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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRMP No. 2374 of 2018

1 - D.D. Mahant S/o Balram Mahant, Aged About 62 Years The Then Present Tahsildar, Bijapur Police Station Bijapur, District Bijapur Chhattisgarh.

2 - Shankarlal Sinha S/o Mohanlal Sinha Aged About 54 Years R/o Present Naib Tahsildar, Baloda Bazar District Baloda Bazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh.

--- Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - Firoz Khan S/o Sikandar Khan Aged About 35 Years R/o Ward No.7 Lalpur Road, Bagbahra Police Station Bagbahra, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.

2 - Chanabai W/o Mehattar Satnami Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Banskata, Post Komakhan, Police Station Komakhan Tahsil Bagbahra District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

3 - Laxmikant Harlalka S/o Hanuprasad Harlalka Aged About 62 Years R/o S-12, Green Paradise, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

4 - Nikunj Harlalka S/o Ramakant Harlalka Aged About 33 Years R/o S-12 Green Paradise, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondent(s)

CRMP No. 2375 of 2018

1 - D.D. Mahant S/o Balram Mahant Aged About 62 Years Through Tahsildar, Bijapur, Police Station- Bijapur, District- Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Shankarlal Sinha S/o Mohanlal Sinha Aged About 54 Years Through Present Naib Tahsildar, Balodabazar, District- Balodabazar- Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.

---Petitioner(s)

Versus

1 - Firoz Khan S/o Sikandar Khan Aged About 35 Years R/o Ward No. 7, Lalpur Road, Bagbahra, Police Station- Bagbahra, District- Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.

2 - Sohta Bai W/o Jodhan Tondon Aged About 64 Years R/o Village- Banskata, Post- Komakhan, Police Station- Komakhan, Tahsil- Bagbahra, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

3 - Laxmikant Harlalka S/o Hanuprasad Harlalka Aged About 62 Years R/o S-12, Green Paradise, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondent(s)

CRMP No. 2380 of 2018

1 - D.D. Mahant S/o Balram Mahant Aged About 62 Years Through Tahsildar, Bijapur, Police Station- Bijapur, District- Bijapur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Shankarlal Sinha S/o Mohanlal Sinha Aged About 54 Years Through Present Naib Tahsildar, Balodabazar, District- Balodabazar- Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.

---Petitioner(s)

Versus

1 - Firoz Khan S/o Sikandar Khan Aged About 35 Years R/o Ward No. 7, Lalpur Road, Bagbahra, Police Station- Bagbahra, District- Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.

2 - Tulsi Bai D/o Gurubaru Aged About 64 Years R/o Village- Banskata, Post-Devri, Police Station- Komakhan, Tahsil- Bagbahra, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.

3 - Laxmkant Harlalka S/o Hanuprasad Harlalka Aged About 62 Years R/o S-12, Green Paradise, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

4 - Nikunj Harlalka R/o Ramakant Harlalka Aged About 33 Years R/o S-12, Green Paradise, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondent(s)

For Petitioners : Shri Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate.

For Respondents : Shri Hemant Kesharwani, Advocate.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J

Order reserved on 22.10.2024

Order Delivered on 03.03.2025

1. The issue involved in all these petitions are one and the same and therefore for the sake of brevity, they are being heard and decided together by this common order.
2. All these petitions have been filed under Section 482 CrPC by the petitioners/accused persons No.1&2 against the impugned order dated 06.09.2018 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mahasamund (in short, JMFC) in Criminal Complaint Case Nos. 1206/2018, 1207/2018 and 1212/2018 respectively whereby the JMFC, Mahasamund have registered the complaint case against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC and issued process against them.
3. In all these petitions/complaint case, the complainant/respondent No.1 had initially moved an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before

