (C)No. 848/13 Mr. Chand Qureshi, Adv.Mr. M. P. Siddiqui, Adv.Mr. Sibashish Misra, Adv.W.P. (C)No. 174/16 Mr. Alok K. Agarwal, Adv.Mr. Upendra Prasad, Adv.Mr. Naveen Chawla, Adv.3Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc.Mr. T. Mahipal, Adv.C.B.I. Ms . Pinki Anand, ASG.Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Adv.Mr. T. A. Khan, Adv.Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, Adv.Mr. Mukhesh Kumar Maroria, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RHeard.Arguments concluded.Judgment reserved. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master4
ITEM NO.17+19 COURT NO.11 SECTION IIIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for bringing on record additional documents) WITH SLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 64/2012 (With appln.(s) for permission to file addl. Documents, stay and Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 848/2013 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 385/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 6569/2014 (With Office Report) T.P.(C) No. 342/2014 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) T.C.(C) No. 29/2015 W.P.(C) No. 174/2016 W.P.(C) No. 311/2016 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) C.A. No. 6571/2014 T.C.(C) No. 38/2016 W.P.(C) No. 698/2016 (With appln.(s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay and Office Report) SLP (C)No. 26330/2016 1
Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc. (With interim relief and office report) SLP (C)No. 26363/2016 (With interim relief and office report) Date : 20/09/2016 These matters were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA For Parties Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv. Mr . Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Adv. Mr. Prashanto Chandra Sen, Adv. Mr. P. S. Sudheer, Adv. Mr. Shivanshu Singh, Adv. Mr. Udayan Verma, Adv. Ms. Sanah Batta, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Banerjee, Sr. Adv. Mr. Arvind Datar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Shashank Manish, Adv. Ms. Vaidehi Mishra, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia, Adv. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, Adv. Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap, Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan, Adv. Mr. T. G. Narayanan Nair, Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. Tushar Mehta, ASG. Mr. Rana Mukherji, Sr. Adv. Ms. Alka Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Amnish Kumar, Adv. 2
Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc. Mr. R. R. Rajesh, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv. Mr. Puneet Taneja, Adv. Ms. Shaheen, Adv. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv. Mr. Ankit Kr. Lal, Adv. Mr. K. V. Sreekumar, Adv. Mr. Alok Krishna Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Mayank Bughani, Adv. Mr. T. Mahipal, Adv. Mr. Upendra Kumar, Adv. Mr. Sanjeev Singh, Adv. Kumar Dushyant Singh, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R List the matters on 27 th September, 2016, on top of the Board. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master 3
²ITEM NO.17+19 COURT NO.11 SECTION IIIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSCivil Appeal No. 6223/2016LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for bringing on record additional documents)WITHSLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011(With Office Report)W.P.(C) No. 64/2012(With appln.(s) for permission to file addl. Documents, stay andOffice Report)W.P.(C) No. 848/2013(With Office Report)W.P.(C) No. 385/2014(With Office Report)C.A. No. 6569/2014(With Office Report)T.P.(C) No. 342/2014(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report)T.C.(C) No. 29/2015W.P.(C) No. 174/2016W.P.(C) No. 311/2016(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report)C.A. No. 6571/2014T.C.(C) No. 38/2016W.P.(C) No. 698/2016(With appln.(s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay and Office Report)SLP (C)No. 26330/20161Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc.(With interim relief and office report)SLP (C)No. 26363/2016(With interim relief and office report) Date : 20/09/2016 These matters were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANAFor PartiesMr. Deepak Khurana, Adv.Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv.Mr . Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Adv.Mr. Prashanto Chandra Sen, Adv.Mr. P. S. Sudheer, Adv.Mr. Shivanshu Singh, Adv.Mr. Udayan Verma, Adv.Ms. Sanah Batta, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Banerjee, Sr. Adv.Mr. Arvind Datar, Sr. Adv.Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv.Mr. Shashank Manish, Adv.Ms. Vaidehi Mishra, Adv.Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Adv.Mr. B. S. Banthia, Adv.Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, Adv.Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv.Mr. Rahul Pratap, Adv.Mr. A. Venayagam Balan, Adv.Mr. T. G. Narayanan Nair, Adv.Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv.Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv.Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Adv.Mr. Tushar Mehta, ASG.
Mr. Rana Mukherji, Sr. Adv.Ms. Alka Agrawal, Adv.Mr. Amnish Kumar, Adv.2Civil Appeal No. 6223/2016 etc.Mr. R. R. Rajesh, Adv.Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv.Mr. Puneet Taneja, Adv.Ms. Shaheen, Adv.Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv.Mr. Ankit Kr. Lal, Adv.Mr. K. V. Sreekumar, Adv.Mr. Alok Krishna Agarwal, Adv.Mr. Mayank Bughani, Adv.Mr. T. Mahipal, Adv.Mr. Upendra Kumar, Adv.Mr. Sanjeev Singh, Adv.Kumar Dushyant Singh, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RList the matters on 27 th September, 2016, on top of theBoard. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master3
ITEM NO.33 COURT NO.11 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 26330/2016 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 26/07/2016 in WP No. 24607/2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh) M/S. BHILAI ENGINEERING CORPORATION LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With interim relief and office report) WITH SLP(C) No. 26363/2016 (With Interim Relief and Office Report) Date : 16/09/2016 These petitions were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA For Petitioner(s) Mr. K. Raghvacharyulu, Adv. Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Adv. Mr. K. V. Sreekumar, Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R List the petitions along with SLP (C)Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011 and other connected matters which are coming up for hearing on 20 th September, 2016. Till the next date of hearing, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master
SECTION III IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) Nos. 26330 & 26363 OF 2016 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF AND INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.1 [Application for permission to file Additional Documents] M/s. Bhilai Engineering Corporation Limited …..Petitioner Versus Union of India & Others ….Responden ts OFFICE REPORT The matters abovementioned have been filed by Mr. K.V. Sreekumar, Advocate on behalf the Petitioner against the Judgment and Final Order dated 26 th July 2016 of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No.24607 of 2016 and 24589 of 2016 respectively. It is submitted that SLP (Civil) No.2910529106 of 2011 @ CC 16511 of 2011 arising out of similar issue was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 17 th October 2011 when the Court was pleased to condone the delay, direct issue notice and directed to tag with the SLP (Civil) No.27411 of 2010 and stayed impugned notice of demand dated 14 th September 2010. The said matters are pending for hearing. A copy of Record of Proceedings dated 17 th October 2011 is enclosed herewith for kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that SLP (Civil) No.26363 of 2016 has been tagged with SLP (Civil) No.26330 of 2016 as both are arising out of similar issue. ...2/
2 It is lastly submitted that Counsel for the Petitioner has on 7 th September 2016 filed application for permission to file additional documents alongwith annexures as per his undertaking dated 3 rd / 6 th September 2016 in both the petitions. The said application has been registered as I.A. No.1 in both the matters. Paper Books of the said documents have been placed with main Paper Books. The matters alongwith application abovementioned are listed before the Hon’ble Court with this Office Report Dated this the 8 th Day of September, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to: Mr. K.V. Sreekumar, Advocate 92, Old Lawyers Chambers. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR c4
ITEM NO.19 COURT NO.2 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 2905-29106/2011 @ CC 16511/2011 (From the judgement and order dated 18/05/2011 & 12/07/2011 in MC No.9304/2011,MC No.10884/2011,WP No.10884/201 of The HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK) ESSAR STEEL LTD.& ANR Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s) With I.A.1(C/delay in filing SLP and office report )) Date: 17/10/2011 This Petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR For Petitioner(s) Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv.-on-Record. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Delay condoned. Issue notice. Tag with SLP(C)No.27411 of 2010. In the meantime, the impugned Notice of Demand dated 14th September, 2010, shall remain stayed. (Sheetal Dhingra) (Juginder Kaur) COURT MASTER Assistant Registrar
