

Date of reserved for orders : 04.08.2026
Date of pronouncement : 25.08.2026
Date of uploading : .08.2026

APHC010384562025



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)**

[3331]

TUESDAY, THE 25th DAY OF AUGUST 2026

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1863/2025

Between:

1. SURAPANENI RAJYA LAKSHMI, W/O LATE RAMA KRISHNA, AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS, R/O MOTUKURIVARI STREET, GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE, GUDLAVALLERU MANDAL, KRISHNA DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH- 521356

...PETITIONER

AND

1. BHEEMADOLU VIJAYA NAGA DURGA, (DIED)
2. BHEEMADOLU VIJAYA NAGA DURGA, W/O NARASIMHA MURTHY, AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, HUSBAND PROTECTION, R/O JUDDIGAVIA PENUMANDA TANUKU MANDAL. KRISHNA DISTRICT.
3. MOTHUKURI SUBRAHMANYAM, (DIED)
4. ANNE TARAKA RAMA RAO, (DIED)

5. ANNE KASTHURI BHAYAMMA, W/O TARAKA RAMA RAO, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, HUSBAND PROTECTION, R/O GUDLAVALLERU MANDAL.
6. ADUSUMILLI VARA LAKSHMI, (DIED).
7. ADUSUMILLI MANORAMMA, (DIED)
8. CHITTIBOMMA JAGANNANDHA RAO, (DIED)
9. POTHUKUCHI NAGESWARA RAO, S/O SUBBAYYA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, TEACHER, R/O GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE AND MANDAL.
10. ANNE VENU, S/O TARAKA RAMA RAO, AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, PROPERTIES, R/O GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE AND MANDAL.
11. POLAVARAPU JYOTHI, W/O BASUK, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, PROPERTIES, R/O GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE AND MANDAL.
12. PINNAMANENI SWARUPARANI, W/O JANARDHANA RAO, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, R/O. GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE AND MANDAL.
13. MOTHUKURI ANAJANA RAO, (DIED)
14. MAGANTI ANURADHA, W/O SEETAIAH, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, HOUSE-WIFE, R/O D.NO.7/69, NEHRU BAZAR, GROMOR COROMANDEL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED OPPOSITE LANE END, GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE AND MANDAL.
15. LINGAMANENI SRINIVAS, S/O SATYANARAYANA, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, R/O BAPUJINAGER BACKSIDE OF SANTHI THEATRE, PALVANCHA, PALVANCHA MANDAL, KHAMMAM DISTRICT.
16. SURAPANENI KALYANI, W/O LOKESH, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, EMPLOYEE IN DIVIS LABS, VISAKHAPATNAM.
17. LINGAMANENI RAGHAVA, S/O SRINIVAS, AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, C/O. SURAPANENI RAJYA LAKSHMI, W/O LATE-RAMAKRISHNA, AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, HOUSE-WIFE, R/O GUDLAVALLERU VILLAGE AND MANDAL, KRISHNA DISTRICT

(RESPONDENT NO.1 AND RESPONDENT NO. 3 TO RESPONDENT 17 ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES IN THIS PRESENT CRP)

...RESPONDENT(S):

Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be pleased to begs to present this Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition having been aggrieved by the Order dated 18.07.2025 passed in E.A.No. 75 of 2025 in E.P.110/2013 IN O.S.No.100 of 1985, on the file of Court Of The Principal Civil judge (Senior Division), Gudivada for the following grounds among other

IA NO: 1 OF 2025

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to order stay of all further proceedings which include a specific direction not to demolish my building located in Survey Number 191/4 located in Gundlavalleru Village Gudlavalleru Mandal pending finalisation of the above CRP in the interest of justice and pass

Counsel for the Petitioner:

1. UMESH CHANDRA P V G

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.

2. JETTI SANTHI KIRAN

The Court made the following order:

Judgment debtor (JDR) No. 12 filed the above Civil Revision petition against the order dated 18.07.2025 in E.A No.75 of 2025 in E.P.No. 110 of 2013 in OS No. 100 of 1985 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gudivada.

2. Respondents 1 and 2 herein filed O.S.No.100 of 1985 seeking ejectment of respondents 3 to 13 herein and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties. The said suit was decreed on 23.02.1991.

