



**HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR**

D.B. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 167/2023

Ravi Kumar S/o Satnaam, Aged About 24 Years, J J Colony,
Sirsa, P.s. And Dist. Sirsa, Haryana.

(At Present Lodged In Central Jail, Sri Ganganagar).

----Appellant

Versus

State Of Rajasthan, Through PP

----Respondent

For Appellant(s)	:	Mr. Pritam Solanki Mr. Arunoday Inkeshwar.
For Respondent(s)	:	Mr. Sharwan Sing Rathore, PP

**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINIT KUMAR MATHUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA**

Judgment

BY THE COURT: (PER HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINIT KUMAR MATHUR)

1.	Date of conclusion of argument	17.02.2026
2.	Date on which the judgment was reserved	17.02.2026
3.	Whether the full judgment or only operative part is pronounced	Full Judgment
4.	Date of Pronouncement	25.02.2026

1. The present Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. by the accused–appellant Ravi Kumar son of Shri Satnaam, assailing the legality and validity of the judgment dated 23.01.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar, in Sessions Case No. 26/2017 (State vs. Ravi Kumar), whereby the accused–appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of



Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo six month's simple imprisonment.

2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that on 18.06.2017, the complainant Deepak Singh submitted a written report (Exhibit P-9) at Police Station Suratgarh, stating therein that his uncle's son, Sunny, son of Charan Singh, had come to Suratgarh from Sirsa approximately 9-10 days prior for the purpose of employment, along with Raju, Jayram, and Ravi. All four were residing together in a rented room situated in Ward No. 8, RIICO Area, Suratgarh. It was alleged that on 14.06.2017 at about 10:00 p.m., Ravi Kumar had a quarrel with Sunny Singh and, in the course of the altercation, inflicted two knife blows upon him, causing grievous injuries. The injured was immediately taken to the hospital at Suratgarh, from where he was referred to Bikaner for further treatment. However, on 17.06.2017 at about 8:00 p.m., Sunny Singh succumbed to his injuries during treatment at the hospital in Bikaner. It was specifically alleged that Ravi Kumar assaulted Sunny Singh with the intention to cause fatal injuries, which ultimately resulted in his death.

3. On the basis of the of the written report (Ex.P-9), a formal First Information Report bearing No. 304/2017 (Ex.P-10) came to be registered at Police Station Suratgarh, Sri Ganganagar, against



the accused-appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

4. After completion of investigation, Police filed a charge-sheet against the accused-appellant for the offences under Section 302 IPC.

5. Learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges under Section 302 of IPC to the accused-appellant, who denied the charges and sought trial.

6. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses. In support of its case, the prosecution also produced documentary evidence, Exhibits P-01 to P-35.

7. The statement of the accused-appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He denied all incriminating circumstances put to him, stating that the prosecution witnesses had deposed falsely and he is innocent. The accused-appellant produced documentary evidence as Exhibits D-2 and Exhibits D-3.

8. Learned Trial Court, after hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of both sides, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant as aforesaid vide its judgment dated 23.01.2023.

9. Hence the present appeal.



10. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge are contrary to the settled principles of law as well as the facts and evidence available on record, and therefore, the same are liable to be quashed and set aside.

11. He further submitted that the Learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence in its true and proper perspective and has erroneously convicted the appellant on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The findings recorded by the court below are perverse, arbitrary, and not supported by cogent evidence.

12. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction is primarily based upon the statements of alleged eye-witnesses PW-5 Jayram and PW-7 Rajaram, who projected themselves as eye-witnesses to the incident. However, a bare reading of their testimonies reveals material contradictions and inconsistencies. There are significant discrepancies not only inter se between their statements, but also between their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Learned Trial Court. In such circumstances, while relying on their testimony and convicting and



sentencing the present accused-appellant is wholly unsafe and is unsustainable in the eyes of law.

13. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that the Learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to properly consider the fact that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of four days from the date of the incident. The explanation furnished by the prosecution that the family was occupied in the treatment of the injured is neither satisfactory nor convincing. In a case of alleged stabbing, the matter ought to have been immediately reported either by the complainant or by the hospital authorities. The inordinate and unexplained delay creates serious doubt about the veracity of the prosecution story.

14. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant did not abscond after the incident; rather, he remained with the injured Sunny during his medical treatment. As per the statement of PW-5 Jayram, it was the appellant who took the injured to the hospital, informed his parents about the occurrence, and even bore the medical expenses. Such conduct is wholly inconsistent with the prosecution case and creates a strong doubt regarding false implication of the appellant.

15. Learned counsel submitted that as per the testimony of PW-9 Dr. Bhanwarlal, it is clear that if the deceased was given prompt and proper treatment, his life could have been saved. The doctor



further stated that the cause of death was formation of pus in the cavity, leading to septicemia and spread of infection throughout the body. These crucial aspects have not been properly considered or appreciated by the Learned Trial Court while recording conviction.

16. Learned counsel also submitted that the alleged recovery of the knife as well as the clothes of the deceased is highly doubtful and suffers from serious infirmities. The court below has failed to consider these material contradictions and discrepancies, which has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.

17. Learned counsel submitted that from a bare reading of the judgment dated 23.01.2023, it is apparent that the conviction has substantially been based upon the alleged disclosure statement of the accused-appellant under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and the consequent recovery. Such reliance is misplaced and insufficient to sustain conviction in the absence of reliable and corroborative evidence.

18. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that there is not an iota of evidence to attract the offence under Section 302 IPC. The essential ingredient of intention to cause death is conspicuously absent. At best, as per the prosecution story itself; the incident appears to have occurred on the spur of the moment during a sudden quarrel, allegedly under the influence of liquor. In such



circumstances, the case does not fall within the ambit of Section 302 IPC.

19. Learned counsel submitted that the witnesses examined by the prosecution are closely related to the deceased and their testimony ought to have been scrutinized with greater caution. The appellant cannot be convicted merely on the basis of alleged blood stains on the clothes of the deceased and other recoveries from the place of occurrence, particularly when the blood group of the deceased and the appellant has not been scientifically established. Mere mention of a similar blood group, without proper corroboration, does not conclusively support the prosecution version.

20. On the grounds stated above, it was prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence deserve to be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charges.

21. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant and submitted that the First Information Report was lodged by Deepak, brother of the deceased. Though the incident occurred on 14.06.2017 and the FIR came to be registered on 18.06.2017, mere delay of four days does not, by itself, render the prosecution case doubtful. He further submitted that immediately after the incident, the injured was taken for medical



treatment to Suratgarh and thereafter referred to Ganganagar, Sirsa and finally Bikaner. The paramount concern of the family was to save the life of the injured and, therefore, the delay in lodging the FIR stands satisfactorily explained.

22. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the post-mortem report clearly reveals two stab injuries inflicted upon the deceased, which were caused by a sharp-edged weapon. The nature, seat and repetition of the injuries unmistakably indicate intention to cause death. It was also argued that there was a monetary dispute between the deceased and the accused-appellant, as the deceased was to receive certain money and the accused-appellant was allegedly delaying re-payment thereof, thereby establishing motive and prior grudge. Hence, the act squarely falls within the ambit of Section 302 IPC.

23. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that during treatment, the deceased disclosed the incident to his father Charan Singh. The statement made by the deceased prior to his death constitutes a dying declaration admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. PW-8 Charan Singh deposed regarding the disclosure made by the deceased. Even during cross-examination, no material was elicited to discredit this aspect. Under Section 137 of the Evidence Act, if a statement remains unshaken in cross-examination, it is to be read in its entirety. Further, as per Section



134 of the Evidence Act, no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a fact; even the testimony of a single reliable witness is sufficient to sustain conviction.

24. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that though PW-1 and PW-2 turned hostile, the testimonies of PW-5 Jayram and PW-7 Rajaram fully corroborate the prosecution case. PW-5 has categorically supported the incident and his presence at the place of occurrence is established. In cross-examination, it has also come on record that the accused-appellant was residing in the same room, thereby proving his presence at the scene. PW-7 Rajaram has portrayed a clear and cogent picture of the entire incident and remained consistent even during cross-examination. There is no reason to disbelieve the statements made by these credible eye-witnesses.

25. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the medical evidence lends full corroboration to the ocular testimony. The post-mortem report confirms two stab injuries. PW-9 Dr. Bhanwarlal has opined that injuries No. 1 and 2 were caused by a sharp-edged weapon and could not have been the result of a fall from a motorcycle. The doctor has clearly stated that injury No. 1 was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Though the immediate cause of death is stated as septicemia, the same developed from the stab injuries; thus, the chain of



causation remains intact and the death was a direct consequence of the knife injuries.

26. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the knife was recovered pursuant to information furnished by the accused-appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act on 22.06.2017. The knife, along with its handle, was recovered from the place disclosed by the accused-appellant, and the seizure memo confirms the presence of blood stains. PW-12 Constable Virendra Kumar and PW-13 Narayan Singh have supported the recovery. The FSL report (Exhibit P-28) confirms the presence of human blood on the recovered knife. The knife had broken during the incident and was concealed in the toilet wall, which explains why it was not recovered during the initial visit of the Investigating Officer.

27. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that minor discrepancies or shortcomings in the investigation do not entitle the accused-appellant to acquittal when the core of the prosecution case stands proved. Trivial contradictions are natural and do not affect the substratum of the prosecution story. The absence of Deepak's signature on Exhibit P-9 does not materially affect the prosecution case, as his signatures appear in the police proceedings and the contents of the report stand duly proved.



28. On the cumulative appreciation of ocular testimony, medical evidence, recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and the FSL report, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was, therefore, prayed that the conviction recorded by the Learned Trial Court under Section 302 IPC be upheld.

29. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have carefully re-appreciated the entire oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. The core question that arises for determination is not as to whether the deceased Sunny @ Shani died a homicidal death — which stands clearly established — but as to whether the act attributed to the accused-appellant Ravi Kumar would amount to “murder” punishable under Section 302 IPC or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” punishable under Section 304 IPC.

30. From the consistent testimonies of PW-5 Jayram and PW-7 Rajaram, it emerge that on the evening of 14.06.2017, the accused-appellant returned to the room after consuming liquor. The deceased demanded his pending wages from the accused-appellant. This demand led to a verbal altercation which suddenly escalated into a heated quarrel. The evidence on record does not



suggest any prior enmity of such magnitude that would indicate a pre-planned design to eliminate the deceased. There is no material to show that the accused-appellant had carried a weapon with him with a pre-determined intention to commit murder.

31. The weapon allegedly used was a vegetable cutting knife ordinarily kept in the room where all four persons were residing together. The prosecution witnesses themselves stated that the quarrel occurred spontaneously over payment of money. In the heat of passion, the accused-appellant picked up the knife lying in the room and inflicted two blows upon the deceased. The incident, therefore, appears to have taken place on the spur of the moment during a sudden quarrel. It is further significant that the accused-appellant did not abscond immediately after the occurrence. As per the statements of prosecution witnesses, including PW-5 Jayram, the accused-appellant remained present and the injured was taken to the hospital for treatment. Though this circumstance alone cannot exonerate the accused-appellant, it is nevertheless a relevant factor while assessing whether there was prior intention or premeditation of mind.

32. The medical evidence on record, particularly the testimony of PW-9, Dr. Bhanwarlal, read with the post-mortem report (Ex.P-18), establish that the deceased Sunny succumbed to injuries sustained by a sharp-edged weapon. As per the witness, the post-



mortem examination was conducted on 18.06.2017 pursuant to a police requisition, and the deceased had expired on 17.06.2017 as per hospital records.

33. On external examination, two ante-mortem incised wounds were found. Injury No. 1 was an incised stab wound measuring 0.7 cm × 0.5 cm, spindle-shaped, situated on the left anterior axilla in the 10th intercostal space, approximately 14 cm below the nipple and 4 cm lateral to the mid-clavicular line. The wound was covered with a brownish-black hard crust, with underlying muscle hematoma. Injury No. 2 was an incised wound measuring 0.7 cm × 0.5 cm deep, spindle-shaped, located in the suprapubic region along the midline of the abdomen, 2 cm above the base of the penis, also surrounded by brownish-black hardened pus with underlying muscle hematoma.