ITEM NO.33 COURT NO.11 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 26330/2016(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 26/07/2016in WP No. 24607/2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature atHyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of AndhraPradesh)M/S. BHILAI ENGINEERING CORPORATION LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSUNION OF INDIA AND ORS. Respondent(s)(With interim relief and office report)WITHSLP(C) No. 26363/2016(With Interim Relief and Office Report) Date : 16/09/2016 These petitions were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANAFor Petitioner(s)Mr. K. Raghvacharyulu, Adv.Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Adv.Mr. K. V. Sreekumar, Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RList the petitions along with SLP (C)Nos. 29105-29106of 2011 and other connected matters which are coming up forhearing on 20 th September, 2016. Till the next date of hearing, no coercive steps shallbe taken against the petitioner. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master
ITEM NO.8 COURT NO.11 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Writ Petition (Civil) No. 698/2016 SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With appln. (s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay and office report) Date : 14/09/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA For Petitioner(s) Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap, Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R List the petition on 20 th September, 2016, along with SLP (C)Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011 and other connected matters. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master
ITEM NO.92 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MR. PAWAN DEV KOTWAL Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 174/2016 SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) WITH W.P.(C) No. 311/2016 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) Date : 14/09/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. G. Panmei, Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Sanjeev Kr. Singh, Adv. Mr. Kumar Dushyant Singh,Adv. Mr. Mayank Bughani, Adv. Mr. T. Mahipal,Adv. Ms. Shaheen, Adv. Mr. Puneet Taneja,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R W.P.(C) No. 174/2016 Fresh steps to be taken for service of respondent Nos.1 to 3 within two weeks. Notice thereafter be issued. Four weeks' time is granted to respondent Nos.4 to 6 for filing counter affidavit. W.P.(C) No. 311/2016 Fresh steps to be taken for service of respondent Nos.1 and 3 within two weeks. Notice thereafter be issued.
Item No.92 -2- Four weeks' time is granted to respondent No.2 for filing counter affidavit. List again on 21.11.2016. (PAWAN DEV KOTWAL) Registrar
MATTER FOR 18.07.2016 COURT NO.7 ITEM NO.2 SEC-X IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 311 OF 2016 (UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA) WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO. 1 (APPLICATION FOR STAY) SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. ...PETITIONER -VERSUS- STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS OFFICE-REPORT The writ petition along with application above-mentioned was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 13.05.2016, when the Court was pleased to pass the following order: "H eard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material. Issue notice. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the directions issued under letter(s)/demand notice(s) dated 30th July, 2014 and 8th November, 2015. " It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order, certified copies of the aforesaid order was issued to the concerned authorities for necessary action and compliance. It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order, show cause notice, returnable for 18th July, 2016 was issued to all three respondents through registered A.D. on 25.05.2016. Neither A.D. card nor unserved cover containing the said notice has been received back in this Registry so far. Service of notice is not complete. The writ petitions along with application above-mentioned are listed before the Hon'ble Court with this office report. Dated this the 16th day of July, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to: Mr. Rahul Pratap, Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Systém 3
MATTER FOR 14.09.2016 COURT NO.11 ITEM NO.8 SEC-X IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 698 OF 2016 (UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA) WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.1 (APPLICATION FOR STAY) SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. ...PETITIONER -VERSUS- UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ...RESPONDENTS OFFICE – REPORT T he Writ Petition alongwith above-mentioned has been filed by Mr. Rahul Pratap, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner . It is submitted that S.L.P.(C) Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011 (@ S.L.P.(C) cc No. 16511 of 2011), arising out of similar issue, was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 17.10.2011, when the Court directed to issue notice. The matter is pending before the Hon'ble Court and is updated to be listed before the Court on 20.09.2016 as per computer data (Main matter is C.A. No. 6223 of 2016) (Copy of order dated 17.10.2011 is annexed to the paper books marked as Annexure P-3 at Page No.37). The Writ Petition alongwith application above-mentioned is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 9th day of September, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to:- Mr. Rahul Pratap , Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
ITEM NO.92 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MR. PAWAN DEV KOTWALWrit Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 174/2016SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s)WITHW.P.(C) No. 311/2016(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) Date : 14/09/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today.For Petitioner(s) Mr. G. Panmei, Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Sanjeev Kr. Singh, Adv. Mr. Kumar Dushyant Singh,Adv. Mr. Mayank Bughani, Adv. Mr. T. Mahipal,Adv. Ms. Shaheen, Adv. Mr. Puneet Taneja,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RW.P.(C) No. 174/2016Fresh steps to be taken for service of respondent Nos.1to 3 within two weeks. Notice thereafter be issued.Four weeks' time is granted to respondent Nos.4 to 6 forfiling counter affidavit.W.P.(C) No. 311/2016Fresh steps to be taken for service of respondent Nos.1and 3 within two weeks. Notice thereafter be issued.Item No.92 -2-Four weeks' time is granted to respondent No.2 for filingcounter affidavit.List again on 21.11.2016. (PAWAN DEV KOTWAL) Registrar
8ITEM NO.8 COURT NO.11 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSWrit Petition (Civil) No. 698/2016SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSUNION OF INDIA AND ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln. (s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay and office report)Date : 14/09/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANAFor Petitioner(s)Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv.Mr. Rahul Pratap, Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RList the petition on 20 th September, 2016, along withSLP (C)Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011 and other connected matters. (Nidhi Ahuja) (Tapan Kr. Chakraborty) Court Master Court Master
1 ITEM NO.12+44 COURT NO.11 SECTION IIIA/III/X/XV/XVIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 6223/2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents) WITH SLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 64/2012 (With appln.(s) for permission to file addl. documents and stay and Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 848/2013 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 385/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 6569/2014 (With Office Report) T.P.(C) No. 342/2014 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) T.C.(C) No. 29/2015 W.P.(C) No. 174/2016 W.P.(C) No. 311/2016 (With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) C.A. No. 6571/2014 T.C.(C) No. 38/2016 Date : 22/08/2016 These appeals were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA
2 ITEM NO.12+44 For Appellant(s) Mr. Akhil Sibal,Adv. Mr. Deepak Khurana,Adv. Mr. Vikas Mishra,Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma,Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal,Adv. Ms. Neeha Nagpal,Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal,Adv. Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee,Adv. Mr. Satyendra Kumar,Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia,Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla,Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka,Adv. Mr. Kush Agrawal,Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar,Adv. Mr. Prashant K. Goswami,Adv. Mr. Anupam Lal Das,Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. Mr. Parshanto Chandra Sen,Adv. Mr. Shivanshu Singh,Adv. Mr. Udayan Verma,Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv. Mr. Tushar Mehra,ASG Mr. Rana Mukherjee,Sr. Adv. Ms. Alka Agrawal,Adv. Mr. A.K. Shah,Adv. Mr. T.G.N. Nair,Adv. Mr. K.N. Madhusoodhanan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv. Mr. Ankit Kr. Lal,Adv. Mr. Ravindra Srivastava,Adv. Mr. Rajeev Dubey,Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv.
