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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

CNR No. DLHC010324012026

+ BAIL APPLN. 2886/2026 & CRL.M.As. 21725-26/2026

RAJEEV DHINGRAPetitioner

versus

STATE & ANR.Respondents

CNR No. DLHC010121032026

+ CRL.M.C. 2245/2026 & CRL.M.As. 9189-99/2026, CRL.M.A.
25091/2026

RUCHIKA DHINGRAPetitioner

versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANRRespondents

CNR No. DLHC010323992026

+ CRL.M.C. 5153/2026

RAJEEV DHINGRA & ORS.Petitioners

versus

STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANRRespondents

Appearances:-

Mr. Sajal Dhamija and Mr. Prince Assal, Advocates for petitioners.

Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan and Ms. Manjeet Arya, APP.

SI Rajnish and SI Pawan, P.S. Greater Kailash.

Mr. Kunal Malhotra, Mr. Akshay Yadav, Advocates for respondent No. 2
– complainant.



CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

ORDER
% 07.09.2026

CRL.M.A. [to be numbered] [e-Diary No. 375670/2026] in BAIL APPLN. 2886/2026 & CRL.M.A. [to be numbered] [e-Diary No. 375675/2026] in CRL.M.C. 5153/2026 (for intervention)

1. Although the captioned petitions have been pending since July 2026, at this stage, one Cordant India Private Limited [“CIPL”] has filed the present applications for intervention. While the applications have not come on record, copies of the same have been handed up in Court, and are taken on record. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to number the applications.

2. It is the submission of Mr. Dinesh Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant – CIPL, that CIPL had entered into certain transactions with the petitioners in respect of some properties, including the subject property [Property No. S-28, Greater Kailash Part-I, New Delhi]. Owing to disputes arising therefrom, CIPL had filed an application under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] [Complaint Case No. 18345/2025]. However, the said application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate *vide* order dated 07.04.2026. It is submitted that the applicant has already filed a revision petition before the Sessions Court against the aforesaid order, which remains pending. A copy of the order dated 07.04.2026 has been handed up in Court and is taken on record.



3. After some arguments, Mr. Sharma seeks permission to withdraw the aforesaid applications, without prejudice to the applicant's rights and contentions in independent proceedings, in accordance with law.

4. The applications are dismissed as withdrawn in terms of the aforesaid submission.

5. The applications are disposed of.

CRL.M.C. 5153/2026

6. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 528 of the BNSS, seeking quashing of FIR No. 114/2025, dated 25.01.2025, registered at Police Station Greater Kailash, District South, Delhi, under Sections 420/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ["IPC"], on the ground of settlement between the parties. They also seek consequential directions for release of petitioner No. 1 from judicial custody.

7. I have heard Mr. Sajal Dhamija, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Yudhvir Singh Chauhan and Ms. Manjeet Arya, learned Additional Public Prosecutors for the State, and Mr. Kunal Malhotra, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 6 – the complainant and his family members [parents, wife, and uncle].

8. The prosecution has also filed a Status Report dated 12.08.2026, which is on record.

9. The FIR was registered on the complaint of respondent No. 2 herein, with regard to a purported transaction for sale of a property bearing No. S-28, Greater Kailash Part-I, New Delhi – 110048 [ground floor and basement with proportionate land rights]. According to the complainant, petitioner No. 1, who was the sole proprietor of M/s Dhingra Properties and Constructions, approached him for the sale of the



said property. Relying upon his assurances of ownership and clear title, the family members of the complainant [respondent Nos. 3 to 6 herein] entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 03.06.2023 with M/s Dhingra Properties and Constructions, for a total consideration of Rs. 2.3 crores, out of which an amount of Rs. 1.96 crores was paid. Although petitioner No. 1 handed over a purported original title deed to the complainant, the sale deed was not executed within time. The complainant also made allegations against the wife and father of petitioner No. 1 [petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 herein] with regard to the above transaction. It is further alleged that the petitioners did not respond to follow-ups, and petitioner No. 1 became untraceable. In the course of investigation, it was revealed that the ground floor of the subject property had already been sold by petitioner No. 1 to a third party on 29.04.2022, i.e. prior to entering into the Agreement to Sell with the family members of the complainant. The transfer of Rs. 1.96 crores from the complainant to the petitioners was also verified, as was the execution of the Agreement to Sell dated 03.06.2023. A chargesheet has been filed under Sections 420/408/467/468/471/120B/34 of the IPC.

10. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners have entered into a settlement with respondent Nos. 2 to 6 on 12.06.2026. The settlement has been signed by respondent Nos. 2 to 6, as also by petitioner No. 1 through his wife [petitioner No. 2] as his Constituted Attorney¹, and petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 in their individual capacity. Petitioner No. 2 has also signed the Settlement Agreement on behalf of

¹ A copy of the General Power of Attorney dated 10.06.2026 executed by petitioner No. 1 in favour of petitioner No. 2 has been placed on record.



the proprietorship concern of petitioner No. 1, M/s Dhingra Properties and Constructions, in her capacity as the Constituted Attorney of the proprietor.