34. Upon internal dissection, it was found that Injury No. 1 had cut through the 10th intercostal muscle and the peritoneum. The peritoneum was congested, hazy and thickened. The peritoneal cavity contained approximately two litres of turbid, yellow, foul-smelling fluid with patches of pus. The omentum was adherent, and a perforation measuring 0.5 cm × 0.2 cm was detected in the upper left transverse colon beneath the wound. Both injuries were opined to have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon and to have been inflicted about 3–4 days prior to death.



35. In the opinion of PW-9, the cause of death was septicemia consequent to intestinal perforation resulting from Injury No. 1, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The post-mortem report (Ex.P-18) bears his signature.

36. During cross-examination, the witness stated that he was unaware of the nature of medicines or antibiotics administered by the treating doctor. He accepted the suggestion that if an M.D. doctor had treated the deceased, any lapse in treatment would be attributable to such treating doctor. He further clarified that septicemia was the mode of death and not the primary cause, and reiterated that the septicemia developed due to pus formation following the intestinal perforation caused by Injury No. 1. He also acknowledged that while Injury No. 1 was described as a stab wound with cutting characteristics, Injury No. 2 was described as an incised wound.

37. Thus, the medical evidence clearly establishes that Injury No. 1 resulted in intestinal perforation leading to septicemia, and there exists an unbroken chain of causation between the injury inflicted and the eventual death of the deceased.

38. However, while the medical evidence proves that the injuries were fatal, the surrounding circumstances must be evaluated to ascertain the requisite *mens rea*. The evidence does not demonstrate that the accused-appellant acted in a cruel or



unusual manner beyond the infliction of the two blows during the quarrel. There is also no material to indicate that he took undue advantage of the situation or that the assault was prolonged or repeated in a barbaric fashion.

39. From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses themselves, it becomes evident that the incident occurred without premeditation of mind, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel over demand of wages. The quarrel was mutual in nature and arose out of an immediate provocation relating to a monetary dispute. The case thus satisfies the essential ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, which applies where death is caused:-

- a) without premeditation,
- b) in a sudden fight,
- c) in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and
- d) Without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

40. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of **Nandkumar Vs. State of Gujarat** reported in **2025 INSC 1302** has held as under:-



"5.4. In Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 299 defines 'culpable homicide'. 'Murder' is defined Under Section 300, Indian Penal Code. The exceptions are provided in Section 300, Indian Penal Code as to under which circumstances the 'culpable homicide' would not become murder. Section 304, Indian Penal Code deals with situations, where the 'culpable homicide' does not amount to murder. In other words, it would not fall within the definition of 'murder'. Section 300, Indian Penal Code, although defines the offence which would become 'culpable homicide amounting to murder', it has, as stated above several exceptions.

5.5. Section 304, Indian Penal Code has two parts namely; Section 304 Part I and Section 304 Part II. The distinction between these two Parts of Section 304, Indian Penal Code is required to be considered having regard to the provisions of Sections 299 and 300, Indian Penal Code. Whether the offender had intention to cause death or he had no such intention brings out the vital distinction.



5.6. In ***Kesar Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana***

2008:INSC:541 : (2008) 15 SCC 753, this Court observed thus, in para 10:-

The distinguishing feature is the mens rea. What is prerequisite in terms of clause (2) of Section 300 is the knowledge possessed by the offender in regard to the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal. Intention to cause death is not an essential ingredient of clause (2). When there is an intention of causing a bodily injury coupled with knowledge of the offender as regards likelihood of such injury being sufficient to cause the death of a particular victim would be sufficient to bring the offence within the ambit of this clause.

5.6.1. For the above purpose, the exceptions contained in Section 300, Indian Penal Code are taken into consideration. In the same judgment, the Court further explained the distinction between 'culpable homicide amounting to murder' and 'not amounting to murder', stating in para No.11:-



Culpable homicide is genus, murder is its specie.

