

**IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA  
AT HYDERABAD**

**TUESDAY, THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF JULY  
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX**

**PRESENT**

**THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI APARESH KUMAR SINGH  
AND  
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN**

**WRIT APPEAL NO: 606 OF 2026**

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal Preferred Against  
the Order dated 27-04-2026 Passed in WP No 31400 of 2024 on the file of the High  
Court.

**Between:**

Nakka Sandhya Rani, W/o: Venkateshwara Swamy, Aged about 55 years  
Occ: Advocate R/o HNo.1-2-336/5 Geethanagar Siddipet Road Jangaon  
Jangaon District

**AND**

**...APPELLANT/RESPONDENT IN W.P**

1. The State of Telangana, Rep by its Secretary to Government Legal Affairs  
Legislative Affairs and Justice Secretariat Hyderabad - 500004
2. The Collector and District Magistrate, Jangaon District
3. The Principal District Judge, Jangaon
4. Varikota Ramgopal, S/o: Late Meenaiah, Age 66 years, Occ: Advocate  
R/o Plot No145/1381F Opp: IOC Pump Siddipet Road Vikas Nagar Jangaon  
Town and District

**...RESPONDENTS**

**I.A. NO: 2 OF 2026**

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the  
affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend

the operation of the Judgment passed in WPNo31400 of 2024 dated 27-04-2026 pending disposal of the Writ Appeal.

**Counsel for the Appellant: SRI M. SURNDER RAO, REPRESENTING  
SRI SRINIVASA RAO MADIRAJU**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI D. SURENDER KUMAR,  
AGP FOR LAW LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.2: GP FOR REVENUE**

**Counsel for the Respondent No.4: SRI C.M.R. VELU**

**The Court made the following: ORDER**

**IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA  
AT HYDERABAD**

**THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI APARESH KUMAR SINGH  
AND**

**THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN**

**WRIT APPEAL No.606 of 2026**

**DATE: 21.07.2026**

**Between:**

Nakka Sandhya Rani

**....Appellant**

**And**

The State of Telangana, Rep. by its  
Secretary to Government, Legal Affairs,  
Legislative Affairs and Justice, and 3 others

**....Respondents**

**JUDGMENT**

Heard Mr. M. Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Srinivasa Rao Madiraju, learned counsel for the appellant; Mr. D. Surender Kumar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Law and Legislative Affairs Department appearing for respondent No.1; and Mr. C.M.R. Velu, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and perused the record.

2. This writ appeal is preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the order dated 27.04.2026 passed by the learned Single judge in W.P.No.31400 of 2024. By the said order, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition filed by respondent No. 4 herein (the original writ petitioner), with a direction to the official respondents to reconsider the process of appointment to the post of Government Pleader, Principal District Court, Jangaon, strictly in

accordance with law and G.O.Ms.No.187, after affording a fair and reasonable opportunity to all eligible candidates, including the writ petitioner and the appellant herein.

**Factual matrix**

**3.** The Government of Telangana, *vide* G.O.Rt.Nos.353 and 354, dated 26.06.2024, discontinued the services of all Law Officers functioning in the Courts subordinate to the High Court, including the writ petitioner, who was then serving as an Assistant Government Pleader. Simultaneously, the Government directed the District Collectors to make in-charge arrangements and to furnish fresh panels of eligible Advocates for regular appointments in accordance with the applicable procedure.

**4.** Pursuant thereto, the District Collector, Jangaon, requested the Principal District Judge, Jangaon, to furnish a panel of eligible Advocates for appointment as Law Officers. Accordingly, the Principal District Judge invited applications from eligible Advocates and, after completing the process, forwarded a panel to the District Collector on 30.09.2024 for appointment to the post of Government Pleader for the Principal District Court, Jangaon. The writ petitioner's name was included at Sl. No.2 in the said panel, which was thereafter forwarded by the District Collector to the Government for consideration.

