

**HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR**

S.B. Misc. Application No. 19/2026

Mr. Aseem Watts S/o Sher Singh, Aged About 59 Years, R/o 135-L-Block, Sriganganagar, Rajasthan- 335001 Sole Proprietor Of M/s Aseem And Company, Having Its Office At 135-L-Block, Sriganganagar, Rajasthan-335001

----Petitioner

Versus

1. Union Of India, Through The Chief Engineer, Bathinda Zone, Bathinda Military Station, Bhatinda-151004
2. The Commander, Hq Commander Works Engineer, Ganganagar Military Station, Sri Ganganagar

----Respondents

For Petitioner(s)	:	Aakash Kukkar Meenal Garg through VC
For Respondent(s)	:	-

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKESH RAJPUROHIT

Order

26/02/2026

1. The present matter has comes upon an application filed by the applicant under Section 151 CPC seeking extension of time for pronouncement of the arbitral award by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
2. This Court does not deem it necessary to recapitulate the entire factual matrix of the case, as the same has already been dealt with in the previous order whereby an application seeking extension of the arbitral period as well as substitution of the arbitrator was allowed. Consequently, Hon'ble Mr. Justice (Retd.) Arvind Singh Sangwan was

appointed as the learned Sole Arbitrator to proceed from the stage at which the proceedings were pending, and the time for completion of the arbitral proceedings was extended by six months from the date the learned new Arbitrator held the first hearing.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the first hearing before the learned Sole Arbitrator was held on 17.06.2025 and the award was reserved on 08.11.2025. It is further submitted that vide email dated 16.12.2025, the learned Sole Arbitrator informed the parties that the award was ready and at the final stage of vetting; however, on account of his illness and the said date being the last date for pronouncement of the award, he requested the parties to grant mutual consent for extension of 15 day's time for pronouncement of the award.
4. It is further submitted that since the mandate could not be extended by mutual consent of the parties, the learned Sole Arbitrator, vide email dated 24.12.2025, requested the parties to approach this Court for extension of time for pronouncing the award by a period of one month. Hence, the present application has been filed.
5. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the material available on record.
6. The issue that arises for consideration is whether extension of the time granted by this Court for completion of the arbitral proceedings can be allowed and whether "sufficient

cause” has been made out for extension of time for making and pronouncement of the arbitral award.

7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ***M/s Ajay Protech Ltd. vs. General Manager & Anr. passed in SLP (Civil) No. 2272 of 2024*** has elaborately considered the scope of extension of time and the meaning of “sufficient cause” under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The relevant paragraphs reproduced as under:

“15. Efficiency in the conduct of arbitral proceedings is integral to the effectiveness of the dispute resolution remedy through arbitration. Efficiency is inextricably connected with expeditious conclusion of arbitral proceedings. While the statute incorporates party autonomy even with respect to the conduct and conclusion of arbitral proceedings, there is a statutory recognition of the power of the Court to step in wherever it is necessary to ensure that the process of resolution of the dispute is taken to its logical end, if according to the Court, the circumstances so warrant. It is in this context that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act adopts the well-known language of limitation statutes and provides that the Court can extend the time if it finds that there is *sufficient cause*.

16. The meaning of ‘*sufficient cause*’ for extending the time to make an award must take colour from the underlying purpose of the arbitration process. The primary objective in rendering an arbitral award is to resolve disputes through the agreed dispute resolution mechanism as contracted by the parties. Therefore, ‘*sufficient cause*’ should be interpreted in the context of facilitating effective dispute resolution.”

8. From the aforesaid principle, it is clear that while expeditious disposal of arbitral proceedings is a legislative mandate, the Court is vested with the power to extend time where circumstances so warrant, in order to ensure that the arbitral process reaches its logical conclusion. The expression

“sufficient cause” must be construed in a manner that advances the object of effective and meaningful dispute resolution rather than defeating it on technical grounds.

9. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the arbitral proceedings have concluded and the award has already been reserved. The learned Sole Arbitrator has informed the parties that the award is ready and at the final stage of vetting. The delay in pronouncement is stated to have occurred due to illness of the learned Arbitrator. There is no material to suggest any deliberate inaction or lack of diligence.

10. This Court also observes that the appropriate statutory remedy for seeking extension of time for completion of arbitral proceedings ordinarily lies under Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. However, the present application has been moved under Section 151 CPC invoking the inherent powers of this Court. Considering that the proceedings have already culminated in reservation of the award and only a short extension is sought for its pronouncement, relegating the parties to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 29A would result in avoidable delay and would defeat the very objective of expeditious dispute resolution.

11. In exercise of the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to secure the ends of justice, and keeping in view that time is of essence in arbitral proceedings, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown. Refusal to extend time at

this stage would frustrate the arbitral process after conclusion of hearings and would run contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

12. Accordingly, the present application is allowed. The time for making and pronouncement of the arbitral award by the learned Sole Arbitrator is hereby extended by a further period of thirty (30) days from the date of this order. In view of aforesaid, the application stands disposed of.

(MUKESH RAJPUROHIT),J