

West Bengal Form No. 3702

HIGH COURT FORM NO. (J) 3

HEADING OF JUDGMENT IN APPEAL

District: UTTAR DINAJPUR
In the Court of 1st Additional District & Sessions
Judge, Raiganj

Present: Rohan Sinha
1st Additional District & Sessions Judge
Raiganj, Uttar Dinajpur (JO Code – WB00883)

Tuesday, the 09th day of June, 2026

MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO. 14 OF 2025
(CNR No. WBUD-01-00-3627-2025)

From the Final Order dated 19.09.2025 passed by Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Raiganj, Uttar Dinajpur, in Miscellaneous Pre-emption Case no. 05 of 2023.

1. Sri Goutam Kumasr DasAppellant

Versus

1. Sri Puspendu ChakiRespondent.

This appeal having been heard on 18.05.2026 in presence of –

Sri Deepraj Sengupta..Advocate for the Appellant.

Sri Shankha Ghosh.....Advocate for the Respondent.

and having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment –

PROLOGUE

1. The instant appeal is directed against the Final Order dated 19.09.2025 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Raiganj, Uttar Dinajpur, in Miscellaneous Pre-emption Case No. 05 of 2023. Notably, the appellant does not dispute the ultimate adjudication or the relief granted therein. His grievance is confined to a particular observation contained in the impugned order which, though not forming part of its operative foundation, is perceived to cast a cloud upon his asserted status and interest in the property concerned. The challenge, therefore, is not to the conclusion reached by the learned court below, but to an incidental remark which, according to the appellant, may carry adverse civil consequences in future disputes. The appeal thus raises the limited question whether such a collateral observation, divorced from the final outcome yet capable of affecting proprietary rights, ought to remain on the judicial record.

EXPOSITIO FACTORUM
(Exposition of Facts)

2. The present appellant, as petitioner before the learned court below, instituted an application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the WBLR Act”), invoking the statutory right of pre-emption in respect of a transfer effected on 20.12.2022 in favour of the opposite party (the respondent herein) through a registered deed bearing No. I-1804-18810 of 2022. The petitioner asserted that he was the owner of the contiguous holding sharing the longest common boundary with the transferred parcel of land and, the transferee being an utter stranger to the tenancy, the impugned alienation had furnished a lawful occasion for the exercise of his preferential right of purchase under the statute.
3. Upon consideration of the materials placed before it, the learned Trial Court proceeded *ex-parte* and allowed the application, declaring the petitioner’s entitlement to pre-empt the transfer

dated 20.12.2022. In doing so, however, the learned court characterised the petitioner as a “co-sharer” in relation to the property in question. It is this particular observation, rather than the relief ultimately granted in his favour, that has occasioned the present appeal. The appellant contends that his claim was founded exclusively upon his status as an ‘adjoining landowner’ possessing the longest common boundary and not as a ‘co-sharer’. Feeling aggrieved by what he perceives to be an erroneous description of his legal status, and apprehending possible adverse ramifications therefrom in future proceedings, the appellant has preferred the present appeal on the grounds delineated in the memorandum of appeal.

FUNDAMENTA APPELLATIONIS
(Grounds of the Appeal)

4. The grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal may be succinctly encapsulated thus:
 - a) *The learned Trial Court erred in describing the petitioner as a co-sharer, although his claim for pre-emption was founded solely upon his status as an adjoining landowner having the longest common boundary with the transferred land.*
 - b) *The observations in the body of the impugned order treating the petitioner as a co-sharer are contrary to the pleadings and the foundation of the proceeding.*
 - c) *The operative portion of the impugned order incorrectly attributes the petitioner’s right of pre-emption to his status as a co-sharer instead of his position as a contiguous landowner sharing the longest common boundary with the transferred holding.*
5. Having thus delineated the contours of the controversy and the grounds of challenge, it now becomes apposite to formulate the point to be pondered over in this appeal.