3 ITEM NO.12+44 Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv. Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde,Sr. Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla,Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka,Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. Mr. Naveen Chawla,Adv. Mr. Upendra Prasad,Adv. Mr. Mayank B.,Adv. Mr. T. Mahipal,Adv. Mr. S.K. Kulkarni,Adv. Mr. M. Gireesh Kumar,Adv. Mr. Ankur S. Kulkarni,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R List on 20 th September, 2016 for final disposal. In the meantime, service be completed in those matters where it is not yet complete. (SAPNA BISHT) SR.P.A. (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY) COURT MASTER
Listing date: 22/8/2016 Court No. : 11 Item No: 12 SECTION IIIA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6223 OF 2016 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. ....APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ORS. ....RESPONDENTS OFFICE REPORT It is submitted that there are four respondents in the abovementioned matter and all are represented by counsel. Service is complete. The matter abovementioned is listed before Hon'ble Court with this Office Report. DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate. 2. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate 3. Mr. S.N. Terdal, Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR min1
SECTION XVI-A IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LISTED ON : 22.8.2016 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION COURT NO.: 11 ITEM NO: 12 TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 38 OF 2016 (@ T.P. (C) No. 1147 of 2015) MP POWER GENERATING CO. LTD. & ANR. ....Petitioner s VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. ....Respondents OFFICE REPORT Pursuant to Court's order dated 12 th July, 2016 passed in T.P (C) No. 1147 of 2015 the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur has sent the Original Record of Writ Petition No. 2564 of 2015 which has been registered as Transferred Case mentioned above. The service position of the above matter is mentioned below. S. No. (I) T.C. No. (II) High Court Particulars (III) Remarks 1 T.C. No. 38 of 2016 @ T.P. (C) 1147/2015 High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, in WP No. 2564/2015 Nos. of Petitioner : 2 Nos. of Respondent : 3 All the Petitioners are represented by Mr. T.G. N. Nair, Advocate. All the Respondents are represented by Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Advocate. Paper Books have been received from the High Court. Service is complete. The matter above mentioned is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this Office report. Dated this the 20 st day of August, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : Mr. T.G. N. Nair, Advocate. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Advocate. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR rm
â1ITEM NO.12+44 COURT NO.11 SECTION IIIA/III/X/XV/XVIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSCivil Appeal No(s). 6223/2016LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Appellant(s) VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents)WITHSLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011(With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 64/2012(With appln.(s) for permission to file addl. documents and stay andOffice Report) W.P.(C) No. 848/2013(With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 385/2014(With Office Report) C.A. No. 6569/2014(With Office Report) T.P.(C) No. 342/2014(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) T.C.(C) No. 29/2015 W.P.(C) No. 174/2016 W.P.(C) No. 311/2016(With appln.(s) for stay and Office Report) C.A. No. 6571/2014 T.C.(C) No. 38/2016 Date : 22/08/2016 These appeals were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA2ITEM NO.12+44For Appellant(s) Mr. Akhil Sibal,Adv. Mr. Deepak Khurana,Adv. Mr. Vikas Mishra,Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma,Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal,Adv. Ms. Neeha Nagpal,Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal,Adv. Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee,Adv. Mr. Satyendra Kumar,Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia,Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla,Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka,Adv. Mr. Kush Agrawal,Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar,Adv. Mr. Prashant K. Goswami,Adv. Mr. Anupam Lal Das,Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. Mr. Parshanto Chandra Sen,Adv. Mr. Shivanshu Singh,Adv. Mr. Udayan Verma,Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv. Mr. Tushar Mehra,ASG Mr. Rana Mukherjee,Sr. Adv. Ms. Alka Agrawal,Adv. Mr. A.K. Shah,Adv. Mr. T.G.N. Nair,Adv. Mr. K.N. Madhusoodhanan,Adv.For Respondent(s) Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv. Mr. Ankit Kr. Lal,Adv.
Mr. Ravindra Srivastava,Adv. Mr. Rajeev Dubey,Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv.3 ITEM NO.12+44 Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv. Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde,Sr. Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla,Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka,Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. Mr. Naveen Chawla,Adv. Mr. Upendra Prasad,Adv. Mr. Mayank B.,Adv. Mr. T. Mahipal,Adv. Mr. S.K. Kulkarni,Adv. Mr. M. Gireesh Kumar,Adv. Mr. Ankur S. Kulkarni,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RList on 20 th September, 2016 for final disposal.In the meantime, service be completed in those matterswhere it is not yet complete.(SAPNA BISHT)SR.P.A. (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)COURT MASTER
SECTION XVI-A IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LISTED ON : 22-8-2016 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION COURT No. : ITEM No. : TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) No. 29 OF 2015 @ T.P. (Civil) No. 1461 of 2013 M/S ROHAN BUILDERS (I) LTD. ....Petitioner VERSUS STATE OF M.P. ORS. .....Respondents OFFICE REPORT Pursuant to this Court's Order passed in T.P. (Civil) No. 1461 of 2013 the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur has sent the Original Record which has been registered as Transferred Case mentioned above. The service position of the above matter is mentioned below.:- SL. NO. T.C. NO. HIGH COURT PARTICULARS REMARKS 1. 29 OF 2015 @ T.P. (C) 1461 of 2013 High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (WP No. 3017 of 2012) Petitioner No. 1 Respondent Nos. 4 Sole Petitioner is represented by Mr. Neeraj Shekhar,advocate. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and 4 are represented by Mr. Mishra Saurabh and Mr. E.C. Agarwala, Advocates respectively. Paper Books have been received from the High Court. Service is complete. As the main matter i.e. Special Leave Petition Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011 are on board hence the above mentioned Transferred Case is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 5 th day of August, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, Advocate Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Advocate Mr. E. C. Agarwala, Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ms
ITEM NO.2 COURT NO.7 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 311/2016 SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for stay and office report) Date : 18/07/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAFULLA C. PANT For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant K. Goswami, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Tag with Civil Appeal No.6571 of 2014. List the matter after service of notice is complete. (Neetu Khajuria) Court Master (Asha Soni) Court Master
MATTER FOR 18.07.2016 COURT NO.7 ITEM NO.2 SEC-X IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 311 OF 2016 (UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA) WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO. 1 (APPLICATION FOR STAY) SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. ...PETITIONER -VERSUS- STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS OFFICE-REPORT The writ petition along with application above-mentioned was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 13.05.2016, when the Court was pleased to pass the following order: "H eard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material. Issue notice. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the directions issued under letter(s)/demand notice(s) dated 30th July, 2014 and 8th November, 2015. " It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order, certified copies of the aforesaid order was issued to the concerned authorities for necessary action and compliance. It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid order, show cause notice, returnable for 18th July, 2016 was issued to all three respondents through registered A.D. on 25.05.2016. Neither A.D. card nor unserved cover containing the said notice has been received back in this Registry so far. Service of notice is not complete. The writ petitions along with application above-mentioned are listed before the Hon'ble Court with this office report. Dated this the 16th day of July, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to: Mr. Rahul Pratap, Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Systém 3
ITEM NO.44 COURT NO.12 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 28/04/2015 in WPT No. 772/2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad) LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With application(s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 11/07/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA For Petitioner(s) Mr. Akhil Sibal, Adv. Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rajeev Dubey, Adv. Ms. Ruchi Sahay, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, ASG Ms. Alka Agrawal, Adv. Mr. G. S. Makkar, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted. List on 22 nd August, 2016 along with Civil Appeal No. 6571/2014 and other connected matters. (RASHI GUPTA ) (TAPAN KR.CHAKRABORTY) SR.P.A. COURT MASTER
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) No. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF M/s Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. …..Petitioner Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ….Respondents OFFICE REPORT The matter abovementioned was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 9 th July, 2015 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to pass the following order: “ Issue N otice. In the meantime, there will be stay of operation of the impugned notices dated 14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011.” Accordingly, show cause notice was issued to all the four respondents on 27 th July, 2015 through registered A.D. Post. Mr. R.P. Mehrotra, Advocate, has on 8 th September, 2015, filed Vakalatnama/Appearance on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 4. The office report with regard to service position of respondent No. 3 and not filing of counter affidavit was listed before the Ld. Registrar Court on 9 th October, 2015, when the following order was passed: “Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have yet to file the counter affidavit. Be filed within four weeks, as last opportunity. Petitioner to provide the complete set of the pleadings within two weeks. Period of four weeks for filing counter affidavit shall reckon thereafter. For respondent No. 3, petitioner still to take fresh steps to effect service. List again on 12.1.2016.” It is submitted that Mr. S.N. Terdal, Advocate, has on 28 th October, 2015 filed vakalatnama/appearance on behalf of respondent No. 3. The counsel for respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 4 has on 10 th February, 2016 filed counter affidavit and copy of the counter affidavit has been included in the paper books.