11. The Settlement Agreement notes that, as a result of the aforesaid transaction, various civil and criminal proceedings are pending between the parties, in addition to proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [“NI Act”]. The settlement contemplates payment of sum of Rs. 3.7 crores by the petitioners to respondent Nos. 2 to 6 towards full and final settlement of all disputes. Although the Settlement Agreement provides for payment of the aforesaid amount in four instalments, with the last instalment being due on 11.12.2026, an amount of Rs. 1,35,00,000/- had already been received earlier, and demand drafts for the remaining amount of Rs. 2,35,00,000/- were handed over to Mr. Malhotra on the last date of hearing, i.e., 03.09.2026. The settlement also provides for an immovable property and personal guarantees to be kept as security for payment of the balance amount. However, this aspect does not require any further consideration, as the settlement amount has already been paid.

12. The Settlement Agreement also records that respondent Nos. 2 to 6 would have no objection to grant of bail to petitioner No. 1 and to quashing of the impugned FIR, and that they would also withdraw the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act.

13. Petitioner No. 1 remains in judicial custody. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 as well as respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are present in Court, and have been identified by their respective learned counsel and the Investigating Officer.



14. The parties confirm the execution of the Settlement Agreement voluntarily, and without any coercion or undue influence.

15. In general, the quashing of criminal proceedings arising out of a property transaction, on the basis of a settlement, as in the present case, is not unknown to law. The petitioners are accused of offences under Sections 420/408/467/468/471/120B/34 of the IPC, out of which Sections 420 and 408, are in fact, compoundable. As far as Sections 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC are concerned, the present case does not involve allegations of forgery of public documents or presentation of forged documents for public purposes.

16. Even as far as non-compoundable offences are concerned, the Supreme Court has permitted quashing of criminal cases on the basis of settlement. The leading authorities on the point, including *Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.*² and *Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.*³, specifically refer to transactions, which are essentially private in character and fall within the class of cases in which criminal proceedings can be brought to an end by settlement between the parties. The relevant extracts from *Gian Singh* are reproduced below:

“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have

² (2012) 10 SCC 303 [hereinafter, “*Gian Singh*”].

³ (2014) 6 SCC 466 [hereinafter, “*Narinder Singh*”].



settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. **However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.** The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”⁴

17. In *Narinder Singh*, the Supreme Court articulated the following principle in this regard:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis

⁴ Emphasis supplied.



petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.”⁵

18. As highlighted by the Supreme Court, however, each case of this nature requires an examination of its particular facts and circumstances to enable the High Court to determine whether its inherent powers ought to be exercised in favour of the accused⁶.

19. In the present case, Mr. Malhotra supports the petitioners’ request for quashing of the proceedings. However, Mr. Chauhan draws my attention to two aspects which may require further consideration – the

⁵ Emphasis supplied.

⁶ B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675, paragraph 6; Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, paragraph 18.



conduct of petitioner No. 1 in the course of the proceedings and his prior criminal antecedents.

20. As far as the first aspect is concerned, Mr. Chauhan submits that petitioner No. 1 was granted anticipatory bail by a judgment of this Court dated 08.04.2025 in BAIL APPLN. 1275/2025. The complainant carried the matter to Supreme Court⁷. The judgment of this Court was reversed by the Supreme Court *vide* order dated 27.02.2026, finding that petitioner No. 1 “*from the very beginning probably had the dishonest intention*”. Consequently, he was directed to surrender within two weeks, and apply for regular bail. Upon his application⁸, further time of two weeks was granted by order of the Supreme Court dated 13.03.2026. However, a further application for modification of the order filed by petitioner No. 1⁹ was withdrawn on 17.04.2026. Despite the aforesaid direction of the Supreme Court, petitioner No. 1 did not surrender and Non-Bailable Warrants were issued against him. He was ultimately arrested on 10.06.2026, and has remained in custody since.

21. The second aspect concerns the prior cases against petitioner No. 1, which have been enumerated in the status report filed by Mr. Chauhan, as follows:

Sr. No.	Case No.	Case details	Status
1.	CS(OS)-745/2023	Rupen Goswami V/s Rajeev Dhingra	Settled disposed dt 08/10/24
2.	CT CASES/41882/2024	Vinay Bhushan Chandok V/s Rajeev Dhingra	Pending 05/10/2026
3.	CT	Raj Jasra V/s Rajeev	Pending 21/11/2026

⁷ Criminal Appeal Nos. 1178-1179/2026.

⁸ Miscellaneous Application Diary No. 14910/2026.

⁹ Miscellaneous Application Nos. 1168-1169/2026 in M.A. 757-758/2026 in CRL.A. Nos. 1178-1179/2026.