the trial court on 30.11.2012 alleging in it that certain lands have been given on lease to other respondents/accused persons which were not transferable without prior permission of the District Collector and it was only for agriculture purposes. The land was given to them in the year 1994-95. The concerned allottees of land, in connivance with present petitioners, shown in the revenue records as their ancestral land and not obtained in lease, sold it to various persons at different dates and thereby caused loss to the State. Since the persons in whose favour the land was given in lease were not owner of the land, no Rin Pustika could be issued in their favour, yet the present petitioners who were the then Tehsildar (Petitioner No.1) and Patwari (Petitioner No.2) have issued Rin Pustika showing that land was their ancestral land and after making necessary entries in Khasra and Kistbandi Khatauni, prepared forged document and in conspiracy with the person concerned, sold the land to others and got the sale deed executed. The complainant made a complaint to State Govt. on 13.12.2011 and in turn the matter was forwarded to Sub Divisional Magistrate (Revenue), Mahasamund (in short, SDM) who, after enquiry submitted its report on 02.06.2012 and found commission of offence and recommended for disciplinary proceeding against the petitioners. A complaint was also made to the police on 24.11.2012 and when no action was taken against the petitioners, they approached before the Superintendent of Police on 14.12.2012. Again no action was taken against the accused persons and therefore a complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC was filed on 30.11.2012 before the trial court by the respondent No.1/complainant.

4. The said complaint filed under Section 156(3) CrPC was considered by the JMFC, Mahasamund and vide its order dated 16.05.2014

directed the Station House Officer, Police Station, Komakhan, to register FIR and to investigate the matter. The said order dated 16.05.2014 was challenged by the respective accused persons before the Revisional Court and the Revisional Court dismissed their Criminal Revision and affirmed the order passed by the JMFC, Mahasamund.

5. The order passed by the trial court as well as Revisional Court was further put to challenge by the respective accused persons before this court by filing CrMP No.591 of 2014 and other batch of petitions. The said CrMP No.591 of 2014 and other connected matters came up for hearing before the coordinate Bench of this court, who, after hearing the parties, vide its order dated 02.05.2017 quashed the order passed by the JMFC, Mahasamund as well as Revisional Court. Consequently, the subsequent proceeding on the basis of order of JMFC Mahasamund were also quashed and the application filed by the complainant/respondent No.1 under Section 156(3) of CrPC was rejected.
6. After passing of the order dated 02.05.2017 by the coordinate Bench in CrMP No.591 of 2014 and other connected batch of petitions, the respondent No.1/complainant filed a complaint case under Section 200 CrPC before the JMFC, Mahasamund on 31.05.2017. After recording statement on oath of the complainant, the order has been passed on 06.09.2018 whereby the trial court has registered the complaint case for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC and issued process to the accused persons which are under challenge in these petitions.
7. Learned counsel for the respective petitioners would submit that subsequent complaint under Section 200 CrPC on the same set of

facts was not maintainable, yet the trial court has registered the complaint case. Earlier on the same set of facts the complainant has filed his application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the trial court. While considering the application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) CrPC the JMFC Mahasamund, after considering the merits of the case, have directed the concerned police to register FIR and to investigate the matter. Consideration and given categorical findings on the merits for registration of FIR amounts to exercise its discretion under Section 190 and 200 of CrPC. The JMFC has treated the complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC like a complaint filed under Section 200 CrPC and passed the order dated 16.05.2014 considering the merits of the complaint. It is not that JMFC called the police report or as and when he received the complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC, without application of mind he directed the police to register FIR and to investigate the matter. It is a case where after considering the merits of the case they have directed for registration of FIR and thereby they exercised the jurisdiction under Section 200 CrPC.

The Coordinate Bench of this court has quashed the order dated 16.05.2014 and also dismissed the application of the complainant filed under Section 156(3) CrPC on the ground that during the proceeding of Section 156(3) CrPC the statement of complainant Firoz Khan was recorded and thereby the trial court has invoked Chapter-XV of CrPC and after entering into Chapter-XV of CrPC the Magistrate could not have reverted back to Section 156 CrPC and also that direction to police for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC cannot be ordered in absence of sanction of prosecution and the complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC was quashed. The complainant has not challenged the

said order dated 02.05.2017 before any higher forum and it attains its finality. Since the Coordinate Bench has already considered that once the trial court has entered into Chapter-XV of CrPC, he cannot revert back to Section 156(3) CrPC, meaning thereby the earlier complaint filed by the respondent No.1/complainant was treated as complaint under Section 200 CrPC and that has been dismissed by the trial court. Subsequent complaint under Section 200 CrPC on the same set of facts was not maintainable.