2 It is further submitted that the office report was lastly listed before the Ld. Registrar Court on 14 th March, 2016, when the following order was passed: “Counter affidavit of respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4 got filed on 10.2.2016 but after the opportunity already declined vide order dt. 12.1.2016. Respondent no. 3 has failed to file counter affidavit despite order dt. 12.1.2016. Further opportunity is therefore declined. Hence process as per rules.” It is lastly submitted that counsel for respondent No. 3 has not filed counter affidavit so far. The matter is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this office report. Dated this the 8 th day of July, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate D41, Defence Colony, New Delhi. 2. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate (Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh) 3. Mr. S.N. Terdal, Advocate Central Agency Section. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR c1
ITEM NO.44 COURT NO.12 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 28/04/2015in WPT No. 772/2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature atAllahabad)LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s)(With application(s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report)Date : 11/07/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANAFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Akhil Sibal, Adv.Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv.Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv.Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Ravindra Srivastava, Sr. Adv.Mr. Rajeev Dubey, Adv.Ms. Ruchi Sahay, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, ASGMs. Alka Agrawal, Adv.Mr. G. S. Makkar, Adv.Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal, Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E RLeave granted.List on 22 nd August, 2016 along with Civil Appeal No.6571/2014 and other connected matters. (RASHI GUPTA ) (TAPAN KR.CHAKRABORTY) SR.P.A. COURT MASTER
ITEM NO.16 COURT NO.7 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 311/2016 SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. PETITIONER(S) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. RESPONDENT(S) (WITH APPLN. (S) FOR AD-INTERIM EX-PARTE STAY) Date : 13/05/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAFULLA C. PANT For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant K. Goswami, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap, Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material. Issue notice. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the directions issued under letter(s)/demand notice(s) dated 30 th July, 2014 and 8 th November, 2015. [VINOD LAKHINA] COURT MASTER [ASHA SONI] COURT MASTER
MATTER FOR 13.05.2016 COURT NO.7 ITEM NO.16 SEC-X IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 311 OF 2016 (UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA) WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.1 (APPLICATION FOR STAY) SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. ...PETITIONER -VERSUS- STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. ...RESPONDENTS OFFICE – REPORT T he Writ Petition alongwith application above-mentioned has been filed by Mr. Rahul Pratap, Advocate on behalf of petitioner. It is submitted that W.P.(C) No. 174 of 2016, arising out of similar issue, was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 04.04.2016, when the Court directed Rule Nisi and the same is pending before the Hon'ble Court. (Copy of the order dated 04.04.2016 is enclosed herewith.) (Main matter is Civil Appeal No. 6571 of 2014.) The Writ Petition alongwith application above-mentioned is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 12th day of May, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to:- Mr. Rahul Pratap , Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
˜ ITEM NO.16 COURT NO.7 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 311/2016 SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. PETITIONER(S) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. RESPONDENT(S) (WITH APPLN. (S) FOR AD-INTERIM EX-PARTE STAY) Date : 13/05/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAFULLA C. PANT For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant K. Goswami, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap, Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the relevant material. Issue notice. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the directions issued under letter(s)/demand notice(s) dated 30th July, 2014 and 8th November, 2015. [VINOD LAKHINA] [ASHA SONI] COURT MASTER COURT MASTERSignature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byVINOD LAKHINADate: 2016.05.1412:21:23 ISTReason:
ITEM NO.8 COURT NO.7 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s).174/2016 SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With appln. (s) for ad-interim ex-parte stay,exemption from filing O.T. and office report) Date : 04/04/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAFULLA C. PANT For Petitioner(s) Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Adv. Mr. Rahul Pratap,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Application for exemption from filing official translation is allowed. Rule nisi . Tag with Civil Appeal No.6571 of 2014 and other connected cases. Until further orders, there shall be stay of the directions issued under letter/demand notice dated 15.10.2015. (Neetu Khajuria) Sr.P.A. (Asha Soni) Court Master
MATTER FOR 04.04.2016 COURT NO.7 ITEM NO.8 SEC-X IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 174 OF 2016 (UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA) WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.1 (APPLICATION FOR GRANT OF AD-INTERIM EX-PARTE STAY) WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.2 (APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING OFFICIAL TRANSLATION) SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURES LTD. ...PETITIONER -VERSUS- STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS OFFICE – REPORT T he Writ Petition alongwith applications above-mentioned has been filed by Mr. Rahul Pratap , Advocate. It is submitted that W.P.(C) No. 64 of 2012, was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 09.07.2014, when the Court directed to issue Rule Nisi. (Copy of the order dated 09.07.2014 is being circulated herewith.) (Main matter is Civil Appeal No. 6571 of 2014) The matter is pending before the Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that W.P.(C) No. 318 of 2006, is pending before the Hon'ble Court and is updated for 08.04.2016 as per computer data. The Writ Petition alongwith applications above-mentioned is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 1st day of April, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to:- Mr. Rahul Pratap , Advocate ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
ITEM NO.59 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR DR. K. ARUL Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 14/03/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr Sandeep Singh, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr Harish Kr Khinchi, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Counter affidavit of respondent nos. 1,2 and 4 got filed on 10.2.2016 but after the opportunity already declined vide order dt. 12.1.2016. Respondent no.3 has failed to file counter affidavit despite order dt.12.1.2016. Further opportunity is therefore declined. Hence process as per rules. (DR. K. ARUL) Registrar
SECTION III IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) No. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF M/s Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. …..Petitioner Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ….Respondents OFFICE REPORT The Office Report was listed before the Ld. Registrars Court on 12 th January, 2016, when the following order was passed: “Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 have not filed the counter affidavit, despite last opportunity having been granted. As such, further opportunity is declined. Respondent No. 3 to file counter affidavit within four weeks. List again on 14.3.2016. ” It is submitted that Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 has on 10 th February, 2016 filed Counter Affidavit but there is a delay of 65 days in filing the counter affidavit and counsel for the said respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 has not filed an application for condonation of delay in filing counter affidavit so far. It is further submitted that counsel for respondent No. 3 has not filed counter affidavit . The Office Report is listed before the Ld. Registrar's Court. Dated this the 11 th day of March, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate D41, Defence Colony, New Delhi. 2 Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate 100, Lawyers' Chambers. 3. Mr. S.N. Terdal, Advocate, Central Agency Section. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
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\206 ITEM NO.59 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR DR. K. ARUL Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 14/03/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr Sandeep Singh, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr Harish Kr Khinchi, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Counter affidavit of respondent nos. 1,2 and 4 got filed on 10.2.2016 but after the opportunity already declined vide order dt. 12.1.2016. Respondent no.3 has failed to file counter affidavit despite order dt.12.1.2016. Further opportunity is therefore declined.Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byHema JoshiDate: 2016.03.14 Hence process as per rules.17:06:17 ISTReason: (DR. K. ARUL) Registrar