	CASES/41776/2024	Dhingra	
4.	CT CASES/2514/2024	J.B. Singh V/s Rajeev Dhingra	Pending 29/10/2026
5.	CT CASES 41179/24 & 41182/24	Ivy Law Offices LLP V/s Rajeev Dhingra	Pending 23/12/2026
6.	CC NI ACT/3/2024	Shriram Finance V/s Rajeev Dhingra	Pending 14/10/2026
7.	CS SCJ/25/2025	Sanjay Electricals V/s Rajeev Dhingra Proprietor of Dhingra Properties	Uncontested Decreed 29-06-2026
8.	CT CASES/4789/2025	Neeraj Batra V/s Rajeev Dhingra	Compounded 07.08.2026
9.	CS 4142/2026 ¹⁰	State Bank of India V/s Dhingra Properties & Constructions	28.09.2026
10.	CS DJ-404/2026	Sanjeev Dhingra V/s Dhingra Properties Pvt.	Pending 11/09/2026
11.	FIR No. 89/2021	U/S 283 IPC PS GK-1	Settled in Lok Adalat
12.	FIR No. 225/2021	U/S 283 IPC PS GK-1	Settled in Lok Adalat
13.	FIR No. 41/2026	U/S 420/34 IPC PS GK-1	Quashed as settled on 10.08.2026 by Hon'ble DHC

22. Having given my anxious consideration to these aspects, I have come to the conclusion that the facts and circumstances of the present case, on balance, lend themselves to an order in favour of the petitioners, for the following reasons:

- a. As noted above, the dispute arises out of a property transaction between the parties, which is inherently private in character. The proceedings are not of a nature which involves any heinous offence or implicates the public interest in continuation of the proceedings, despite the settlement. The offences involved, to the extent that they are not compoundable, do not concern forgery of any public

¹⁰ Although this case is mentioned in the status report as a criminal case, it was clarified in the course of hearing that it is, in fact, a civil suit.



documents or presentation of allegedly forged documents for public purposes.

- b. The complainant and his family members have themselves settled the proceedings. The settlement contemplates payment of a substantial sum to them, which they have already received.
- c. While the conduct of petitioner No. 1 in failing to surrender, despite the direction of the Supreme Court, is no doubt deplorable, he has spent a period of 2 months and 22 days in custody, as on 05.09.2026¹¹. An affidavit/undertaking of apology dated 24.07.2026, affirmed by petitioner No. 1, has also been placed on record. Further, the order of the Supreme Court dated 27.02.2026 specifically permitted petitioner No. 1 to seek regular bail after surrender, which indicates that the Court did not intend, at that stage, that he would be deprived of his liberty throughout the proceedings.
- d. As a further expression of atonement, the petitioners have voluntarily deposited a demand draft of Rs. 15,00,000/- in favour of the Registrar General of this Court, as recorded in the order dated 03.09.2026. Mr. Dhamija requests that this amount be utilised in the national interest, by transfer to the Army Central Welfare Fund.
- e. As far as petitioner No. 1's prior criminal cases are concerned, out of the 14 cases mentioned in the status report, four are civil cases and seven are complaint cases, under Section 138 of the NI Act. Two of the complaint cases concern the present transaction itself,



and two others have already been settled/compounded. Only three cases are based on FIRs registered against petitioner No. 1. Of these, two are under Section 283 of the IPC, pertaining to obstruction of a public way, which, according to Mr. Dhamija, arose in the context of ongoing construction work being carried out by petitioner No. 1. One prior involvement in a case under Sections 420/34 of the IPC was quashed on the basis of a settlement, by an order of this Court dated 10.08.2026 in CRL.M.C. 1237/2026. Having regard to the nature of these involvements, they do not, in my view, come in the way of the relief sought by the petitioners.

- f. The Supreme Court has also held that the likelihood of conviction is one of the relevant factors to be considered in such cases. The complainant and his family members having settled the disputes and received the amount payable thereunder, they have also supported the petitioners' request, making conviction relatively improbable.

23. Having regard to these circumstances, I am of the view that the appropriate course is to permit quashing of the impugned FIR, in the interest of justice between the parties. Accordingly, FIR No. 114/2025, dated 25.01.2025, registered at Police Station Greater Kailash, District South, Delhi, is quashed. It is so ordered. Consequently, petitioner No. 1 be released from judicial custody forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.

24. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to transmit the amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- deposited by the petitioners to the Army

¹¹ A copy of the Nominal Roll dated 05.09.2026 has been handed over in Court and is taken on record.



Central Welfare Fund [Account No. 520101236373338; IFSC Code UBIN0530778], within a period of four weeks from today, in terms of the petitioners' submission in paragraph 17 (d) above.

25. The petition is disposed of in these terms.

26. A copy of the order be communicated to the concerned Jail Superintendent electronically for information and necessary compliance.

BAIL APPLN. 2886/2026 & CRL.M.C. 2245/2026

27. As a result of the order passed in CRL.M.C. 5153/2026, these petitions have been rendered infructuous and are disposed of.

28. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

PRATEEK JALAN, J

SEPTEMBER 7, 2026
'PV'/SS/KA/