3. Thereafter, the decree holder (DHR) No.1 died and DHR No. 2 filed E.P.No.110 of 2013 under Order XXI Rule 36 CPC against JDRs 3 and 7 to 10. The legal representatives of JDR No.4 were subsequently brought on record as JDRs 12 to 16, and the relief in the execution petition was sought against them also. Pending the E.P., JDR No.12 filed E.A.No.75 of 2025 under Order XXI Rule 29 and Section 151 CPC, seeking stay of proceedings in E.P.No.110 of 2013 till the pronouncement of judgment in O.S.No.4 of 2020 on the file of the learned Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gudivada.

4. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, JDR No.12 pleaded that she filed O.S.No.4 of 2020 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gudivada, to set aside the judgment and decree in O.S.No.100 of 1985, insofar as item No. 3 of the plaint schedule property is concerned, to declare her as the absolute owner of the said property and other reliefs.

(ii) The suit OS No. 4 of 2020 was posted to 18.07.2025 for defendants' evidence. The decree holder in O.S.No.100 of 1985 filed E.P.No.110 of 2013 seeking delivery of the property. JDR No.12 further stated that she did not receive notice in O.S.No.100 of 1985 and hence, the decree and judgment dated 23.02.1991 passed in the said suit do not bind her. Due to ill-health, JDR No.12 left for her daughter's house at Visakhapatnam. She came to know that the DHR came to the E.P. schedule property along with his men, seeking delivery of the same.

(iii) JDR No.12 further stated that she constructed a house in 1986. The DHR got knowledge about the suit O.S.No. 4 of 2020. However, he is still proceeding with E.P.No.110 of 2013 in O.S.No.100 of 1985.

5. Respondent No.2-DHR filed a counter and opposed the application. It was contended, *inter alia*, that the petitioner-JDR No.12 obtained a gift deed in respect of the subject property from her family members after filing suit O.S.No.100 of 1985. Vara Lakshmi, mother of the petitioner, JDR No.12, received summons in the previous E.P.No.118 of 1991 in O.S.No.100 of 1985. Thereafter, I.A.No.605 of 1992 was filed to set aside the decree and judgment in O.S.No.100 of 1985 and the same was pending till 22.01.2007, on which date it was dismissed for default.

(ii) The petitioner-JDR No.12 received summons in E.A.No.623 of 2015 in E.P.No.110 of 2013; however, she failed to appear. Later, on 30.07.2019, she filed E.A.No.270 of 2019 to set aside the decree in O.S.No.100 of 1985, and the said petition was dismissed, against which C.R.P.No.68 of 2020 was filed. The said C.R.P. was dismissed on 29.12.2023. The petitioner-JDR No.12, who has been watching the steps and developments in E.P.110 of 2013, on coming to know the order of delivery, locked the house.

(iii) On 04.07.2025, the DHR filed petitions to break open the lock, appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to fix the boundaries with the help of Mandal Surveyor to assist the Field Assistant, and for demolition of RCC building raised in item No.3 of the schedule property. When an attempt was made to serve notice on the counsel for the petitioner-JDR No.12, he refused to receive the notice. The executing Court, on considering the endorsement, passed the necessary orders. The Advocate Commissioner served notice on the Tahsildar to depute a surveyor. The petitioner, from the beginning, kept on

filing one or the other application to drag on the execution proceedings. Eventually, the petitioner prayed to dismiss the application.

6. The Executing Court, by order dated 18.07.2025, dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the same, the above revision was filed.

7. Heard Sri Umesh Chandra P.V.G., learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri O. Uday Kumar, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that suit O.S.No.100 of 1985 was instituted against the grandmother of the petitioner, who was vested with life interest only, and the petitioner is the absolute owner and possessor of the property. The petitioner was not made a party defendant to the suit. The Executing Court should have granted a stay of the execution proceedings, pending the suit O.S.No.4 of 2020.

9. Learned counsel for respondent No.2-DHR, on the other hand, would contend that petitioner's mother and grandmother are parties to the suit. In the execution petition, the petitioner, being one of the legal representatives of JDR No.4, Vara Lakshmi, came on record as judgment debtor No.12, as per order dated 23.12.2016 in E.A.No.623 of 2015. The petitioner-JDR No.12 was set ex parte on 30.03.2017. Subsequently, JDR No.12 filed E.A.No.211 of 2019 under Order XXI Rule 106 C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte order and the same was allowed on 19.09.2019.