ITEM NO.70 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MR. PAWAN DEV KOTWAL Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 12/01/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sandeep Singh, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. S. Senger, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr. Harish Kr. Khinchi, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 have not filed the counter affidavit, despite last opportunity having been granted. As such, further opportunity is declined. Respondent No.3 to file counter affidavit within four weeks. List again on 14.3.2016. (PAWAN DEV KOTWAL) Registrar
SECTION - III IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) No. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF M/s Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. . …..Petitioner Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ….Respondents OFFICE REPORT The Office Report was listed before the Ld. Registrars Court on 9 th October, 2015 when the following order was passed:- “Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 have yet to file the counter affidavit. Be filed within four weeks as last opportunity. Petitioner to provide the complete set of the pleadings within two weeks. Period of four weeks for filing counter affidavit shall reckon thereafter. For respondent No.3, petitoner still to take fresh steps to effect service. List again on 12.1.2016. ” It is submitted that there are four respondents in the matter mentioned above. Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 has not filed Counter Affidavit so far. It is further submitted that Mr. S.N. Terdal, Advocate has on 28 th October, 2015 filed Vakalatnama/Appearance on behalf of Respondent No. 3 but he has not filed Counter Affidavit so far. The Office Report is listed before the Ld. Registrar's Court for orders. Dated this the 8 th Day of January, 2016. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate D-41, Defence Colony, New Delhi. 2 Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate 100, Lawyers' Chambers, Supreme Court of India New Delhi. 3. Mr. S.N. Terdal, Advocate, Central Agency Section, Supreme Court of India, New Delhi. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR c4
Æ ITEM NO.70 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MR. PAWAN DEV KOTWAL Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 12/01/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sandeep Singh, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. S. Senger, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. Mr. Harish Kr. Khinchi, Adv. Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 have not filed the counter affidavit, despite last opportunity having been granted. As such, further opportunity is declined. Respondent No.3 to file counter affidavit within four weeks. List again on 14.3.2016. (PAWAN DEV KOTWAL)Signature Not Verified RegistrarDigitally signed byRupam DhamijaDate: 2016.01.1216:38:50 ISTReason:
ITEM NO.77 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MRS. RACHNA GUPTA Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 09/10/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sandeep Singh, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. S. Senger, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 have yet to file the counter affidavit. Be filed within four weeks, as last opportunity. Petitioner to provide the complete set of the pleadings within two weeks. Period of four weeks for filing counter affidavit shall reckon thereafter. For respondent No.3, petitioner still to take fresh steps to effect service. List again on 12.1.2016. (RACHNA GUPTA) Registrar
SECTION - III IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) No. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF M/s Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. . …..Petitioner Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ….Respondents OFFICE REPORT The Office Report was listed before the Ld. Registrars Court on 2 nd September, 2015 when the following order was passed:- “Service report qua all the four respondents is still awaited. ” It is submitted that Mr. Mr. R.P. Mehrotra, Advocate, has on 8 th September, 2015 filed Vakalatnama/Appearance on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 but he has not filed Counter Affidavit on their behalf so far. Neither A.D. Card nor unserved cover containing the show cause notice has been received back from Respondent No. 3 so far. The Office Report is listed before the Ld. Registrar's Court for orders. Dated this the 6 th Day of October, 2015. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate D-41, Defence Colony, New Delhi. 2 Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate 100, Lawyers' Chambers, Supreme Court of India New Delhi. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR c4
Ä ITEM NO.77 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MRS. RACHNA GUPTA Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 09/10/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sandeep Singh, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. S. Senger, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 have yet to file the counter affidavit. Be filed within four weeks, as last opportunity. Petitioner to provide the complete set of the pleadings within two weeks. Period of four weeks for filing counter affidavit shall reckon thereafter. For respondent No.3, petitioner still to take fresh steps to effect service.Signature Not Verified List again on 12.1.2016.Digitally signed byRupam DhamijaDate: 2015.10.0917:34:46 ISTReason: (RACHNA GUPTA) Registrar
ITEM NO.75 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MRS. RACHNA GUPTA Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 02/09/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Service report qua all the four respondents is still awaited. List again on 9.10.2015. (RACHNA GUPTA) Registrar
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) No. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF M/s Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. . …..Petitioner Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. ….Respondents OFFICE REPORT The matter above-mentioned was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 9 th July, 2015 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to pass the following order:- “Issue N otice. In the meantime, there will be stay of operation of the impugned notices dated 14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011.” Accordingly, show cause notice was issued to all the four respondents on 27 th July, 2015 through registered A.D. Post. Neither A.D. Cards nor unserved covers containing the show cause notices have been received back from the said Respondents so far. It is submitted that a copy of the show cause notice was also sent to Mr. R.P. Mehrotra, Advocate ( Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh) but he has not filed Vakalatnama/Appearance on behalf of the respondents/State of Uttar Pradesh so far. The Office Report is listed before the Ld. Registrar's Court for orders. Dated this the 31 st h Day of August, 2015. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate D-41, Defence Colony, New Delhi. 2 Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate (Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh) Supreme Court of India New Delhi. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR c4
\220 ITEM NO.75 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR MRS. RACHNA GUPTA Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for bringing on record additional documents and interim relief and office report) Date : 02/09/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Service report qua all the four respondents is still awaited. List again on 9.10.2015. (RACHNA GUPTA) RegistrarSignature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byRupam DhamijaDate: 2015.09.0717:20:15 ISTReason:
ITEM NO.26 COURT NO.1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 28/04/2015 in WPT No. 772/2011 passed by the High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad) LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for exemption from filing O.T. and interim relief and office report) Date : 09/07/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY For Petitioner(s) Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Akhil Sibal, Adv. Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice. In the meantime, there will be stay of operation of the impugned notices dated 14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011. (Neetu Khajuria) Sr.P.A. (Vinod Kulvi) Assistant Registrar
SECTIONIII IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.2 (Application for placing on record additional documents) Lanco Anpara Power Limited ...Petitioner VERSUS State of Uttar Pradesh& Ors. ...Respondents REVISED OFFICE REPORT The matter abovementioned has been filed by Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate, on behalf of the Petitioner against the Judgment and Order dated 28th April, 2015of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Tax No. 772 of 2011. It is submitted that Civil Appeal No. 96571 of 2014 @ SLP (C) No. 27411 of 2010 etc. referred to on 'Listing Proforma' was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 9th July, 2014 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant leave and the same is pending for hearing. Copy Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 9th July, 2014 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 695 of 2015 filed between the same parties was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 8th May, 2015 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dispose of the same as having become infructuous. . Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 8th May, 2015 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is lastly submitted that Counsel for the Petitioner has on 6 th July, 2015 filed additional document along with application for placing on record additional documents and the said application has been registered as I.A.No.2. Copies of the same are being circulated herewith. The matter is listed before the Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 8th Day of July, 2015. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