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners and have submitted that earlier the petitioners had filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the trial court for a direction to the police authorities to register FIR and to investigate in to the matter. In that application under Section 156 (3) CrPC the trial court was directed to register FIR and to investigate into the matter vide its order dated 16.05.2014. The order passed under the application under Section 156(3) CrPC was affirmed by the revisional court and thereafter the same was challenged before this court in CrMP No.591 of 2014 and batch of petitions. Vide order dated 02.05.2017 all the CrMPs were allowed and the order dated 16.05.2014 passed by the trial court as well as the order passed by the revisional court was set aside on technical ground. Therefore, the subsequent filing of duly constituted complaint case under Section 200 CrPC is very well maintainable and the trial court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction to register case against the petitioners. Consideration of application under Section 156(3) CrPC is pre cognizance stage whereas the consideration in complaint under Section 200 CrPC is the post cognizance stage. Since

the order dated 02.05.2017 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this court setting aside the orders passed by the trial court as well as revisional court in 156(3) CrPC proceeding, the petitioner has not challenged before any higher forum and availing their remedy by filing the duly constituted complaint case under Section 200 CrPC. Statement of the complainant and the witnesses have been recorded and after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case the trial court has passed its order on 06.09.2018 by which the complaint case is directed to be registered for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC which cannot be said to faulty or illegal. Therefore, all the petitions does not have any merits and are liable to be dismissed.

9. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents enclosed along with petitions.
10. It is not in dispute that earlier the respondent No.1 had filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the trial court alleging in it that land in question were allotted to Smt. Sobhta Bai, Chana Bai and Tulsi Bai on lease and the said lands were not transferable without prior permission of the Collector, but they have transferred the land in contravention of the provisions of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the revenue authorities have certified the mutation of names of purchaser in the revenue records and thereby they have committed the forgery and conspiracy in preparing the false documents. The trial court after recording statement of the complainant on 28.04.2014 and vide order dated 16.05.2014 directed the police authorities to register an FIR and to investigate into the matter. The order dated 16.05.2014 was challenged by the present petitioners before the revisional court

but the same was dismissed and the matter was ultimately traveled up to this court in CrMP No.591 of 2014 along with other batch of petitions. The Coordinate Bench of this court vide its order dated 02.05.2017 allowed the said CrMPs and set aside the order dated 16.05.2014 and the order passed by the revisional court. Further, the application filed by the complainant was also rejected. While passing the order dated 02.05.2017, the Coordinate Bench of this court has made the following observations in paragraph 11 & 12 as under:

“11. Thus, applying the principle of law laid-down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), if the facts of the present case are examined, it is quite vivid that the Magistrate did not consider it appropriate to invoke Section 156(3) of the CrPC decided to record the statement of complainant-Firoz Khan by invoking Chapter XV of the CrPC and thereby recorded the statement of the complainant and once learned Magistrate has invoked Chapter XV of the CrPC, he could not have reverted back to Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

12. The matter may be considered from one more angle. Applicant-Shri D.D. Mahant and applicant-Shri Shankarlal Sinha are government servants, their appointing authority is the State Government. The Supreme Court in the matter of Anil Kumar and others Vs. M.K. Aiyappa and another, 2013(10) SCC 705, has held that direction to police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC cannot be ordered in absence of sanction for prosecution, which squarely applies to the facts of the present case. No such sanction was granted by the State Government and application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC has been granted directing investigation against Shri Sinha and Shri Mahanat, which is clearly impermissible in law.”

- 11.** When an application under Section 156(3) CrPC filed before the jurisdictional magistrate, the magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. The power of the magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC cannot be marginalized. To

understand the real purport of Section 156(3) CrPC, it is necessary to reproduce the said provision here :

“156- Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case-

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.”

12. The scope for consideration of the application under Section 156(3) CrPC by the magistrate has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ***Priyanka Shrivastava & Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2015 (6) SCC 287***. In paragraph 22 to 24 it was held as under:

“22. In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa [3], the two-Judge Bench had to say this:

“11.....The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed [(2008) 5 SCC 668] examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation.”

23. In Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi [4], this Court ruled thus:

“18. ...11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of

enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter."

24. In *CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd.*[5], the Court while dealing with the power of Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences, has opined that having considered the complaint, the Magistrate may consider it appropriate to send the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. And again:

"18.....When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under [pic]Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3)."

- 13.** The provisions of Section 156(3) CrPC is given in Chapter -XII whereas, the provisions of complaints to the Magistrate is provided under Chapter- XV of CrPC. The power given to magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC does not provide to examine the complainant or witness and from the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, he has to weight the allegations and consider it as to whether there is sufficient material for direction to register the FIR and to investigate into the matter or not. Recording of the statement of the complainant is provided under Section 200 CrPC which reads as under:

"Chapter-XV Complaints to Magistrate

200. Examination of complainant-A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and

shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:

Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses,

(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or

(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192:

Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.”