10. Learned counsel would further that subsequently, the petitioner-JDR No.12 filed E.A.No.270 of 2019 under Order VII Rule 9 C.P.C. seeking permission to file additional counter in E.P. and the same was dismissed on 21.11.2019, against which the petitioner filed C.R.P.No.68 of 2020. The said C.R.P. was dismissed for non-prosecution, on 29.12.2023. Learned counsel

would further submit that E.A.No.280 of 2019 filed under Order XXI Rules 97, 98 and 101 read with Section 47 C.P.C. is still pending. In fact, the revision petitioner is claiming title through the grandmother and mother, who are parties to the suit. The petitioner filed the present application to procrastinate the proceedings.

11. The points for consideration are :

1. Whether the proceedings in E.P.No.110 of 2013 in O.S.No.100 of 1985 on the file of the learned Principal Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gudivada, need to be stayed till pronouncement of judgment in O.S.No.4 of 2020?
2. Whether the order under revision warrants interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

12. Before delving into the above points, it is appropriate to extract Rule 29 of Order XXI, which deals with stay of execution, pending suit between the decree holder and judgment debtor. Rule 29 reads thus:

“29. Where a suit is pending in any court against a holder of a decree of such court [or of a decree which is being executed by such court], on the part of the person against whom a decree was passed, the court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of a decree until the pending suit has been decided.”

13. Thus, the above provision manifests that, to stay execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 29 C.P.C., pendency of a suit in the same court is a *sine qua non*. Whether mere pendency of a case in such court automatically entails a stay, or other conditions must be fulfilled and whether granting a stay is a directory or mandatory require consideration.

14. While the first limb envisages 'such court', the second limb authorises the exercise of jurisdiction on certain terms. The word 'may' employed in the section also gains significance.

15. In the case at hand, the decree holders filed suit O.S.No.100 of 1985 initially against the mother and grandmother of the petitioner-JDR No.12 and the said suit was decreed. The decree holders filed E.P. in the year 2013 and the petitioner, one of the legal representatives of JDR No.4, Vara Lakshmi, who suffered a decree in the suit, was brought on record as JDR No.12 as per the order, dated 23.12.2016 in E.A.No.623 of 2016.

16. The petitioner-JDR No.12 filed the suit O.S.No.4 of 2020 after a long period to set aside the decree dated 23.02.1991 in O.S.No.100 of 1985 and to declare her as the owner of item No.3 of the suit schedule property in O.S.No.100 of 1985. In fact, the revision petitioner was set ex parte in E.P.No.110 of 2013 on 30.03.2017. Thereafter, the revision petitioner filed E.A.No.211 of 2019 and the same was allowed on 19.09.2019.

17. The word 'such court' employed in Rule 29 of Order XXI fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Shaukat Hussain @ Ali Akram and Others vs. Smt. Bhuneshwari Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. and others**¹. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the words 'such court' mean, in the context of that Rule, the Court in which the suit is pending. In other words, the suit instituted against the decree holder and execution proceedings should be pending in the same Court at a time.

18. In the case at hand, suit O.S.No.100 of 1985 was filed three decades before filing of the suit by the petitioner-JDR No.12, and the said suit was

¹ 1972 (2) SCC 731

decreed against mother and grandmother of the revision petitioner, on 23.02.1991 and the said judgment and decree became final.

19. The revision petitioner is claiming title to item No.3 of the schedule property through mother and grandmother. In fact, Rule 102 of Order XXI envisages certain rules not applicable to transferee *pendent lite*. Rule 102 of Order XXI reads thus:

“Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person.”

20. In the explanation given thereto, it was clarified that “transfer” includes a transfer by operation of law.

21. In fact, the revision petitioner also filed E.A.No.80 of 2025 under Order XXI Rule 26 and Section 151 C.P.C. to stay delivery of property to the decree holder till the disposal of O.S.No.4 of 2020 and the said E.A. was dismissed on 24.07.2025.

22. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if the decree holder is allowed to take possession of the property, it would be a travesty of justice, needs no consideration. The contention of the petitioner is that the property originally belonged to her grandfather, A. Lakshmana Das. Said A. Lakshmana Das, while retaining life interest in the property, bequeathed it to his son, A. Narasimha Rao, by a document dated 29.03.1978 with vested remainder that his wife, Manoharamma, shall enjoy the property for her lifetime and thereafter vested remainder with his son; that Sri Narasimha Rao, predeceased his mother leaving behind him his wife and

three daughters including the plaintiff; that Manoharamma, along with Vara Lakshmi, the mother of the petitioner and other sisters of the petitioner bequeathed the property to the petitioner vide registered gift deed on 02.07.1984 may not enure to the benefit of the revision petitioner at this stage.