Copy to: 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, dvocate D41, Defence Colony, New Delhi, ASSISTANT REGISTRAR C2
SECTIONIII IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.2 (Application for placing on record additional documents) Lanco Anpara Power Limited ...Petitioner VERSUS State of Uttar Pradesh& Ors. ...Respondents REVISED OFFICE REPORT The matter abovementioned has been filed by Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate, on behalf of the Petitioner against the Judgment and Order dated 28th April, 2015of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Tax No. 772 of 2011. It is submitted that Civil Appeal No. 96571 of 2014 @ SLP (C) No. 27411 of 2010 etc. referred to on 'Listing Proforma' was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 9th July, 2014 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant leave and the same is pending for hearing. Copy Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 9th July, 2014 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 695 of 2015 filed between the same parties was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 8th May, 2015 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dispose of the same as having become infructuous. . Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 8th May, 2015 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is lastly submitted that Counsel for the Petitioner has on 6 th July, 2015 filed additional document along with application for placing on record additional documents and the said application has been registered as I.A.No.2. Copies of the same are being circulated herewith. The matter is listed before the Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 8th Day of July, 2015. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
Copy to: 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, dvocate D41, Defence Colony, New Delhi, ASSISTANT REGISTRAR C2
SECTIONIII IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.2 (Application for placing on record additional documents) Lanco Anpara Power Limited ...Petitioner VERSUS State of Uttar Pradesh& Ors. ...Respondents REVISED OFFICE REPORT The matter abovementioned has been filed by Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate, on behalf of the Petitioner against the Judgment and Order dated 28th April, 2015of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Tax No. 772 of 2011. It is submitted that Civil Appeal No. 96571 of 2014 @ SLP (C) No. 27411 of 2010 etc. referred to on 'Listing Proforma' was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 9th July, 2014 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant leave and the same is pending for hearing. Copy Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 9th July, 2014 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 695 of 2015 filed between the same parties was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 8th May, 2015 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dispose of the same as having become infructuous. . Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 8th May, 2015 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is lastly submitted that Counsel for the Petitioner has on 6 th July, 2015 filed additional document along with application for placing on record additional documents and the said application has been registered as I.A.No.2. Copies of the same are being circulated herewith. The matter is listed before the Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 8th Day of July, 2015. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
Copy to: 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, dvocate D41, Defence Colony, New Delhi, ASSISTANT REGISTRAR C2
SECTIONIII IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO. 16957 OF 2015 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.2 (Application for placing on record additional documents) Lanco Anpara Power Limited ...Petitioner VERSUS State of Uttar Pradesh& Ors. ...Respondents REVISED OFFICE REPORT The matter abovementioned has been filed by Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Advocate, on behalf of the Petitioner against the Judgment and Order dated 28th April, 2015of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Tax No. 772 of 2011. It is submitted that Civil Appeal No. 96571 of 2014 @ SLP (C) No. 27411 of 2010 etc. referred to on 'Listing Proforma' was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 9th July, 2014 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant leave and the same is pending for hearing. Copy Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 9th July, 2014 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is further submitted that Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 695 of 2015 filed between the same parties was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 8th May, 2015 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dispose of the same as having become infructuous. . Copy of the Record of Proceedings dated 8th May, 2015 is enclosed herewith for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. It is lastly submitted that Counsel for the Petitioner has on 6 th July, 2015 filed additional document along with application for placing on record additional documents and the said application has been registered as I.A.No.2. Copies of the same are being circulated herewith. The matter is listed before the Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 8th Day of July, 2015. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
Copy to: 1. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, dvocate D41, Defence Colony, New Delhi, ASSISTANT REGISTRAR C2
Ô ITEM NO.26 COURT NO.1 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16957/2015 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 28/04/2015 in WPT No. 772/2011 passed by the High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad) LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for exemption from filing O.T. and interim relief and office report) Date : 09/07/2015 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY For Petitioner(s) Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Akhil Sibal, Adv. Mr. Deepak Khurana, Adv. Ms. Aditi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice. In the meantime, there will be stay of operation of the impugned notices dated 14.03.2011 and 02.04.2011.Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed by (Neetu Khajuria) (Vinod Kulvi)NEETU KHAJURIADate: 2015.07.1017:17:26 IST Sr.P.A. Assistant RegistrarReason:
ITEM NO.51 COURT NO.10 SECTION XVIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Transfer Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 342/2014 M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTR.LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF M.P.& ORS Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for stay and office report) Date : 08/09/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVA KIRTI SINGH For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant Shukla,Adv. Mr. A. Singh,Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R In spite of service of notice there is no representation for the respondents. Post along with C.A. No.6569/2014. (NARENDRA PRASAD) (SHARDA KAPOOR) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
¼ ITEM NO.51 COURT NO.10 SECTION XVIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Transfer Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 342/2014 M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTR.LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF M.P.& ORS Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for stay and office report) Date : 08/09/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVA KIRTI SINGH For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant Shukla,Adv. Mr. A. Singh,Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R In spite of service of notice there is no representation for the respondents. Post along with C.A. No.6569/2014. (NARENDRA PRASAD) (SHARDA KAPOOR) COURT MASTER COURT MASTERSignature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byNarendra PrasadDate: 2014.09.0916:50:32 ISTReason:
> ITEM NO.76 REGISTRAR COURT. 1 SECTION XVIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR PANKAJ BHANDARI Transfer Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 342/2014 M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTR.LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF M.P.& ORS Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for stay and office report) Date : 19/08/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran ,Adv. For Respondent(s) UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Service is complete on the respondents but no one has put in appearance. Registry to process the matter for listing before the Hon'ble Court, as per rules. (PANKAJ BHANDARI) RegistrarSignature Not VerifiedDigitally signed byRupam DhamijaDate: 2014.08.2017:23:36 ISTReason:
\236 ITEM NO.13 COURT NO.6 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 27411/2010 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No. 15924/2009 passed by the High Court of Orissa At Cuttack) M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s) (with prayer for interim relief and office report) WITH SLP(C) No. 29105-29106/2011 (With Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 64/2012 (With prayer for and stay and and permission to file addl. documents and Office Report) T.P.(C) No. 580/2012 (With prayer for and stay and Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 848/2013 (With prayer for and stay and Office Report) SLP(C) No. 1487/2013 (With prayer for Office Report) W.P.(C) No. 385/2014 (With prayer for and stay and Office Report) Date : 09/07/2014 This petition was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE For Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashanto Chandra Sen, Adv. Mr. Anushurti, Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan ,Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Ms. Neha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Ankur Sehgal, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala ,Adv.Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed by For Respondent(s)Rajni MukhiDate: 2014.07.1913:29:21 IST Mr. Harin Raval, Sr. Adv.Reason: Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. - 2 - Mr. Shibashish Misra ,Adv. Mr. B. S. Banthia ,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
SLP ) No. 27411/2010, 29105-29106/2011 and SLP ) No. 1487/2013 Leave granted. W.P.(C) Nos.64/2012, 848/2013 & 385/2014 Rule Nisi. T.P. ) No. 580/2012 The transfer petition is allowed in terms of the SignedOrder. [RAJNI MUKHI] [USHA SHARMA] SR. P.A. COURT MASTER (Signed Order in T.P.(C) 580/2012 is placed on the file) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO. 580 OF 2012Essar Power MP Ltd. & Anr. ...Petitioners VersusState of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents O R D E R Heard. The transfer petition is allowed. The W.P.(C) No. 2721/2011, titled `M/s. Essar Power M.P.Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Pending before theHigh Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur shall stand transferredto this Court. The entire record pertaining to W.P. ) No.2721/2011 shall be transmitted to this Court by the High Court ofMadhya Pradesh at Jabalpur within four weeks from the date ofreceipt of the copy of this order. ..............................J. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA] ................................J. [S.A.BOBDE]NEW DELHI;JULY 09,2014
>ITEM NO.51 COURT NO.4 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 385 OF 2014HINDALCO INDUTRIES LTD.& ANR Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ODISHA & ORS Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for ex-Parte stay and office report)Date: 09/05/2014 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S. THAKUR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPANFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Mahesh Agarwal,Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala,Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal,Adv. Mr. Vivek Jain,Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Heard. Issue notice. Tag with SLP(C)No.27411 of 2010. In the meantime, the operation of the show causenotices/demand notices dated 03.08.2013, 03.01.2014 and29.03.2014 issued by respondent no.3, shall remain stayed. (Mahabir Singh) (Saroj Saini) Court Master Court Master
&ITEM NO.40 COURT NO.5 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgement and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No.15924/2009of The HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief and office report)WITH SLP(C) NO. 1487 of 2013(With appln(s) for c/delay in filing SLP and office report)SLP(C) NO. 29105-29106 of 2011(With office report)T.P.(C) NO. 580 of 2012(With appln(s) for stay and office report)W.P(C) NO. 64 of 2012(With appln(s) for stay and permission to file addl. documents andoffice report)W.P(C) NO. 848 of 2013(With appln(s) for stay and office report)Date: 15/04/2014 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIK HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANAFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashanto Chandra Sen, Adv. Mr. P. S. Sudheer, Adv. Mr. Anshul Gupta, Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv. 1 Mr. Vivek Jain, Adv. Mr. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. B.S. Banthia, Adv.For Respondent(s) Mr. Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv. Mr. Ankit Lal, Adv.
Mr. B.S. Banthia, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv. UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R List the matters on a non-miscellaneous day in the month of July, 2014. [Nidhi Ahuja] [Sharda Kapoor] Court Master Court Master 2
¢ITEM NO.17 COURT NO.5 SECTION XVIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL.) NO(s). 342 OF 2014 [FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING]M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTR.LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF M.P.& ORS Respondent(s)(With application for ex-Parte stay, exemption from filing OfficialTranslation and office report)Date: 10/03/2014 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIK HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLAFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka, Adv. Mr. Vivek Yadav, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R|Application seeking exemption from filing official translation is allowed. ||Issue notice. ||In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of the proceedings in Writ Petition ||No.2198 of 2012 titled as M/s Simplex Infrastructures Limited v. State of ||Madhya Pradesh & Ors. pending the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur. || ||[KALYANI GUPTA] | |[SHARDA KAPOOR] ||COURT MASTER | |COURT MASTER |
NITEM NO.31 COURT NO.5 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgement and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No.15924/2009 of The HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief and office report)WITH SLP(C) NO. 1487 of 2013(With appln. for c/delay in filing SLP and office report)SLP(C) NO. 29105-29106 of 2011(With office report)T.P.(C) NO. 580 of 2012(With appln. for stay and office report)W.P(C) NO. 64 of 2012(With applns. for stay, permission to file addl. documents and office report)W.P(C) NO. 848 of 2013(With appln. for stay and office report)Date: 02/01/2014 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIK HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.Y. EQBALFor the parties Mr. Harin Raval, Sr. Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv. Mr. Prashano Chandra Sen, Adv. Ms. Rajkumari Banju, Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan, Adv. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv. Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Ms. Parul Shukla, Adv. Mr. B.S. Banthia, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv. UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
In view of the letter circulated by learned counsel for the petitioners in SLP(C) No. 1487 of 2013, let the matters be listed after four weeks. Rejoinder be filed in the meanwhile. (G. SUDHAKARA RAO) (SHARDA KAPOOR) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
ìITEM NO.5 COURT NO.6 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgement and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No.15924/2009 of The HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief and office report)WITH SLP(C) NO. 1487 of 2013(With appln. for c/delay in filing SLP and office report)SLP(C) NO. 29105-29106 of 2011(With office report)T.P.(C) NO. 580 of 2012(With appln. for stay and office report)W.P(C) NO. 64 of 2012(With applns. for stay, permission to file addl. documents and office report)W.P(C) NO. 848 of 2013(With appln. for stay and office report)Date: 11/11/2013 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIK HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHARFor the parties: Mr. Prashanto Chandra Sen, Adv. Ms. Rajkumari Banju, Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv. Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Harin Raval, Sr. Adv. Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka, Adv. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Adv. Mr. Mishra Saurabh, Adv. Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Adv. Mr. B.S. Banthia, Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv. UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
These matters be listed after four weeks under the heading "After Notice Matters". Parties may file pleadings in the meanwhile. In W.P.(C) No. 848 of 2013, petitioner will take fresh steps for effecting service on the unserved respondents, in the meantime. (G. SUDHAKARA RAO) (SURESH KUMAR VERMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
ÎITEM NO.13 COURT NO.6 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSWRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 848 OF 2013 (FOR PREL. HEARING)ESSAR STEEL INDIA LTD Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for ex-parte stay and office report)Date: 30/09/2013 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIK HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHARFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Kavin Gulati, Sr. Adv. Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv. Ms. Parul Shukla, Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice. Tag with SLP(C) Nos. 29105-29106 of 2011 etc. In the meantime, the impugned Notice of Demand dated 3rd July, 2013 shall remain stayed. (G. SUDHAKARA RAO) (SHARDA KAPOOR) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
SECTION-III IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NOS. 29105-29106 OF 2011 WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEEF Essar Steel Limited & Anr. ...PETITIONERS -VERSUS- State of Orissa & Ors. ...RESPONDENTS OFFICE REPORT The matters above-mentioned were listed with office report dated 22nd August, 2012 before the Hon'ble Court on 24th August, 2012, when the Court was pleased to pass the following order : “In view of the letters circulated on behalf of the respondents in these matters, time to file counter affidavit by the State of Orissa, is extended by four weeks; rejoinder, if any, may be filed within two weeks thereafter.� It is submitted that counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 has on 7th September, 2012 filed counter affidavit and the copy of the same has been included in the paper-books but counsel for the petitionr has not filed rejoinder affidavit so far. It is further submitted that no one has filed Vakalatnama/ Appearance on behalf of respondent no. 5 though served with notice. The matters are listed before the Court with this Office Report. Dated this the 1st day of August, 2013. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Copy to : 1. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, Advocate 48, Lawyers Chamber. 2. Mr. Shibashish Misra, Advocate E-83, Greater Kailash, New Delhi. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