5. Upon receipt of the antecedent verification report from the Commissioner of Police, Warangal, it was noticed that certain candidates included in the panel had adverse or pending antecedents. Insofar as the writ petitioner is concerned, a private complaint in C.C.No.2579 of 2022 was stated to be pending on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Jangaon. In view thereof, the District Collector, by proceedings dated 07.10.2024, requested the Principal District Judge to furnish a fresh/revised panel. Consequently, the Principal District Judge forwarded a revised panel on 08.10.2024, wherein the name of the writ petitioner was omitted and the name of the appellant, Smt. Nakka Sandhya Rani, was included. The revised panel was thereafter forwarded by the District Collector to the Government on 11.10.2024.

6. Acting upon the revised panel, the Government issued G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025, appointing the appellant as Government Pleader for the Principal District Court, Jangaon. Pursuant thereto, the appellant assumed charge on 19.09.2025 and has been discharging her duties as Government Pleader ever since.

7. Aggrieved by the exclusion of his name from the revised panel, the writ petitioner instituted W.P. No.31400 of 2024, challenging the action of the respondents in disregarding the first panel and preparing a revised panel without cancelling or superseding the earlier panel. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appellant,

having been appointed as Government Pleader, was impleaded as respondent No.4 by order dated 25.11.2025 passed in I.A. No.2 of 2025. The writ petitioner also filed I.A. No.1 of 2025 seeking interim suspension of G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025; however, no interim order was granted.

**8.** Upon hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge, by the impugned order, partly allowed the writ petition and *inter alia* directed the official respondents to reconsider the process of appointment to the post of Government Pleader for the Principal District Court, Jangaon, in accordance with law, G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000, and the applicable constitutional principles, after affording an opportunity to all eligible candidates, including the writ petitioner and the appellant.

**9.** Aggrieved thereby, the present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant.

**Submissions on behalf of appellant**

**10.** Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, assailed the impugned order and has advanced the following submissions:

- i) That the appointment of Law Officers is governed by the executive instructions contained in G.O.Ms.No.187, Law Department, dated 06.12.2000, which do not possess statutory force but are merely administrative guidelines. A writ of

mandamus cannot be issued to enforce such executive instructions. Reliance was placed upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in ***S. Nagender v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others***<sup>1</sup> to contend that the learned Single Judge failed to follow the binding precedent while entertaining and allowing the writ petition.

- ii) That mere inclusion of the writ petitioner's name in the first panel did not confer upon him any vested or enforceable right to appointment. Under Instruction 5(4) of G.O.Ms.No.187, the Government is empowered either to appoint one among the empanelled candidates or to call for a fresh panel. The decision to seek a revised panel falls within the executive domain of the Government and cannot be subjected to judicial review unless shown to be arbitrary, *mala fide* or actuated by extraneous considerations. In the present case, the decision was founded upon the antecedent verification report disclosing adverse antecedents, which constituted a valid and rational basis for seeking a fresh panel.
- iii) That the State, being the principal litigant, possesses the prerogative as well as the constitutional obligation to appoint the most suitable counsel to represent its interests before the Courts. Such executive decisions are entitled to judicial

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<sup>1</sup> (2006) 4 ALD 210

deference and ought not to be interfered with unless they are shown to be arbitrary or vitiated by *mala fides*. The writ petitioner has neither pleaded nor established any such infirmity in the decision-making process.

- iv) That the writ petitioner neither questioned the antecedent verification report which formed the basis for his exclusion from the revised panel nor challenged G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025, whereby the appellant came to be appointed as Government Pleader. In the absence of a challenge to the final appointment order, no relief affecting the appellant's appointment could have been granted, and the learned Single Judge erred in issuing directions which, in effect, unsettle the appellant's appointment.
- v) That although elaborate submissions were advanced on behalf of the appellant, the learned Single Judge neither recorded nor considered the same while disposing of the writ petition, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. It was also pointed out that the impugned order erroneously records the name of the counsel appearing for respondent No.4 as Sri K. Laxmaiah, whereas, in fact, the appellant was represented by Mr. M. Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel.
- vi) That the writ petition was instituted in the year 2024, whereas the appellant was appointed as Government Pleader by

G.O.Rt.No.565 dated 15.09.2025. Though aware of the said appointment, the writ petitioner neither amended the writ petition nor challenged the appointment order, but merely sought impleadment of the appellant and filed an interlocutory application seeking suspension of the appointment of the appellant. The appellant assumed charge on 19.09.2025 and has been discharging her duties continuously for more than nine months. In such circumstances, interference at this belated stage, after valuable rights have accrued in favour of the appellant, is inequitable and barred by the doctrine of delay and laches.

