

**HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR**

D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1183/2018

In

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7356/2008

1. Om Prakash Son of Shri Radhey, Aged About 50 Years,
(Since Deceased)
 2. Megheshyam Son Of Mangal, Aged About 58 Years, (Since
Deceased)
 - 2/1 Smt. Mohan Dai
 - 2/2 Prem Chand
 - 2/3 Bhag Chand
- Residents Of Village Sikrori, Tehsil Kumher, District
Bharatpur (Raj.)
- 2/4 Smt. Rani W/o. Chitoo Prasad, Resident Of Village Bharna
Khurd, Tehsil Chata, District Mathura (Raj.).
 3. Radhakishan Son Of Shri Mangal, Aged About 66 Years,
 4. Nekram Son Of Shri Jagram, Aged About 43
 5. Narendra Singh Son Of Shri Harmohan, Aged About 36
Years,
- All are Villagers and Resident of Village Sikrori, Tehsil
Kumher, District Bharatpur (Raj.)

----Appellants-(Intervenors)

Versus

1. Girraj, Son Of Shri Hari Kishan, Aged About 63 Years
 2. Dau, Son Of Shri Hari Kishan, Aged About 45 Years
- Both Residents Of Village Sikrori, Tehsil Kumher, District
Bharatpur (Raj.)

...Petitioners-Respondents

3. The State Of Rajasthan through the Secretary in the
Department Of Revenue, Government Of Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
4. The Board Of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer.
5. The Collector, Bharatpur.

6. The State Government through The Tehsildar, Kumher, District Bharatpur (Raj.)
7. Deen Dayal Sharma S/o. Shri Sanwal, Aged About 66 Years, Resident Of Village and Post Sikrori, Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur (Raj.)
8. Ram Gopal S/o. Shri Sanwal, Aged About 47 Years, Resident Of Village and Post Sikrori, Tehsil Kumher, District Bharatpur (Raj.)

-----Non-Petitioners-Respondents

For Appellant(s)	:	Mr. Suresh Pareek, Senior Advocate with Mr. S.L. Sharma Advocate.
For Respondent(s)	:	Mr. Anil Mehta, Additional Advocate General with Mr. Yashodhar Pandey Advocate Mr. Sanjay Mehrish Advocate Mr. T.L. Pandey Advocate.

HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI

Judgment / Order

Reportable

31/03/2022

An application for grant of leave to appeal has been filed by the appellants, who were permitted to intervene in the writ petition filed by Girraj and Dau, the first and the second respondent in this appeal. As the prayer for grant of leave has been opposed, this Court is called upon to decide whether leave can be granted to the present applicants/proposed appellants.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties on the issue of leave to appeal, it is

apposite to briefly state regarding case of respondents-writ petitioners in the writ petition.

Girraj and Dau assailed an order dated 18.08.2005 passed by the Collector, order dated 14.07.2008 passed by the Board of Revenue in the matter of a suit filed by Girraj and Dau seeking declaration regarding their khatedari rights in respect of the land in dispute. According to the writ petitioners, the land in dispute, after coming into force the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959, was entered in the name of the writ-petitioners in terms of Section 29 of the said Act and the writ petitioners were recorded as *Khudkasht* of the land in Jamabandi of Samwat 2012-2015. According to the writ-petitioners, they had acquired khatidari rights, but the State Government wrongfully entered the said land and recorded as Charagah in the Samwat Year 2019, which gave rise to cause of action to file suit before the Additional Collector for correction of entries by declaring them as khatedars. That suit was decreed in favour of the writ-petitioners vide order dated 21.04.1984, but after almost 19 years, a reference was made to the Collector, Bharatpur, who vide order dated 18.12.2003 rejected the reference and directed the Tehsildar to conduct a fresh investigation with the direction that if he finds that there has been some illegality committed by the revenue authority, a fresh reference may be made. The matter travelled up to the Board of Revenue which allowed the reference and set aside the judgment and decree passed the Assistant Collector, declaring the land as Charagah with a direction for the same being recorded as Charagah. Aggrieved by the said decision, petition was filed by Girraj and Dau. In that petition, proposed

appellants were permitted to intervene in opposition of the petition.

After hearing the writ-petitioners, the State and the intervenors, learned Single Judge held that the order dated 18.08.2005 passed by the Collector as also order dated 14.07.2008 passed by the Board of Revenue were illegal and consequently those orders were set aside. It was held that the writ-petitioners would have all the rights as flown from the judgment and decree dated 21.04.1984 passed by the Assistant Collector meaning thereby that the land was not to be treated as Charagah, but in the khatedari rights of the writ-petitioners.