23. The primary object of Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code is to prevent double execution and to enable the executing court to adjust the direct claims between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor. However, the exercise of this jurisdiction is purely discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right.

24. As observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Shaukat Hussain (supra)** and subsequently reiterated in **Sir Shadi Lal Estate & Development Ltd. v. Jagdamba Construction Co.**,² the power under Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code is discretionary and can be invoked only when a suit is pending in the same court against the holder of a decree of such court. However, the mere fulfilment of statutory conditions or the mere pendency of a separate suit between the parties does not automatically mandate or justify an order of stay. If the mere filing or pendency of a suit were treated as a sufficient ground to stay execution, it would render every valid decree vulnerable to infinite delay at the whim of an unsuccessful litigant, thereby frustrating the very principle of administration of justice. Paras 10 & 14 of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"10. Under Order 21 Rule 29 CPC, a court has the power to stay execution of a decree provided the decree-holder and judgment-debtor are the same parties and the suit is pending in the same court. It is well settled that the power under Order 21 Rule 29 CPC is a discretionary power and the court must exercise the discretion with care and caution

² (2007) 11 SCC 345

and in exceptional cases and not routinely. The power to stay execution of a decree should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.

...

14. It must be remembered that a decree passed by a competent court should not be lightly stayed. The execution of a decree cannot be stayed merely because a suit is pending between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor unless extraordinary circumstances are made out."

25. To determine whether an order of stay ought to be granted under Order XXI Rule 29, the executing court must look beyond the mere existence of a pending suit and evaluate certain underlying factors. As observed in **Ghan Shyam Das v. Anant Kumar Sinha**,³ the Hon'ble Apex Court explicitly held that the discretionary power to stay execution cannot be exercised unless the applicant's conduct is bona fide. If the court finds that the judgment-debtor is attempting to abuse the judicial process, the discretion under Order XXI Rule 29 must be denied. Relevant Para 12 is reproduced as under:

"12. The remedy under Order 21 Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a discretionary remedy. So far as the question of stay of execution is concerned, the court will not routinely exercise its discretion to stay execution unless the applicant satisfies the court that his conduct has been bona fide and that non-grant of stay would result in irreparable injury. Where the judgment-debtor's conduct demonstrates dilatory tactics or an abuse of the process of the court to deprive the decree-holder of the fruits of his decree, no stay can be granted."

³ (1991) 4 SCC 379

26. Similarly in **Shaukat Hussain's case** (*supra*) this principle was reiterated and the court held that,

"8. It is obvious that the rule does not contemplate that the execution of a decree must be stayed merely because a suit is pending between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor. The power given to the court under Order 21, Rule 29 is a discretionary power. It is only in appropriate cases where the court thinks fit that it may stay the execution of the decree. The mere pendency of a suit is not a sufficient ground for staying the execution of a decree."

27. The jurisdiction is equitable in nature, and the fundamental requirement for its exercise is that the applicant must establish a compelling, exceptional circumstance that outweighs the decree-holder's legitimate entitlement to enjoy the fruits of a decree lawfully obtained. The requirements to grant stay were also discussed in **Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd.**⁴ wherein it was held that:

"9. The court has jurisdiction to pass an order of stay. However, the discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. An order of stay is in the nature of an equitable relief and the principles governing the grant of temporary injunctions—namely prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—are equally applicable when considering a prayer for staying execution proceedings."

28. Therefore, this court may conclude that a court, while granting a stay on the execution proceedings, is required to consider the following situations:

- i. Whether the pending suit has a direct, substantial, and decisive bearing on the decree under execution;

⁴ (2005) 1 SCC 705

- ii. Whether the non-grant of a stay would result in irreparable injury or an irreversible situation that cannot be remedied later;
- iii. Whether the applicant has established a prima facie case with a high probability of success in the pending suit; and
- iv. Whether the balance of convenience dictates the abeyance of execution.

29. In evaluating these criteria, the conduct of the petitioner/judgment-debtor is a paramount consideration. The executing court cannot blind itself to the mala fides, dilatory tactics, or lack of bona fides on the part of the applicant. The Apex Court in **Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi**⁵ underscored the duty of execution courts to actively curb frivolous, vexatious, and prolonged execution litigation designed solely to stall the enforcement of decrees and observed that:

"23. It is a matter of common knowledge that in India, litigation does not end with the decree, and the real troubles of the decree holder start after getting the decree. Execution proceedings are delayed for years together by raising frivolous objections by the judgment debtor or by third parties...