PUNCTA DETERMINATIONIS
(Points for Determination)

6. The solitary question that falls for consideration in the present appeal is as follows:
 - (i) *Whether the appeal, directed not against the ultimate relief granted but against certain observations embodied in the impugned order, is maintainable in law; and, if so, whether such observations are inconsistent with the settled principles of law and the factual matrix of the case?*

7. Having thus formulated the point for determination, this Court shall now proceed to examine the same in order to ascertain whether the impugned order warrants appellate interference or ought to be left undisturbed.

DECISIO CUM RATIONIBUS
(Decision with Reasons)

8. Before entering upon the merits of the grievance sought to be projected by the appellant, it becomes necessary to advert to the well-settled distinction between the appellate and review jurisdictions recognised under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Though both constitute judicial mechanisms for correction of error, they operate in distinct fields, are animated by different considerations, and are governed by separate statutory prescriptions.
9. The right of appeal is a substantive and statutory right. An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and ordinarily invites the superior court to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the decree or order impugned. The appellate court is vested with wide powers under Sections 96, 100, 104 and Order XLI of the Code to reassess questions of fact and law, subject of course to the limitations imposed by the statute. The object of an appeal is to determine whether the adjudication itself, or the relief granted thereunder, suffers from legal infirmity warranting reversal, modification or setting aside.
10. A review, on the other hand, is not an appeal in disguise. It is a narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction conferred by Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code. The power of review may be exercised only upon the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason analogous thereto. The review court does not sit in appeal

over its own judgment, nor is it permitted to undertake a rehearing on merits merely because another view is possible.

11. The distinction has been repeatedly emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Versus Government of Andhra Pradesh¹, the Court lucidly explained that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for the correction of an error apparent on the face of the record. The same principle was reiterated in Meera Bhanja versus Nirmala Kumari Choudhury², wherein it was held that review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because a different view on the merits is conceivable. Likewise, in Kamlesh Verma versus Mayawati³, the Court comprehensively catalogued the circumstances in which review would lie and, equally importantly, the situations in which it would not.

12. Equally significant is the principle that appellate jurisdiction is ordinarily invoked by a person aggrieved by the operative adjudication or by a finding which has worked to his legal prejudice. The law does not favour appeals directed merely against stray observations, incidental remarks or superfluous findings which neither constitute the ratio of the decision nor affect the ultimate relief granted. Judicial pronouncements are to be read as a whole, and not as though every sentence therein were a decree capable of separate appellate challenge.

13. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the peculiar feature of the present case immediately comes to the fore. The appellant does not impeach the ultimate adjudication rendered by the learned Trial Court. The decree remains wholly in his favour. The relief sought by him under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has been granted in its entirety. What is assailed is

¹ AIR 1964 SC 1372

² (1995) 1 SCC 170

³ (2013) 8 SCC 320

not the destination reached by the learned court below but a particular description employed while traversing the path towards that destination. In substance, therefore, the appellant seeks expunction or correction of an observation concerning his legal status, without inviting any alteration of the operative result.

14. Such a grievance bears a far closer affinity to the limited corrective jurisdiction traditionally associated with review than to the broad appellate scrutiny contemplated under Section 96 of the Code. An appeal is ordinarily directed against an adverse adjudication; it is not designed to function as a vehicle for the mere refinement of judicial language where the decree itself remains unobjectionable to the appellant. Unless the impugned observation constitutes a finding having independent civil consequences or is capable of prejudicially affecting substantive rights in future proceedings, the maintainability of a regular appeal directed solely against such observation becomes a matter requiring careful scrutiny.
15. The settled principle, therefore, is that while an appellate court may, in an appropriate case, expunge or clarify an unwarranted observation having potential adverse consequences, the jurisdiction of appeal cannot be converted into an academic exercise for correction of every perceived infelicity of expression contained in a judgment. The true inquiry must always be whether the impugned remark has transcended the realm of mere observation and assumed the character of a finding capable of affecting legal rights. It is only upon an affirmative answer to that inquiry that appellate interference may legitimately be invoked.
16. In the case at hand, the learned Trial Court, while decreeing the petitioner's claim for pre-emption, proceeded to describe his status in relation to the property in question as that of a co-sharer. This, however, stands in marked contrast to the very foundation upon which the proceeding was instituted. The petitioner neither asserted nor sought recognition as a co-sharer; rather, his claim

was unequivocally predicated upon his status as an adjoining landowner possessing the longest common boundary with the transferred holding.