pITEM NO.9 COURT NO.6 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgment and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No. 15924/2009 of TheHIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief and office report)WITHSLP(C) NO. 1487 of 2013[STATE OF M.P. & ORS. V. M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. & ANR.](With application for condonation of delay in filing SLP and office report)SLP(C) NO. 29105-29106 of 2011[ESSAR STEEL LTD. & ANR. V. STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.](With office report)W.P(C) NO. 64 of 2012[HINDALCO INDUSTRIES LTD. V. STATE OF M.P. & ORS.](With application for stay, permission to file additional documents andoffice report)Date: 02/08/2013 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIK HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHARFor Petitioner(s) Mr. C.A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv.In SLP 27411 Mtr. Prashanto Chandra Sen, Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan, Adv.In SLP 29105-106 Mr. Amar Dave, Adv.& WP 64 Ms. Shikha Sarin, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv.In SLP 1487 Mr. B.S. Banthia, Adv.For Respondent(s)in SLP 27411 & Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv.29105 Mr. Suvinay Dash, Adv.For RR 1 in WP 64 Mr. B.S. Banthia, Adv.In SLP 1487 Mr. Prashant Shukla, Adv. Mr. Alok Hoonka,Adv. Mr. Abhinav, Adv. Mr. Nikhilesh Ramachandran, Adv. UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R| |
|Mr. Nikhilesh Ramachandran as appeared for respondent No. 1 in SLP(C) NO. 1487 ||of 2013 and in the said SLP Mr. E.C. Agrawala will appear for respondent No. 2 ||as he has already appeared for the same respondent in connected SLP. ||Vakalatnama be filed within a week. ||Six weeks' time is granted to the respondents in SLP(C) No. 1487 of 2013 to ||file counter affidavit. ||Pleadings are complete in SLP(C) NO. 27411 of 2010. ||List the matters after six weeks. || ||[KALYANI GUPTA] | |[SHARDA KAPOOR] ||COURT MASTER | |COURT MASTER |
ÎITEM NO.21 COURT NO.1 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)....../2012 CC 22935/2012(From the judgement and order dated 27/02/2012 in WP No.2198/2012of The HIGH COURT OF M.P AT JABALPUR)STATE OF MP & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUSM/S SIMPLEX INFRATRUCTURE LTD & ANR. Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for c/delay in filing SLP and office report)Date: 11/01/2013 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAMAJIT SENFor Petitioner(s) Mr. B.S. Banthia, AORFor Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay, as also on the special leave petition. Let the matter be heard along with S.L.P.(C) No.27411 of 2010. In the meantime, there will be an ad-interim order staying the collection of fees under the Building and other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996.|(Chetan Kumar) | |(Juginder Kaur) ||Court Master | |Assistant Registrar |
hITEM NO.38 COURT NO.2 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgement and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No.15924/2009 of TheHIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief and office report )WITH SLP(C) NO. 29105-29106 of 2011(With office report)W.P(C) NO. 64 of 2012(With appln.(s) for stay and permission to file addl.documents and officereport)Date: 24/08/2012 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWARFor Petitioner(s) Mr. P.C. Sen, Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan,AOR. Ms Aanchal Yadav, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agarwal, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, AOR. Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Abhinav Agarwal, Adv.For Respondent(s) Mr. Shibashish Misra,AOR. Mr. Vikas Upadhyay, Adv. Mr. B.S. Banthia, AOR. UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R In view of the letters circulated on behalf of the respondents in these matters, time to file counter affidavit by the State of Orissa, is extended by four weeks; rejoinder, if any, may be filed within two weeks thereafter.|(Sheetal Dhingra) | |(Juginder Kaur) ||COURT MASTER | |Assistant Registrar |
ÐITEM NO.33 COURT NO.2 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 64 OF 2012HINDALCO INDUSTRIES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF M.P.& ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for ex-Parte stay,exemption from filing O.T.,andoffice report ))Date: 19/03/2012 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER SINGH NIJJARFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Abhinav Agarwal, Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice, returnable four weeks hence. Tag with SLP(C)No.27411 of 2010. In the meantime, the operation of the show cause notices, mentioned in prayer (b) of I.A.2 of 2012, shall remain stayed.(Sheetal Dhingra) (Juginder Kaur) COURT MASTER Assistant Registrar
ÐITEM NO.33 COURT NO.2 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 64 OF 2012HINDALCO INDUSTRIES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF M.P.& ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for ex-Parte stay,exemption from filing O.T.,andoffice report ))Date: 19/03/2012 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER SINGH NIJJARFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala,Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv. Mr. Abhinav Agarwal, Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice, returnable four weeks hence. Tag with SLP(C)No.27411 of 2010. In the meantime, the operation of the show cause notices, mentioned in prayer (b) of I.A.2 of 2012, shall remain stayed.(Sheetal Dhingra) (Juginder Kaur) COURT MASTER Assistant Registrar
4ITEM NO.6 COURT NO.2 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.64 OF 2012HINDALCO INDUSTRIES LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF M.P.& ORS. Respondent(s)(With appln(s) for ex-Parte stay, exemption from filing O.T. andoffice report)Date: 02/03/2012 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER SINGH NIJJARFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv. (NP) Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, AOR Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R On the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner, let this matter stand adjourned till 19th March, 2012. (Chetan Kumar) (Juginder Kaur) Court Master Assistant Registrar
.ITEM NO.19 COURT NO.2 SECTION III S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)....../2011 CC 16511/2011(From the judgement and order dated 18/05/2011 & 12/07/2011 in MCNo.9304/2011,MC No.10884/2011,WP No.10884/201 of The HIGH COURT OFORISSA AT CUTTACK)ESSAR STEEL LTD.& ANR Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)With I.A.1(C/delay in filing SLP and office report ))Date: 17/10/2011 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER SINGH NIJJARFor Petitioner(s) Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv.-on-Record.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Delay condoned. Issue notice. Tag with SLP(C)No.27411 of 2010. In the meantime, the impugned Notice of Demand dated 14th September, 2010, shall remain stayed.(Sheetal Dhingra) (Juginder Kaur) COURT MASTER Assistant Registrar
dITEM NO.97 REGISTRAR COURT.1 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE REGISTRAR S.G. SHAHPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief and office report)Date: 13/12/2010 This Petition was called on for hearing today.For Petitioner(s) Mr. A.Venayagam Balan,Adv.For Respondent(s) Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv. UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R No request for filing counter affidavit. List before the Hon'ble Court, as per rules. (S.G. SHAH) REGISTRARrd
vITEM NO.29 COURT NO.2 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgement and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No. 15924/2009of The HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief )Date: 04/10/2010 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIKFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv. Mr. P.C. Sen, Adv. Ms. Swati Verma, Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan,Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Issue notice. In the meantime, there will be stay of operation of the impugned notice dated 12th October, 2009. (Sheetal Dhingra) (Juginder Kaur) Court Master Court Master
®ITEM NO.MM-2B COURT NO.2 SECTION XV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGSPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).27411/2010(From the judgement and order dated 04/09/2010 in WP No. 15924/2009of The HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK)M/S. STERLITE ENERGY LTD. Petitioner(s) VERSUSSTATE OF ORISSA & ORS. Respondent(s)(With prayer for interim relief )Date: 23/09/2010 This Petition was called on for hearing today.CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALTAMAS KABIR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. PATNAIKFor Petitioner(s) Mr. R.F. Nariman,Sr.Adv. Mr. P.C. Sen,Adv. Ms. Swati Verma,Adv. Mr. A.Venayagam Balan,Adv.For Respondent(s) UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Let the matter be listed on the date notified. (Ganga Thakur) (Juginder Kaur) PS to Registrar Court Master