- vii) That the learned Single Judge directed reconsideration of the process of appointment to the post of Government Pleader despite the post already having been filled by the appellant. Such a direction is incapable of implementation unless the appellant's appointment is first set aside. Any reconsideration resulting in the selection of the writ petitioner would necessarily entail termination of the appellant's appointment, which cannot be undertaken without following due process of law and affording her an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the relief granted is illusory, unworkable and incapable of practical implementation.

- viii) That although the appellant was impleaded as respondent No.4 by order dated 25.11.2025, the writ petitioner failed to amend either the pleadings or the prayer in the writ petition to specifically challenge G.O.Rt.No.565 dated 15.09.2025. The relief claimed remained confined to consideration of the first panel. It was contended that the Court could not have granted relief beyond the scope of the pleadings or effectively nullified the appellant's appointment in the absence of a specific challenge to the appointment order.
- ix) That the learned Single Judge erred in drawing an adverse inference merely because the revised panel was prepared within a short span after the first panel. Once the antecedent verification reports were received, the authorities were under an obligation to act promptly. The preparation of the revised panel between 30.09.2024 and 08.10.2024 reflected administrative efficiency and a *bona fide* exercise of power to ensure that only suitable candidates were recommended, and could not, by itself, be construed as arbitrary or *mala fide*.

**Submissions on behalf of the respondent No.4 (writ petitioner)**

11. *Per contra*, learned counsel for respondent No.4 advanced the following submissions:

- i) That the action of the official respondents in discarding the first panel and preparing a revised panel within an unusually

short span of time, without formally cancelling or superseding the earlier panel and without affording any notice or opportunity to the writ petitioner, is arbitrary, unfair and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The first panel had been prepared after due consultation between the District Collector and the Principal District Judge in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000, and after considering the merit and suitability of the eligible candidates. The subsequent preparation of a revised panel, without adhering to any transparent procedure, vitiates the decision-making process.

- ii) That the inclusion of the writ petitioner's name in the first panel gave rise to a legitimate expectation that his candidature would be fairly considered for appointment. The exclusion of his name from the revised panel, without assigning any reasons and without affording him an opportunity of hearing, defeated such legitimate expectation and was contrary to the principles of fairness and natural justice. It was further submitted that every State action must satisfy the test of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.
- iii) That the antecedent verification report pertaining to the writ petitioner was already available when the first panel was prepared and forwarded to the Government. Despite being

aware of the pendency of a private complaint against the writ petitioner, the authorities consciously included his name in the first panel, thereby indicating that the said circumstance was not treated as a disqualification at that stage. The subsequent exclusion of the writ petitioner on the very same material, without any fresh development or changed circumstance, is arbitrary, inconsistent and indicative of a colourable exercise of power.

- iv) That the writ petition was clearly maintainable as the challenge was directed against arbitrary State action. Though G.O.Ms.No.187 contains executive instructions, the exercise of power thereunder is nevertheless amenable to judicial review where it is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The power of the Government to call for a fresh panel is not absolute or unfettered and cannot be exercised in a manner that defeats the legitimate right of an eligible candidate to fair, transparent and non-arbitrary consideration.

**12.** We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and perused the material on record.

### **Consideration by this Court**

**13.** The principal question that arises for consideration is the nature and enforceability of G.O.Ms.No.187, Law (L) Department,

dated 06.12.2000, titled "*The Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000*". A plain reading of the said Government Order shows that it contains executive instructions regulating the appointment and conditions of service of Law Officers. Admittedly, the said instructions have not been framed in exercise of the rule-making power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, do not possess statutory force.