17. It scarcely admits of dispute that the right of pre-emption under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is not an abstract or free-floating right. It is a statutory entitlement inseparably attached to a particular juridical status recognised by the enactment. The right may arise in favour of a co-sharer, a bargadar, or an adjoining landowner possessing the longest common boundary, each category constituting a distinct and independent source of entitlement. The very maintainability and success of a claim for pre-emption, therefore, depend upon the precise legal character in which the applicant approaches the Court.
18. Viewed in this light, the description of the petitioner as a co-sharer cannot be dismissed as a casual expression, an inadvertent turn of phrase, or a superfluous observation lacking legal significance. The status upon which a claim of pre-emption is founded constitutes the very bedrock of the adjudication. Consequently, when the learned Trial Court not only described the petitioner as a co-sharer but also proceeded to grant the relief of pre-emption on that footing, the observation became inextricably intertwined with the reasoning that culminated in the final decision.
19. It is, therefore, difficult to relegate such a finding to the realm of an innocuous or collateral remark having no bearing upon the rights of the parties. On the contrary, the observation touches the very heart of the controversy, for it concerns the legal source from which the petitioner's entitlement to pre-emption was perceived to arise. A finding of this nature possesses the potential to cast a long shadow over future disputes concerning the property and may, if left uncorrected, furnish occasion for avoidable controversy regarding the petitioner's legal status.

20. Undoubtedly, a grievance directed against an erroneous description or finding recorded in a judgment would, in ordinary circumstances, appear to fall within the corrective domain of review jurisdiction. Yet the boundaries separating appellate and review jurisdictions are not so inflexible as to compel courts to ignore substantive prejudice merely because it presents itself in an unusual form. Judicial remedies are fashioned not for the worship of procedural form but for the advancement of substantive justice.
21. Thus, in exceptional situations where an observation, though embedded in a judgment otherwise favourable to the aggrieved party, assumes the character of a determinative finding affecting legal status, proprietary rights, or future civil consequences, the matter transcends the sphere of a mere clerical or incidental error. In such circumstances, the grievance cannot be viewed as a simple invitation to the court to revisit its own reasoning; rather, it becomes a challenge to a finding which has acquired an independent legal existence capable of prejudicing the party concerned.
22. The present case, in the considered view of this Court, belongs to that narrow and exceptional category. The appellant does not seek a reversal of the relief granted in his favour, but neither does he complain of a stray or inconsequential observation. His grievance is directed against a finding touching the very juridical character on which the right of pre-emption rests. Since such a finding is capable of affecting his legal position beyond the confines of the present proceeding, the invocation of appellate jurisdiction cannot be regarded as wholly misconceived merely because the grievance might, in another factual setting, have been amenable to correction through review. The extraordinary nature of the situation thus furnishes sufficient justification for examining the matter within the appellate fold, lest a potentially prejudicial finding be allowed to remain embedded in the judicial record without scrutiny.

23. The aforesaid conclusion derives considerable reinforcement from the conduct adopted by the respondent himself in the present proceeding. It is not in dispute that the respondent, though arrayed as the opposite party before the learned Trial Court, appeared and filed his written objection on 05.04.2024, but ultimately elected to remain absent and allowed the pre-emption proceeding to culminate in an ex-parte adjudication against him.

24. More significantly, even after entering appearance in the present appeal, the respondent has neither preferred any cross-appeal nor lodged any cross-objection assailing the order impugned. Learned counsel appearing on his behalf has also not apprised this Court of any separate challenge instituted against the judgment and order whereby the petitioner's claim for pre-emption stood allowed in its entirety. The inevitable inference, therefore, is that the respondent has chosen to acquiesce in the substantive relief granted by the learned Trial Court and has accepted the finality of the adjudication to that extent.