Though, the State did not prefer any appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge, the intervenors have filed this appeal along with an application for grant of leave to appeal.

Learned counsel for the proposed appellants would submit that even though, the proposed appellants were not party to the writ proceedings or in any of the proceedings before the Assistant Collector, Collector or the Board of Revenue, they were permitted to intervene in the writ petition as it was not merely a dispute between two private persons claiming khatedari rights, but it is a case where the land which was recorded as Charagah (pasture land), was declared to be in khatedari rights of the writ-petitioners which deprived the intervenors and other villagers to use the land in dispute as pasture land. Therefore, in these peculiar circumstances and as the villagers, the intervenors/proposed appellants are deprived of use of the land for common purposes as pasture land, would be "person aggrieved" and therefore, leave may be granted to assail the order of the learned Single Judge.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 & 2-writ-petitioners would submit that the intervenors were not party in any of the proceedings up to the Board of Revenue, it was only when the order of the Board of Revenue was assailed by the writ-petitioners before this Court by filing a writ petition, the intervenors entered into the litigation seeking to oppose the relief sought in the writ petition and in that limited capacity alone, they were permitted to intervene. As they were not party to the writ petition, nor in any of the proceedings out of which writ petition had arisen, leave could not be granted in their favour. Both the parties have relied upon various judgments.

The first issue which arises for consideration is as to whether, on general principles, a person, who is not party to the proceedings giving rise to the order sought to be challenged in appeal, can be permitted to file an appeal with the leave of the court.

This issue came up for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Nookala Setharamaiah Versus Kotaiah Naidu and Others, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1354.** Their Lordships in the Supreme Court, taking note of settled legal position in plethora of decisions held as below:-

"5. It was, however, said that the appellant was not impleaded as a party to Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957, and he could not seek redress in a superior court against the order of Basi Reddy, J. But it is settled by a long course of authorities that a person who has not been made a party to a proceeding may still appeal with leave of the appellate Court, provided he might have properly been made a party to the proceeding: see Re. "B" an Infant, (1958) 1 QB 12. In In re Securities Insurance Co., (1984) 2 Ch 410, Lindley, L. J., observed at p. 413:

"I understand the practice to be perfectly well settled that a person who is a party can appeal (of course within the proper time) without any leave, and that a person who without being a party is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it, or is prejudicially affected by it, cannot appeal without leave. It does not require much to obtain leave. If a person alleging himself to be aggrieved by an order can make out even a prima facie case why he should have leave he will get it; but without leave he is not entitled to appeal.

The rule has been accepted by the High Courts in India: See *Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association*, ILR (1949) Bom 591 = (AIR 1949 Bom 141); *Ponnalagu v. State of Madras*, ILR (1953) Mad 808 = (AIR 1953 Mad 485) and *Pullayya v. Nagbhushanam*, ILR (1962) Andh Pra 127 = (AIR 1962 Andh Pra 140) (FB).

6. The appellant could undoubtedly have been made a party to a petition before the High Court. He could, therefore, challenge the correctness of the order made by Basi Reddy, J. No objection could be raised against the grant of leave to him to appeal on the ground that he was not a party to the Writ Petition No.888 of 1957. In my judgment therefore, Appeal No.2121 of 1969 must also fail."

However, in another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **N. Swain and Another Versus B.K. Mohapatra and Others, 1970 (3) Supreme Court Cases 321**, the appeal preferred at the instance of intervenors in the writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable. That was a case where a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India was granted by the High Court in favour of the intervenors in the writ petition for preferring an appeal in the Supreme Court and that was a case where the State had separately preferred an appeal. Observing that as the intervenors could have intervened in the appeal filed by the State, the appeal of the intervenors was held to be not

maintainable observing that High Court ought not to have granted certificate in favour of the intervenors.

The Supreme Court did not go further as to whether with the leave of the court, appeal could be entertained at the instance of the intervenors on the premise that they were "person aggrieved" in the sense of that word, either because they were bound by the order or because the order was prejudicial to their interest.

In another subsequent decision in the case of **State of Punjab (now Haryana) and Others Versus Amar Singh and Another, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 994**, this issue again came up for consideration. On facts, that was a case relating to claim of land owners qua the ceiling laws and issue as to whether State Government or its department, if aggrieved, or prejudiced by a decision of the Collector, could prefer an appeal, was decided as below:-

"83. There is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or in the Tenancy Act saying as to who can file an appeal or revision against the decision or order of the Collector exercising jurisdiction under Section 18. But in view of the long array of judicial decisions including that of the Financial Commissioner, there can be no doubt that the State Government or its Department can, if aggrieved, or prejudiced by such a decision, go in appeal or revision against it.