14. In the matter of *Kailash Vijayvargiya Vs. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri, 2023 (14) SCC-1*, the scope and powers of the Magistrate to direct for registration of FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC and the position of entertaining the complaint under Section 202 CrPC have been considered and in paragraphs 49 to 52 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“49. As to the scope of power of the Magistrate to direct an FIR under Section 156(3), this court in *Mohd. Yusuf v. Afaq Jahan (Smt) and another*, (2006) 1 SCC 627 opined that:

“11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the Police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the Police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the Police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the Police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that Police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.”

50. In *Anju Chaudhary (supra)*, this court analysing the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) observed:

“41. Thus, the Magistrate exercises a very limited power under Section 156(3) and so is its discretion. It does not travel into the arena of merit of the case if such case was fit to proceed further. This distinction has to be kept in mind by the court in different kinds of cases....”

51. In *HDFC Securities Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra*, (2017) 1 SCC 640, this court while interpreting the words “may take cognizance” and Section 156(3), held:

“24. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent 2 submitted that the complaint has disclosed the commission of an offence which is cognizable in nature and in the light of *Lalita Kumari* case [*Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.*, (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , registration of FIR becomes mandatory. We observe that it is clear from the use of the words “may take cognizance” in the context in which they occur, that the same cannot be equated with “must take cognizance”. The word “may” give discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and that the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter, which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. It is settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, do not disclose the commission of an offence.”

52. However, the position is different at the post- cognizance stage. Under Section 202, the Magistrate can analyse the veracity of the complaint made and appreciate whether there are grounds to proceed further. In *Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and Another*, AIR 1963 SC 1430, this Court referred to the objective of Section 202, to observe:

“8. to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued or not and to remove from his mind any hesitation that he may have felt upon the mere perusal of the complaint and the consideration of the complainant's evidence on oath. The courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations of the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Section 202 is not to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-section (1) of Section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complainant and the statements made

before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant.”

15. In the present case, from perusal of order dated 16.05.2014 it appears that the JMFC, Mahasamund, while considering the application under Section 156(3) CrPC have recorded the statement on oath of the complainant on 28.04.2014 and thereafter considering the merits of case and satisfying himself, has directed the police authorities to register FIR, which in the opinion of this court, cannot be an order under Section 156(3) CrPC, but it is an order after taking cognizance of the matter and considering the case on its merits that too after recording statement on oath of the complainant.
16. The Co-ordinate Bench of this court has also considered in its order dated 02.05.2017 passed in CrMP No.591 of 2014 and other connected batch of matters holding in paragraph 11 as under:

“11. Thus, applying the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above stated judgments (Supra), if the facts of the present case are examined, it is quite vivid that the Magistrate did not consider it appropriate to invoke Section 156(3) of the CrPC decided to record the statement of complainant-Firoz Khan by invoking Chapter-XV of the CrPC and thereby recorded the statement of the complainant and once learned Magistrate has invoked Chapter-XV of the CrPC, he could not have reverted back to Section 156(3) of the CrPC.”
17. The order dated 02.05.2017 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this court have not been challenged any further. When it comes in the order that the Magistrate has already invoked Chapter-XV of CrPC, he could not have reverted back to Section 156(3) CrPC, the order dated 16.05.2014 cannot be termed as the order passed under Section 156(3) CrPC and it is the order passed under Chapter-XV of CrPC which deals with the cognizance taken by the Magistrate on complaint made by the complainant after his examination. Therefore, in the considered view of this court, the subsequent complaint filed by the

complainant under Section 200 CrPC on 03.07.2017 cannot be entertained on the same set of facts and cause of action, yet the trial court has registered the complaint case and issued process to the non applicants/accused persons which is beyond jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

- 18.** For the foregoing reasons, all the petitions filed by the respective petitioners are hereby **allowed** and the order dated 06.09.2018 passed in Criminal Complaint Case Nos. 1206/2018, 1207/2018 and 1212/2018 are hereby set aside and further proceeding of aforesaid complaint cases pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mahasamund, are hereby quashed.

Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge

inder