25. What is of even greater significance is that, during the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondent did not seek to sustain the impugned order on the footing that the appellant was a co-sharer in the property in question. On the contrary, the submissions advanced before this Court unmistakably proceed upon an acceptance of the appellant's status as a contiguous landowner possessing the requisite common boundary with the transferred holding. Thus, the very foundation upon which the learned Trial Court appears to have characterised the appellant as a co-sharer has found no support from the respondent himself.

26. In such circumstances, the impugned observation stands bereft not only of support from the pleadings and materials on record but also of any endorsement from the party who would have been the foremost beneficiary of its continuance. The respondent, having neither challenged the decree nor disputed the appellant's status

as an adjoining landowner, cannot now be heard, either expressly or by implication, to contend that the finding describing the appellant as a co-sharer should nevertheless be preserved upon the judicial record.

27. The conduct of the respondent thus furnishes a compelling indication that the controversy sought to be raised in the present appeal is not illusory or academic. Rather, it demonstrates that the description of the appellant as a co-sharer was an incongruous feature of the impugned order, unsupported by the case pleaded by either side and unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute. A court of law cannot remain a silent spectator when an erroneous description touching the juridical status of a litigant survives in a judgment despite finding no sustenance either from the pleadings, the evidence, or even the stand ultimately adopted by the contesting party.

28. This Court is, therefore, persuaded to hold that the observation in question cannot be permitted to attain an unwarranted permanence merely by reason of its incorporation in the impugned order. Judicial records are intended to reflect adjudicatory accuracy, not to perpetuate inadvertent misconceptions. Where an error touching the very legal character of a successful litigant is brought to the notice of the appellate court and remains undefended even by the opposing party, judicial conscience demands its correction rather than its preservation.

29. Therefore, though the present appeal may, at first blush, appear to be an attempt to seek review under the cloak of an appeal, a closer scrutiny reveals that the grievance is not directed against a mere error in reasoning or an incidental observation. The challenge is to a finding touching the very juridical status of the appellant, a finding which forms an integral component of the adjudicatory process and is capable of generating independent civil consequences. Such a grievance transcends the narrow confines of

review jurisdiction and legitimately invites appellate scrutiny. The doctrine that a review cannot be converted into an appeal is intended to preserve the limited ambit of review jurisdiction. It does not follow, as a corollary, that every appeal directed against a prejudicial finding must be repelled merely because the ultimate relief remains unchallenged. In other words, we may safely conclude that though the proposition that "*a review cannot be permitted to masquerade as an appeal*" is firmly entrenched by our legal authorities, but the reverse of this proposition is not always mandatory. It must be grasped that judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so (See- State Of Haryana versus Chandra Mani & Ors;⁴). As we all know that, when substantial justice and technical approach were pitted against each other the former has to be preferred. Therefore, where the impugned finding affects status, title, entitlement, or other substantive civil rights, the appellate court is not rendered powerless merely because the decree itself operates in favour of the appellant.

30. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to undertake an independent scrutiny of the materials that were placed before the learned Trial Court. A careful perusal of the application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 reveals that the petitioner/appellant founded his claim upon a specific and consistent factual narrative. According to him, he had, in the year 2008, acquired a defined portion measuring 0.066 acre out of a total area of 0.08 acre comprised in R.S. Plot No. 1317, corresponding to L.R. Plot No. 4952, from the erstwhile owners thereof. It was further pleaded that, by virtue of a subsequent purchase effected in the year 2018, he acquired the remaining portion of the said plot and thereby became the exclusive owner of the entirety of L.R. Plot No. 4952 (Rs plot no. 1317).