84. Firstly there is a catena of authorities which, following the doctrine of Lindley, L.J., in re Securities Insurance Co., (1894) 2 Ch 410 have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it. As a rule, leave to appeal will not be refused to a person who might have been made ex nomine a party – see Province of Bombay v. W. I. Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bom 141; Heera Singh v. Veerka, AIR 1958 Raj 181 and Shivaraya v. Siddamma, AIR

1963 Mys 127; Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai, AIR 1961 Ker 114. In re B, an Infant (1958) QB 12; Govinda Menon v. Madhavan Nair, AIR 1964 Ker 235.

On general principles, it was held that a person, who is not a party to a decree or order, may, with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it.

In a subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Ram Nandan Singh And Others Versus AG Office Employees Cooperative House Construction Society Limited, Ranchi and Others, (2007) 14 Supreme Court Cases 102**, objection to the maintainability of the appeal at the instance of intervenors was again taken note of by placing reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of **N. Swain and Another (Supra)** and **Ravi Rao Gaikwad and Others Versus Rajajinagar Youth Social Welfare Assn. And Others, (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 62** was taken as below:-

"9. Ms Bagchi, learned counsel appearing for the erstwhile Managing Committee questions the locus of the appellants to prefer this appeal relying on the decisions of this Court in *N. Swain v. B.K. Mohapatra* and *Ravi Rao Gaikwad v. Rajajinagar Youth Social Welfare Assn.*"

The objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal at the instance of intervenors was overruled, taking into consideration that the intervenors, right from the beginning, had been taking interest in the proceedings and they were even impleaded as party in the writ appeal before the High Court. Thus,

the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of **N. Swain and Another (Supra) and Ravi Rao Gaikwad and Others (supra)** were distinguished on facts of that case.

In one of its earlier decisions, the High Court of Bombay in the case of **The Province of Bombay and Ors. Versus Western India Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bombay 141**, dealt with the similar objection that the appeal was preferred at the instance of the one, who was not a party to appeal, but taking into consideration that it would be in the interest of justice to allow the Province of Bombay to prefer appeal, leave was granted on following considerations:

"3. Now, as far as the Province of Bombay is concerned, it was not a party to the petition, although under the direction of the learned Judge notice was served upon the Province of Bombay, and pursuant to that notice the Province of Bombay appeared before the learned Judge and submitted its point of view before the Court; and a preliminary point is taken that inasmuch as the Province of Bombay was not a party to the petition, it is not competent for the Province of Bombay to prefer an appeal from the decision of the learned Judge. The Civil Procedure Code does not in terms lay down as to who can be a party to an appeal. But it is clear, and this fact arises from the very basis of appeals, that only a party against whom a decision is given has a right to prefer an appeal. Even in England the position is the same. But it is recognised that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal if he is affected by the order of the trial Court, provided he obtains leave from the Court of Appeal. Therefore, whereas in the case of a party to a suit he has a right of appeal, in the case of a person, not a party to the suit who is affected by the order he has no right, but the Court of Appeal may in its discretion allow him to prefer an appeal. It is difficult to understand why the Province of Bombay, which is vitally affected by the decision of Mr. Justice Coyajee, did not think fit to get itself made a party to the petition. Not only it did not do so, but it preferred an appeal without obtaining any leave or any direction from the Court of Appeal, and there can be no doubt that Mr. Vimadalal's contention is sound that as the record stands

the appeal preferred by the Province of Bombay is not competent. It is an appeal preferred by a person who was not a party to the proceedings before Mr. Justice Coyajee and who has not been given any leave by the Court of Appeal to prefer this appeal. It was open to the Province of Bombay to come before us before filing this appeal and get the necessary leave and directions, but that, again, the Province of Bombay did not choose to do. But I do not think it would be right to deprive the Province of Bombay of the right to challenge Mr. Justice Coyajee's decision merely on this technical ground. Technicalities should never be permitted to override substantial justice, and we think that the Province of Bombay should be heard provided it pays all the costs of this appeal up to date. We would, therefore, give leave to the Province of Bombay to maintain this appeal although it was not a party to the proceedings before Mr. Justice Coyajee."

On facts, that was a case where even though, Province of Bombay was not a party to the petition, under the direction of the learned Judge, notice was served upon the Province of Bombay, and pursuant to that notice, the Province of Bombay appeared before the learned Judge and submitted its point of view before the Court. Applying the principle that a person, who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal if he is affected by the order of the Trial Court, provided he obtains leave from the Court of Appeal, appeal at the instance of the Province of Bombay was held maintainable.

