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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

CNR No. DLHC011085882025

+ **CRL.M.C. 281/2026**

SACHIN DOCK @ SACHIN & ORS.

.....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Rajesh Ratho, AOR with Mr. Akash Choudhary, Mr. Ankur Rawat, Mr. Prince Single & Mr. Shubham Baisoya, Advs. with petitioners in person.

versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Shoaib Haider, APP.
SI Vishvendra PS Mandawali.
Respondent no.2 in person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

ORDER

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19.08.2026

CRL.M.A. 1057/2026

1. Present application has been filed seeking condonation of 105 days in re-filing present petition.
2. For the reasons disclosed in the application, the delay of 105 days in re-filing the present petition.
3. The application stands disposed of.

CRL.M.A. 1056/2026 (EXEMPTION)

4. Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.



5. Application stands disposed of.

CRL.M.C. 281/2026

6. The petition is for the quashment of the FIR No.257/2019 for offence under Section 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) registered at Police Station Mandawali Fazal Pur, New Delhi.

7. The petitioners and respondent no.2 are present and they have been identified by the Investigating Officer of the case as well as by the respective counsel.

8. The facts of the case would indicate that marriage between the petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 2 was solemnized on 28.06.2012 as per Hindu rites and customs. Out of their wedlock, they have one girl child namely Kumari Manya.

9. It appears that the dispute in question arose out of a matrimonial discord between petitioner no.1 and respondent no.2, and they started to live separately. Thereafter, the FIR in question was lodged by respondent no.2 against the petitioners.

10. It is submitted that both the parties have amicably settled their disputes by way of a MOU/settlement deed dated 28.05.2024 which is on record. Respondent no.2 does not want any action against the petitioners in view of the settlement. She has made her statement voluntarily of her own accord without any coercion or pressure.

11. On behalf of the State there is no opposition in quashing of the FIR in question in view of the settlement arrived at between the petitioners and the respondent no.2 and the statement of the respondent no.2.

12. Despite certain offences being classified as non-compoundable under the IPC, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 482 of the CrPC



(Section 528 BNSS), High Courts have proceeded to quash such proceedings on account of a settlement between the parties. In ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab***,¹ the Court recognized that such an approach serves the ends of justice by bringing the litigation to an end, preventing its needless continuation, and acknowledging that following the compromise, the likelihood of conviction has become remote and bleak.

13. The conditions and pre-requisites for compounding were elaborated in ***Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab***,² and the following were deemed necessary before quashing the proceedings on the basis of a settlement/compromise:

13.1 There should hardly be any likelihood of the offender being convicted, given the compromise that took place between the parties. Particularly, so in disputes that are predominantly civil in nature, for instance those arising from commercial transactions, matrimonial relationships, or family matters, a genuine compromise may render the possibility of conviction remote and bleak;

13.2 By not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be the casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. Where continuation of proceedings despite settlement is unfair, unjust, or an abuse of process, quashing may be allowed to secure the ends of justice; and

13.3 The timing of the compromise also becomes relevant, quashing may be considered at the investigation or early-trial stage, but is

¹ (2012) 10 SCC 303.

² (2014) 6 SCC 466.



ordinarily declined once evidence is substantially complete or conviction has been recorded.

14. The aforesaid proposition was refined in ***Vijay Kumar Kela v. CBI***,³ to clarify that, ultimately, it is facts and circumstances of each case that determine the compoundability of proceedings and no straight-jacket formula can be prescribed. It was also noted that before exercising powers under Section 482 of the CrPC (Section 528 BNSS), the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.

15. However, the Court clarified that compounding on the basis of a purported settlement cannot take place where—***first***, heinous offences affecting the society at large are in question; and ***second***, a compromise between the parties cannot quash corruption or official duty offences.⁴

16. Specifically, it may also be noted that while the offence of rape is ordinarily non-compoundable.⁵ However, in cases where marriage has subsequently taken place and the parties are residing together quashment on the basis of a settlement has been allowed. The principle adopted for such a quashment is that the same is required in the interest of justice and to do complete justice;⁶ and such an exercise is undertaken where despite the seriousness of the offence, the facts do not disclose such elements of public interest or heinous criminality, as to necessitate the continuation of criminal proceedings.⁷

³ 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1003.

⁴ (2012) 10 SCC 303.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Sandeep Singh Thakur v. State of M.P.*, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2927, para. 16.

⁷ *Mr. Vishal & Ors v. The State Of Nct of Delhi*, CRL.M.C. 2584/2026 & CRL.M.A. 10512/2026.



17. Further, where proceedings for the offence of rape along with allegations under the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“**POCSO**”) are sought to be quashed. Courts have allowed quashment for instance where the parties have married and a child has also been born. The underlying rationale to justify such a quashment is that if the FIR is not quashed, it will adversely affect the minor child who needs protection and care from his parents, and destroy the lives of three individuals, the couple and the new born.⁸

18. Weightage is also given to circumstance where no criminal intent is involved in the act and it not a case where there was a forceful physical relationship with the minor child on the date of incident.⁹ The overarching concern of the Courts have always remained that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice.¹⁰

19. Similarly, the offence of attempt to murder is ordinarily non-compoundable. The Supreme Court¹¹ has cautioned that the High Court should not reject the plea of compounding the offence mechanically and must take note that the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or framing of the charge is not conclusive. It remains open to the Court to consider if the said provision has been added for the sake of it or there is “*sufficient evidence*” to frame charge under this provision. Considering the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the

⁸ *Harmeet Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi*, 2026:DHC:3142, *Mr. Sujit Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)*, CRL.M.C. 7406/2024, CRL.M.A. 28277/2024 & CRL.M.A. 28278/2024.

⁹ *Moeed Ahamad v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8119, para 16

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para 17.



vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc., in certain circumstances, quashing of even such a offence, is permissible. However, such an exercise by the HC would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial.

20. Further, dacoity and robbery are ordinarily non-compoundable. However, the Court while taking into consideration the facts of the case, the compromise arrived at between the parties, and considering the affidavits by each one of the petitioners by way of joint application, may in appropriate cases, exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings arising from such offences¹² and may also reduced the sentence imposed while maintaining the conviction.¹³

21. For the offence of cheating and forgery where the dispute is predominantly civil, investigation is pending for a long time, and where the complainant, including a bank, has been satisfied that the claims have been satisfied due to compromise on receiving payments, the Court has also considered the settlement while exercising its jurisdiction to bring the criminal proceedings to an end.¹⁴ Notably, in such cases, the factum of the possibility of conviction being remote and bleak owing to the settlement, also becomes a material factor, while considering the question of quashment.

22. In view of the aforesaid and bearing in mind the nature of the dispute,

¹¹ *State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan*, (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15.4.

¹² *Aftab Khan v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.*, CrI.M.C. 4814/2015

¹³ *Unnikrishnan v. State of Kerala*, (2018) 15 SCC 343.

¹⁴ *CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd.*, (1996) 5 SCC 591 and *Nikhil Merchant v. CBI*, (2008) 9 SCC 677.



the settlement between the parties and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, the FIR No.257/2019 for offence under Section 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) registered at Police Station Mandawali Fazal Pur, New Delhi, and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioners are thus quashed.

23. The Court, however, has not adjudicated regarding any right of the child.

24. The petition stands disposed of. Pending application also stands disposed of.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J

AUGUST 19, 2026/ab