⁴ 1996 AIR 1623

31. The case projected by the petitioner/appellant further discloses that L.R. Plot No. 4952 (Rs plot no. 1317) lies immediately to the north of L.R. Plot No. 4953. It was specifically asserted that one Arati Sarkar, the vendor of the opposite party/respondent, had been allotted a definite portion of land in L.R. Plot No. 4953 through a registered deed of partition being No. 17471 of 2022 and that the said allotted portion was situated contiguous to the southern boundary of the petitioner's holding. The petitioner/appellant accordingly claimed that the transfer effected by Arati Sarkar in favour of the opposite party/respondent concerned the very parcel of land lying adjacent to his holding and, consequently, attracted his statutory right of pre-emption as an adjoining landowner possessing the longest common boundary.
32. It is pertinent to observe that the expression "*longest common boundary*" assumes decisive significance only in a situation where there exist two or more competing claimants, each asserting a right of pre-emption on the strength of contiguity with the land transferred. In such a contest, the statutory preference is accorded to the claimant possessing the longest common boundary with the property sought to be pre-empted. In the present case, however, the record is conspicuously devoid of any indication that any person other than the petitioner/appellant laid any claim to the right of pre-emption. The question of comparative entitlement, therefore, never arose for consideration.
33. Equally important is the fact that the materials on record do not furnish any basis for attributing to the petitioner/appellant the status of a co-sharer in respect of L.R. Plot No. 4953, from which the disputed transfer emanated. The certified copy of the deed of partition unmistakably reveals that, in exercise of the powers contemplated under Section 14 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, specific and demarcated portions of land were allotted to the legal heirs of the original owner, Sunil Kumar Sarkar. Once such

partition crystallised the respective shares into distinct and identifiable parcels of land, the unity of possession, which constitutes the very essence of co-sharership, stood severed and replaced by exclusive ownership over the portions respectively allotted.

34. Consequently, after the execution and implementation of the deed of partition, the notion of continuing co-sharership in relation to the demarcated portions of Plot No. 4953 becomes difficult to sustain, either in fact or in law. The transferor, Arati Sarkar, did not convey an undivided interest in a joint holding; rather, she transferred a definite and identifiable parcel of land which had fallen to her exclusive share upon partition. The statutory foundation upon which a claim of co-sharership could ordinarily rest thus stood eclipsed by the very documents forming part of the record.

35. Viewed from any angle, therefore, the factual and legal materials available before the learned Trial Court overwhelmingly point towards the petitioner/appellant's status as a contiguous landowner whose holding adjoined the transferred property. The impugned description thus appears to have entered the judgment not as a logical culmination of the pleadings and evidence but as an incongruous departure therefrom.

36. Significantly, the recitals and boundary descriptions embodied in the impugned deed itself lend substantial assurance to the aforesaid factual assertion. The boundaries delineated therein unmistakably indicate the existence of the petitioner's property on the northern side of the transferred land, thereby fortifying the claim of contiguity advanced by him throughout the proceeding.

37. Equally noteworthy is the nature of the defence set up by the opposite party/respondent. A scrutiny of the written objection dated 05.04.2024 reveals little beyond a general and evasive denial of the petitioner's assertions. The respondent did not advance any

positive case of his own capable of dislodging the factual foundation laid by the petitioner. The pleadings are conspicuously silent regarding any assertion that the petitioner was a co-sharer in the transferred property or that his claim rested upon any status other than that of an adjoining landowner.

38. On the contrary, the documentary evidence available on record appears to travel in a singular direction. Exhibit 1 & 2 supports the claim of the petitioner/appellant in respect of his ownership over plot no. 4952 (RS plot no. 1317), while Exhibit 4, namely the certified copy of the deed of partition, clearly demonstrates that Arati Sarkar, the vendor of the opposite party/respondent, was allotted a parcel of land measuring 2.5 decimals situated immediately to the south of the plot owned by the petitioner/appellant. Exhibit 3, being the impugned deed of transfer, further reveals that the entirety of the said allotted portion measuring 2.5 decimals was conveyed by Arati Sarkar in favour of the opposite party/respondent. The boundary recitals contained therein once again acknowledge the existence of the petitioner's holding on the northern side of the transferred land.

39. The cumulative effect of these pleadings and documents is both striking and unmistakable. Far from establishing the petitioner as a co-sharer in the transferred holding, the materials on record consistently portray him as the owner of a distinct and independent plot situated immediately adjacent to the land transferred in favour of the respondent. Every significant piece of documentary evidence points towards his status as a contiguous landowner possessing a common boundary with the transferred property. The record, therefore, furnishes abundant support for the case pleaded by the petitioner/appellant and leaves this Court unable to discern any factual foundation upon which the learned Trial Court could have characterised him as a co-sharer while granting the relief of pre-emption.