The High Court of Bombay in the case of **Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak Versus The Charity Commissioner, Bombay and Others, AIR 1976 Bombay 304**, dealt with a case where an issue arose as to whether appeal at the instance of the interfeon was maintainable. On facts, it was found that as the interfeon claimed to be a devotee or a person interested in the proper management of the Haji Malan Dargah, and he has submitted

before the lower Court as also before the High Court that he opposes the appointment of the defendant as one of the Trustees on the allegation that he was acting in the manner prejudicial to the best interests of the Trust, for the ends of justice and having regard to the nature of the suit, leave was granted and objection was overruled.

Similar view was taken by the High Court of Calcutta in the case of **United Commercial Bank Versus Hanuman Synthetics Ltd and Others, AIR 1985 Calcutta 96**, repelling the contention that merely because a person was aggrieved or has suffered a prejudice, he cannot in law be allowed to prefer an appeal, not being a party to the proceedings. Taking into consideration the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **State of Punjab (now Haryana) and Others Versus Amar Singh and Another (supra)** by R.S. Sarkaria J., in a separate judgment as also by V. R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for majority, it was held that observations in the majority view that no right of review or appeal under the provisions of the Punjab Securities and Land Tenures Act, 1953 could be availed of by the State as of right as it was not party to proceedings could not be stretched that State could not appeal even with the leave of the Court.

In taking this view, the Calcutta High Court relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of the **The Province of Bombay and Ors. (Supra)**, as also the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of **Nookala Setharamaiah (supra)** and **Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha**

Versus Golcha Properties Private Ltd. (In Liquidation) AIR 1971 Supreme Court 374.

Therefore, the settled legal position, which emerges from the aforesaid decisions is that as a general principle where a person was not party to the petition/suit at the first instance, nevertheless, he can prefer an appeal, if he is aggrieved by the order passed in the suit/petition with the leave of the Court, if he satisfies that he is a "person aggrieved" or bound by the order or when order is prejudicial to his interest.

As we have seen, in the case of **Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak (supra)**, inter alia, who was not party to suit, was granted leave to appeal, for the ends of justice and having regard to the nature of the suit as he claimed to be a devotee or a person interested in the proper management of the Haji Malan Dargah and that he had submitted before the lower Court and even before the High Court that he opposes the appointment of the defendant as Trustee as he was acting in the manner prejudicial to the best interest of the Trust.

In a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Adi Pherozshah Gandhi Versus H. M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 385**, the expression a "person aggrieved" was considered in elaborate details with reference to large number of decisions turning on different facts and context.

M. Hidayatullah, C.J. (concurring with majority view) was persuaded with long line of decisions explaining "person

aggrieved", in the context of different enactments. In Para-7, their Lordships observed thus:-

"7. The expression a 'person aggrieved' is not new, nor has it occurred for the first time in the Advocates' Act. In fact it occurs in several Indian Acts and in British Statutes for more than a hundred years. In the latter a right of appeal to a 'person aggrieved' is conferred in diverse contexts. It occurs in the Ale House Act, the Bankruptcy Acts, Copyright Act, Highway Act, Licensing Acts, Milk and Dairies (Amendment) Act, Rating and Valuation Act, Summary Jurisdiction Act, Union Committee Act, Local Acts, in certiorari proceedings and the Defence of Realm Regulations to mention only a few. The list of Indian Acts is equally long."

Referring to the observations made in *Re Sidebotham Ex parte Sidebotham* (1880) 14 Ch D 458, the meaning of expression "person aggrieved" in the context of Section 71 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 was observed and referred to as below:-

"8. As a result of the frequent use of this rather vague phrase, which practice, as Lord Parker pointed out in *Ealing Corporation v. Jones*, 1959-1 QB 384 has not been avoided, in spite of the confusion it causes, selections from the observations of judges expounding the phrase in the context of these varied statutes were cited before us for our acceptance. The observations often conflict since they were made in different contexts and involved the special standing of the party claiming the right of appeal. Yet these definitions are not entirely without value for they disclose a certain unanimity on the essential features of this phrase, even in the diversity of the contexts. The font and origo of the discussion is the well-known definition of the phrase by James L.J. in *In Re Sidebotham Ex p. Sidebotham*, (1880) 14 Ch D 458. It was observed that the words 'person aggrieved' in Section 71 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 meant:

"not really a person who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who had suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wrongfully deprived him of

something, or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something."