24. The executing court must play an active role in scrutinising the applications filed in execution proceedings to ensure that frivolous challenges do not derail the enforcement of a decree passed by a competent court."

30. At the cost of repetition, this court is highlighting the earlier litigation of the revision petitioner in the E.P.

- The Petitioner/JDR No.12 filed E.A. No.211/2019 under Order-XXI Rule 106 CPC to set aside the ex parte order dated 30.03.2017, and the same was allowed on 19.09.2019.

⁵ (2021) 6 SCC 418

- Thereafter, the Petitioner/JDR No.12 filed E.A.No.270/2019 under Order VII Rule 9 CPC seeking permission to file an additional counter in the Execution Petition. The same was dismissed holding that the plea raised by the Petitioner/JDR No.12 that she was not a party to the suit and that the decree was not binding on her could not be accepted, on 21.11.2019.
- Subsequently, on 22-02-2023, the Petitioner/JDR No.12 filed a memo in E.P. No.110/2013 stating that she had filed a suit in O.S.No.4/2020 concerning item No.3 of the E.P. schedule property, and that the JDRs were not disputing items No.1, 2, and 4. As there was no objection from the Petitioner/JDR No.12 or others regarding those items, the Court ordered delivery of Items No.1, 2 and 4, which was effected on 14.04.2023.
- It is important to note that the Petitioner/JDR No.12 filed the suit in O.S. No.4/2020 on 12.12.2019, after the dismissal of E.A.No.270/2019 in E.P. No.113/2013.
- No appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree in O.S. No.100/1985. Furthermore, revision has been filed against the dismissal of E.A.No.270 of 2019 before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P., vide CRP No. 68 / 2020 and the said CRP was dismissed by the Hon'ble Court for non-prosecution on 29.12.2023.

31. Furthermore, a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction carries a strong presumption of finality and validity. The jurisprudence enunciated in cases such as **Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd.**,⁶ emphasises that the mere challenge to a decree or the institution of collateral proceedings does not operate as a stay, nor does it dilute the sanctity of a valid decree. An executing court or a co-ordinate court

⁶ (2005) 1 SCC 705

will not lightly interfere with or stay the execution of a decree passed by a competent court. It is a well settled principle of law that the executing court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it act as an appellate court over the decree it is called upon to execute. It is pertinent to refer to Para 8 of **Atma Ram Properties case** as under:

"8. It is well settled that mere preferring of an appeal does not operate as stay on the decree or order appealed against nor on the proceedings in the court below. A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction does not become inoperative merely because an independent challenge or proceeding has been initiated. The execution of a decree for possession or money passed by a competent court cannot be held in abeyance as a matter of course."

32. Similarly in **B. Shreenath v. Rajesh**,⁷ the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:

"10. The executing court cannot go behind the decree. A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction retains its sanctity until set aside by a superior court in appropriate appellate or revisional proceedings. No other court or executing court can render such a decree ineffective by granting routine stay orders."

33. Therefore, the jurisdiction to stay execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 29 of the CPC is extraordinary and discretionary. Mere pendency of a suit is never a self-executing ground for a stay. The executing court must rigorously analyse the bona fides and conduct of the petitioner, ensure that decrees passed by competent courts are respected and enforced expeditiously.

⁷ (1998) 4 SCC 543

34. The executing court narrated the circumstances as to how the petition is not maintainable and dismissed the petition by assigning reasons as to why such a stay cannot be granted. This court, while exercising jurisdiction, will not normally act as an appellate court and substitute its opinion.

35. In **Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. and Another Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu and Others**⁸, the Hon'ble Apex Court, by referring to the decisions reported in **Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil**⁹; **Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.**¹⁰, and **Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel**¹¹ and considered the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and summarised the principles as follows:

“35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters, is as follows:

- a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals.
- b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record.
- c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw

⁸ 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745

⁹ (2010) 8 SCC 329

¹⁰ (2001) 8 SCC 97

¹¹ (2022) 4 SCC 181

when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.”

36. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the trial Court. The order under revision brooks no interference. There are no merits in the revision.

37. Hence, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.

As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.

JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

Date : 25.08.2026

ikn

Whether the order is:

Speaking Yes/No / Recorded Yes/No

Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No