40. Before parting with the present discussion, this Court remains acutely conscious of the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Barasat Eye Hospital versus Kaustabh Mondal⁵, which have subsequently received affirmation and application in Abdul Matin Mallick versus Subrata Bhattacharjee (Banerjee) & Ors.⁶ The salutary principles flowing from the aforesaid decisions have not escaped the notice of this Court and have been borne in mind while examining the legality of the impugned order.

41. Tested on the touchstone of those authoritative pronouncements, the facts of the present case disclose no infraction of the statutory requirements governing the institution of a claim for pre-emption. The records reveal that the petitioner/appellant instituted the application for pre-emption on 27.01.2023 with requisite challans for depositing the required amount and, within a matter of days, on 30.01.2023, deposited the entire consideration money stipulated in the impugned transaction together with an additional ten per cent thereof, as contemplated by the governing statutory framework. The chronology of events thus leaves little room for doubt. The petitioner/appellant demonstrated due diligence in complying with the mandatory preconditions attached to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. The statutory obligation having been fulfilled within the prescribed period and in the prescribed manner, this Court is unable to discern any departure from, or non-compliance with, the legislative mandate. The proceeding, therefore, does not suffer from any infirmity on that score.

DECISIO
(Decision)

42. Therefore, upon a grave, anxious and dispassionate consideration of the entire materials on record, this Court arrives at the inescapable conclusion that the impugned Final Order dated 19.09.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court warrants

⁵ (2019) 19 SCC 767

⁶ (2022) 7 SCC 147

interference only to a limited extent. The observations therein characterising the appellant as a '*co-sharer*' cannot be sustained, being unsupported by the pleadings, the evidence, and the very foundation upon which the claim for pre-emption was instituted and adjudicated. Those observations accordingly stand modified and shall be read as recognising the appellant's status as '*an adjoining landowner*' possessing the requisite common boundary with the property involved in impugned transaction. Save and except the aforesaid modification, the judgment and final order of the learned Trial Court shall remain inviolate. The substantive adjudication whereby the appellant's claim for pre-emption in respect of the transfer effected through Deed No. I-1804-18810 of 2022 dated 15.12.2022 was allowed shall continue to hold the field with full force and vigour, unaffected and undisturbed.

43. Thus, while the destination reached by the learned Trial Court remains unaltered, this Court has merely corrected the path by which it was reached. The relief granted survives intact; only the juridical character erroneously ascribed to the appellant stands restored to its true and lawful form. In the result, the judicial record is relieved of an incongruity, while the substantive justice already achieved remains wholly preserved.

VERBA ULTIMA
(Epilogue)

44. In result, the instant appeal succeeds.

45. Memo of appeal is sufficiently stamped.

Hence, it is

ORDERED

that the instant appeal stands ***allowed*** on contest to the limited extent indicated hereinabove.

The observations contained in the Final Order dated 19.09.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Raiganj, Uttar

Dinajpur, in Miscellaneous Pre-emption Case no. 05 of 2023, describing the appellant as a **co-sharer** in relation to the property in question, are hereby modified and shall be read as recognising the appellant's status as **an adjoining landowner** possessing the requisite common boundary with the transferred holding.

Save for the correction aforesaid, the impugned order is left wholly untouched. The adjudicatory conclusion reached by the learned Trial Court, recognizing the appellant's entitlement to pre-empt the transfer effected through Deed No. I-1804-18810 of 2022 dated 15.12.2022, remains undisturbed and shall continue to govern the rights of the parties with the same force and effect as before.

There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

Let a copy of this judgment, together with the Trial Court's Records, be transmitted forthwith to the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Raiganj, Uttar Dinajpur, for information and necessary action. While doing so, this Court requests the learned Trial Court to ensure faithful compliance with the mandate embodied in Section 9(5) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, in its true spirit, purpose and legislative object.

Dictated & Corrected

1st ADJ, Raiganj
Uttar Dinajpur

1st Additional District Judge
Raiganj, Uttar Dinajpur