The important words in this definition are "a benefit which he might have received" and "a legal grievance" against the decision which "wrongfully deprives him of something" or affects "his title to something".

Two more cases throwing light on the expression "person aggrieved" in similar context were also noted as below:-

"10. Two cases which may usefully be seen in the same context may next be mentioned. In *Jennings v. Kelly* (1940) AC 206 in relation to the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, Lord Wright did say that if a person was treated in certiorari proceedings as a competent party and notice was served on him as being a proper party he would be a person aggrieved. The point to bear in mind is that the person must be treated as a party. However the force of the observation was considerably weakened because the party there was ordered to pay costs and the right of appeal was held to be available on that limited ground. Further qualification is to be found in *In Re Riviere's Trade Mark*, (1884) 26 Ch D 48 where Lord Selborne observed:

"..... it must be a legal grievance it must not be *stet pro ratione voluntas*; the applicant must not come merely saying 'I do not like this thing to be done', it must be shown that it tends to his injury, or to his damage, in the legal sense of the word."

The locus standi of the person aggrieved must be found from his position in the first proceeding and his grievance must arise from that standing taken with the effect of the order on him."

सत्यमेव जयते

Having noted various judgments contextually interpreting the expression "person aggrieved", it was highlighted that any person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a "person aggrieved", rather he must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received, if the order had gone the other way. It was explained as below:-

"12. From these cases it is apparent that any person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a

'person aggrieved'. He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. It is no, doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure him. That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance. These principles are gathered from the cases cited and do not, as I shall show later, do violence to the context in which the phrase occurs in the Advocates' Act. Although I am aware that in *Seven Oaks Urban District Council v. Twynam*, 1929-2 KB 440 8 p. 443, Lord Hewart C.J. uttered words of caution, again emphasised by Lord Parker C.J. in 1959-1 QB 384 (*supra*), in applying too readily the definitions given in relation to other statutes but I do not think I am going beyond what Lord Hewart, C.J. said and what Lord Parker C.J. did in the case. Lord Parker observed:

"..... As Lord Hewart C.J. pointed out in 1929-2 KB 440: 'but as has been said again and again there is often little utility in seeking to interpret particular expressions in one statute by reference to decisions given upon similar expressions in different statutes which have been enacted alio intuitu. The problem with which we are concerned is not, what is the meaning of the expression 'aggrieved' in any one of a dozen other statutes, but what is its meaning in this part of this statute?' Accordingly, I only look at the cases to which we have been referred to see if there are general principles which can be extracted which will guide the court in approaching the question as to what the words "person aggrieved" mean in any particular statute."

If I may say respectfully I fully endorse this approach. I am now in a position to examine the Advocates' Act but before I do so I must refer to a case near in point to this case, than any case considered before."

In the case in hand, the proposed appellants/intervenors in the writ petition, were permitted to intervene in the writ petition, obviously taking into consideration that the dispute involved a claim of individuals, who claimed to be the khatedars of the land as against the State's action of declaring and recording the land as

a pasture land. Resident of a village where a pasture land is situated, would certainly be a person who would be interested in ensuring that the land is reserved for pasture land for benefit of all for grazing of cattle including that of the intervenors, which is a common interest of all the villagers. If the land is allowed to be recorded as khatedar land, it would deprive the villagers of using the land as pasture land for grazing their cattle. The intervenors, being villagers, who would be deprived of use of the land for common use as pasture land, in the context of the present case, would certainly be "person aggrieved" because in the event, if the order passed by the learned Single Judge is allowed to stand, they would also be deprived of the use of the land as pasture land. Therefore, the word "person aggrieved" in the present context is to be given a wider meaning and should not be given a restricted meaning. For taking this view, this Court places reliance upon the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Adi Pherozshah Gandhi (supra)**, wherein it was held as under:-

"17. Lord Denning referred to the definition of James L.J. in (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 (supra) and said that if the definition were to be regarded as exhaustive and were held applicable, an 'aggrieved person' would be only a person who was a party to a lis, a controversy inter partes and had a decision given against him. The Attorney General would not come within this restricted definition as there was no suit between two parties when disciplinary proceedings were started ex mero motu by the court or at the instance of the Attorney General or some one against a legal practitioner. But the definition of James L.J. was not exhaustive and the words 'person aggrieved', were of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation. They included not a busy body but certainly one who had a genuine grievance because an order had been made which prejudicially affected his interests....."

Consequently, application for grant of leave to appeal is allowed.

List this case for further orders.

(MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA), ACTING CJ

Sanjay Kumawat-12



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