The culpable homicide, excluding the special characteristics of murder, would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Code recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. When a culpable homicide is of the first degree, it comes within the purview of the definition of Section 300 and it will amount to murder. The second degree which becomes punishable in the first part of Section 304 is culpable homicide of the second degree. Then there is culpable homicide of third degree which is the least side of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for is also the lowest among the punishments for the three grades. It is punishable under the second part of Section 304.

5.7. In other words, where the two ingredients namely that the infliction of bodily injury on deceased was caused intentionally and secondly that it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, are satisfied, the offence would amount to murder. There may be circumstances which may emerge from the facts and evidence of a given case that the offence becomes 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'.



5.8. In ***Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab*** : AIR 1958 SC 465 and further in ***Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra***, this Court stated that divided into two Parts, Section 304, Indian Penal Code deals with the situations where 'culpable homicide' would not be a murder. The conceptualisation of the 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' were explained in the following way, as quoted in para 4 of the **Kesar Singh** 2008: INSC: 541: (2008) 15 SCC 753:-

If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no intention to cause death the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part I, however, if there is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the offence would fall under Part I but where no such intention is established and only knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part II.



6. In the context of the above parameters as to what would constitute murder Under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and under what circumstances the 'culpable homicide' would not amount to murder, recollecting the basic facts of the present case, looking to the kind and nature of injuries referred to above which is available from the medical evidence, it could not be said that the injuries were not of the nature which were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. The assailant used knife and inflicted serious injuries on the body of the deceased, including below the belly. Looking to the act on part of the Appellant, it has to be concluded that the Accused was liable to be attributed with the knowledge that the injuries which he was to inflict by using the weapon in hand, would be sufficient to result into death in ordinary course.

41. In the present case, all the above ingredients stand satisfied from the prosecution evidence itself. Therefore, though the act of the accused-appellant in inflicting knife injuries is clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must bear criminal liability for the same, the offence would not amount to murder under Section 302 IPC.



42. Upon a careful, comprehensive, and independent appraisal of the entire material available on record, as well as the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case does not fall within the ambit of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It is trite law that where the intention to cause death, or the intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the offence would fall within the scope of Section 304 Part-I IPC. However, in cases where such intention is not proved, and the evidence only establishes that the accused had the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death, the offence would fall under Section 304 Part-II IPC. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had the intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. The circumstances brought on record do not indicate any premeditation of mind, prior enmity of such gravity, or deliberate conduct from which a definite intention to cause death can be safely inferred. Nevertheless, the material on record clearly establishes that the accused had the knowledge that the act committed by him was likely to cause death. The nature of the act and the attendant circumstances unmistakably show awareness of the probable consequences, though falling



short of the requisite intention contemplated under Section 300 IPC. Therefore, in the absence of proof of intention but in the presence of knowledge attributable to the accused, the offence is more appropriately covered under Section 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal Code.

43. In light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and upon due appreciation of the evidence brought on record, this Court finds it appropriate to interfere with the impugned judgment to the limited extent of altering the conviction of the accused-appellant from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC. Consequently, the finding of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court under Section 302 IPC is held to be not just and proper and, to that extent, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant, Ravi Kumar, is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II of IPC.

44. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the occurrence pertains to the year 2017. The appellant has remained in judicial custody since his arrest on 21.06.2017 and has thus undergone incarceration for a period exceeding **8 years**. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, and considering the nature of the offence as now determined, this Court is of the firm view that the ends of



justice would be adequately met if the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him.

45. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 304 Part-II IPC, the sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is sufficient to meet the ends of justice in the peculiar facts of the present case. Needless to state, the period of detention already undergone by the accused-appellant during investigation, trial, and pendency of the appeal shall be set off in terms of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

46. Consequently, the instant appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 23.01.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Suratgarh, in Sessions Case No. 26/2017, is modified to the extent indicated hereinabove. The conviction of the appellant Ravi Kumar under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is instead convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC, with the sentence reduced to the period already undergone by him. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

47. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.



48. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437A Cr.P.C. the accused-appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned trial court, which shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the judgment or for grant of leave, the appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before Hon'ble the Supreme Court.

49. Office is directed to send the record of the trial court forthwith.

(CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA),J

(VINIT KUMAR MATHUR),J

-Kartik Dave/C.P. Goyal/-