**14.** The legal position in this regard is no longer *res integra*. A Full Bench of this Court in **S. Nagender** (supra 1) while dealing with the self-same G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 06.12.2000 authoritatively held that executive instructions or guidelines governing appointments of Law Officers are directory in nature and cannot be enforced by issuance of a writ of mandamus. The Full Bench therein has observed as under:

**51.** ...It is no doubt true that having framed the Rules or issued instructions or guidelines by the State Government, it is not open to the State Government to totally disregard the instructions or guidelines and the same may have to be followed as far as possible and an endeavour to be made in the said direction. By that itself it does not mean that these rules/guidelines/instructions are mandatory in nature and can be enforced by way of a Writ Petition by issuance of either a writ of mandamus or specified positive directions in this regard....

The aforesaid declaration of law is binding upon this Court. Consequently, the learned Single Judge could not have proceeded on

the premise that every procedural requirement contained in G.O.Ms.No.187 was enforceable as of right.

**15.** Further, Instruction 5(4) of G.O.Ms.No.187 expressly empowers the Government, upon receipt of a panel forwarded by the District Collector, either to appoint one among the empanelled candidates or to call for a fresh panel. Correspondingly, Instruction 5(5) obligates the District Collector to submit a fresh panel whenever so called upon. Thus, the power to seek a fresh panel is itself traceable to the executive instructions governing the appointment process. At the same time, it cannot be denied that even while exercising powers under executive instructions, the State is expected to act fairly, reasonably and free from arbitrariness. Judicial review would, therefore, lie not for enforcement of the executive instructions *per se*, but to examine whether the decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness, *mala fides*, irrationality or violation of constitutional guarantees. The scope of judicial review, however, cannot be enlarged to compel strict compliance with every executive instruction as though it were a statutory mandate.

**16.** It is equally well settled that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list or panel does not confer upon such candidate any vested or inalienable right to appointment. In ***Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India***<sup>2</sup>, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even

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<sup>2</sup> (1991) 3 SCC 47

the inclusion of a candidate in a select list does not create any right to appointment and that the appointing authority retains the discretion whether or not to fill the vacancies, subject to the requirement that such discretion is exercised fairly and not arbitrarily. The said principle applies with greater force in the case of appointments of Government Pleaders and other Law Officers, which are essentially professional engagements.

**17.** The writ petitioner's name was included in the first panel; however, the Government, in exercise of the discretion conferred under Instruction 5(4) of G.O.Ms.No.187, chose to call for a fresh panel instead of making an appointment therefrom. The Government was under no legal obligation to make an appointment from the first panel merely because the writ petitioner's name was included therein. Much emphasis was placed by the learned Single Judge on the fact that the first panel was not formally superseded or cancelled before a fresh panel was called for. In our considered opinion, such omission, by itself, does not vitiate the subsequent process. Neither G.O.Ms.No.187 nor any other provision brought to our notice mandates the issuance of a formal order cancelling or superseding the earlier panel before the Government exercises its power to call for a fresh panel. The very exercise of the power under Instruction 5(4) to seek a fresh panel necessarily implies that the Government had decided not to proceed with the earlier panel.

**18.** It is to be noted that the appointment of Government Pleaders and other Law Officers stands on a distinct footing from appointments to civil posts. A Law Officer represents the State before Courts and acts as its legal representative. The relationship between the Government and its Law Officers is essentially that of a client and its counsel, though imbued with a public element. Consequently, the Government is entitled to appoint such counsel as it considers suitable and in whom it reposes confidence to effectively represent its interests before the Courts. The choice of a Law Officer is, therefore, predominantly an executive function. Unless the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, *mala fide*, irrational or in violation of any constitutional or statutory mandate, the scope of judicial review in such matters remains limited.

**19.** In the present case, the Government, upon receipt of the antecedent verification reports, exercised its discretion under Instruction 5(4) of G.O.Ms.No.187 and called for a fresh panel. The record discloses that a private complaint in C.C. No.2579 of 2022 was pending against the writ petitioner at the relevant point of time. Whether such antecedent ultimately rendered the writ petitioner unsuitable is a matter falling within the domain of the appointing authority. The Government was entitled to take the antecedent verification report into consideration while assessing the suitability of the candidates, and this Court would not ordinarily substitute its

own assessment for that of the competent authority in the absence of arbitrariness, *mala fides* or extraneous considerations.

**20.** A significant aspect of the present case is that, during the pendency of the writ petition, the Government issued G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025, appointing the appellant as the Government Pleader for the Principal District Court, Jangaon. The appellant thereafter assumed charge on 19.09.2025 and has been discharging her duties pursuant to the said appointment. Although the appellant was impleaded as respondent No.4 by order dated 25.11.2025, the writ petitioner neither amended the pleadings nor the relief sought in the writ petition so as to specifically challenge the validity of G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025. The writ petitioner merely filed an interlocutory application seeking suspension of the said G.O, which was not granted. The substantive relief in the writ petition continued to be confined to a declaration that the respondents had acted illegally in not considering the first panel and a consequential direction to consider the first panel for appointment.

**21.** The relief sought in the underlying writ petition reads as follows:

*to issue a Writ of mandamus nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the inaction of the Respondents in not considering first panel of Advocates to be appointed as Law Officers in various Courts at Jangaon District and considering other panels without any notice to the Bar Association against its valid cancellation or return which is creating conflicts and affecting our professional-life, as illegal and violative of Article 21 of Constitution of India and consequently direct the*

*respondents to consider the first panel of advocates for the post of GP pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.*

Thus, there was no specific challenge to the appellant's appointment under G.O.Rt.No.565. Nevertheless, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge necessarily have a bearing upon the appellant's appointment, which had already been made during the pendency of the writ petition. In the absence of a substantive challenge to the appointment order and an appropriate prayer seeking its invalidation, the learned Single Judge ought to have exercised greater restraint in issuing directions which have the effect of unsettling an appointment that had already been made.

**22.** Another circumstance of significance is that the writ petitioner's exclusion from the revised panel was preceded by the antecedent verification report received from the Commissioner of Police, Warangal, referring to the pendency of C.C. No.2579 of 2022 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Jangaon. The writ petitioner neither disputed the correctness of the said report nor challenged its consideration by the appointing authority; his only contention was that the pending proceeding was a private complaint and not a police case. Whether such antecedent ultimately rendered the writ petitioner unsuitable for appointment is not for this Court to determine, as the assessment of suitability for appointment as Government Pleader primarily falls within the domain of the

appointing authority. Therefore, it was open to the Government to take the antecedent verification report into consideration while assessing the suitability of the candidates, and the writ petitioner's failure to challenge either the report or its consideration assumes significance while examining the legality of the decision-making process.

**23.** The appellant has also contended that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the submissions advanced on her behalf. The record discloses that the appellant filed a counter-affidavit and was represented by Mr. M. Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel. Although the impugned order records that the counsel appearing for respondent No.4 was heard, a perusal thereof does not reflect any discussion of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant. It is also noticed that the impugned order erroneously records the name of the counsel appearing for respondent No.4 as Sri K. Laxmaiah, whereas the appellant was represented by Mr. M. Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel. While an incorrect recording of the name of the counsel, by itself, may not be determinative, the absence of any discussion on the substantial contentions urged on behalf of the appellant assumes significance and lends credence to the grievance that the said contentions were not adequately considered by the learned Single Judge. Such omission has a bearing on the fairness of the adjudicatory process and is a relevant

circumstance while examining the sustainability of the impugned order.

**24.** Moreover, the writ petition was instituted in the year 2024. During its pendency, the appellant was appointed as Government Pleader *vide* G.O.Rt.No.565 dated 15.09.2025 and assumed charge on 19.09.2025. Despite being fully aware of the said appointment, the writ petitioner neither challenged the appointment order nor amended the relief sought in the writ petition, but merely filed an implead petition, which was allowed on 25.11.2025, and an application seeking suspension of the appointment, which was not granted. By the time the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition on 27.04.2026, the appellant had been functioning as Government Pleader for over seven months.

**25.** It is well settled that a writ of mandamus is a discretionary remedy, and relief under Article 226 may be declined where the petitioner approaches the Court after undue delay, particularly when third-party rights have intervened and crystallized. In the facts of the present case, the writ petitioner cannot be permitted to indirectly unsettle the appellant's appointment at such a belated stage without specifically challenging the appointment order.

**26.** It is also apposite to note that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to "*reconsider the process of appointment*" is incapable of effective implementation. The post of Government

Pleader is a single post and had already been filled by the appointment of the appellant, who assumed charge on 19.09.2025. Any reconsideration of the appointment process would necessarily have a bearing on the appellant's subsisting appointment. If such reconsideration were to result in the selection of the writ petitioner, it would inevitably require the appellant's appointment to be displaced; conversely, if the appellant were again found suitable, the exercise would serve no practical purpose. In either event, the appellant's appointment could not have been unsettled in the absence of a specific challenge to G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025, by which she was appointed. Therefore, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge travels beyond the scope of the relief sought in the writ petition and is incapable of being effectively worked out in the absence of a challenge to the appellant's appointment.

**27.** In the present case the writ petitioner impleaded the appellant by filing I.A. No.2 of 2025, which was allowed on 25.11.2025. However, he neither amended the pleadings nor the relief sought to challenge G.O.Rt.No.565, dated 15.09.2025, whereby the appellant was appointed as Government Pleader. The relief continued to be confined to consideration of the first panel. Mere impleadment of the appellant did not enlarge the scope of the writ petition or dispense with the necessity of specifically challenging the appointment order. It is well settled that a Court ordinarily cannot grant relief beyond the pleadings or the prayers sought. Consequently, the directions

issued by the learned Single Judge, which have the effect of unsettling the appellant's appointment, could not have been granted in the absence of a specific challenge to G.O.Rt.No.565.

**28.** The learned Single Judge inferred arbitrariness from the short interval between the first panel dated 30.09.2024 and the revised panel dated 08.10.2024. We are unable to concur with the said finding. The record discloses that, upon receipt of the antecedent verification report from the Commissioner of Police indicating adverse antecedents against certain candidates, including the writ petitioner, the District Collector promptly sought a revised panel on 07.10.2024, which was furnished on 08.10.2024 and forwarded to the Government on 11.10.2024. Mere expedition in administrative action cannot, by itself, give rise to an inference of arbitrariness. In the absence of any material establishing *mala fides*, extraneous considerations or abuse of power, the prompt action taken by the authorities to ensure that only suitable candidates were recommended for appointment as Law Officers cannot be faulted.

### **Conclusion**


**29.** For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from errors of law and of approach warranting interference in appeal. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the true nature of G.O.Ms.No.187, the limited scope of judicial review in matters

relating to appointment of Law Officers, the absence of any vested right in favour of the writ petitioner, and the fact that the appellant's appointment had neither been specifically challenged nor could it have been unsettled in the manner directed. Consequently, the impugned order dated 27.04.2026 in W.P. No. 31400 of 2024 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

**30.** Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is allowed. The order dated 27.04.2026 in W.P. No. 31400 of 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, stand closed. No costs.

//TRUE COPY//

**SD/- M.RAMANA KRISHNA**  
**JOINT REGISTRAR**  
  
**SECTION OFFICER**

To,

1. The Secretary to Government Legal Affairs Legislative Affairs and Justice Secretariat , The State of Telangana, Hyderabad - 500004
2. The Collector and District Magistrate, Jangaon District
3. The Principal District Judge, Jangaon
4. One CC to Sri Srinivasa Rao Madiraju, Advocate [OPUC]
5. Two CCs to GP for Law Legislative Affairs, High Court for the State of Telangana, at Hyderabad [OUT]
6. Two CCs to the GP for Revenue, High Court for the State of Telangana, at Hyderabad[OUT]
7. One CC to Sri C.M.R. Velu, Advocate[OPUC]
8. Two CD Copies

TJ

TKS


PMG.

**HIGH COURT**

**DATED: 21/07/2026**

**JUDGMENT**

**WA.No.606 of 2026**



**ALLOWING THE WRIT APPEAL  
WITHOUT COSTS**

(12) PMG.  
28/7/26