



**IN THE COURT OF THE DISTRICT MUNSIF OF UDHAGAMANDALAM,
THE NILGIRIS**

Present: **Thiru. L.PRAKASH, B.Sc., B.L.,**
DISTRICT MUNSIF, UDHAGAMANDALAM.

Wednesday, the 22nd day of July 2026

I.A. No. 05 of 2025
in
O.S. No. 150 of 2022
(C.N.R. No. TNNS030 - 00177 - 2022)

K. Mohan, S/o. K.H. Kari

... Petitioner/Plaintiff

/VS/

1. K.R. Joghee, S/o. K.B. Rangan

2. R. Mohan Kumar, S/o. Raman

3. Veena Kolachina, W/o. Angad and D/o. Reguram Kolachina

4. Angad Mehta, S/o. Harijit Mehta

... Respondents/Defendants

This petition came on 03.02.2026 for final hearing before me in the presence of Mr. Y. B. Bheeman, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Plaintiff and of Mr. E. Sreedharan, learned Counsel for the Respondents/Defendants No. 3 and 4 and the Respondent No. 1/Defendant No.1 is remaining exparte in the main suit itself and Respondent No. 2/Defendant No. 2 are remains exparte in this petition, upon hearing both sides, and upon considering case records carefully, this court passes the following :

**ORDER**

1. This petition is filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying to pass an order of ad interim injunction/status quo restraining the respondents/defendants Nos. 3 and 4, their men, agents, servants, or anyone claiming through them, from in any manner altering or changing the nature of the suit property or putting up any work or construction thereon, pending disposal of the suit.

Gist of petition and affidavit:

2. The petitioner/plaintiff in the above case states that he filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents/defendants in respect of the suit property on 07.11.2022, and the same has been pending. The plaintiff purchased the property through a registered Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013 from the 1st defendant and has been in physical possession ever since the date of sale. During the pendency of the suit, defendants 3 and 4 allegedly attempted to unlawfully interfere with the property on 04.09.2025 with the intention of changing its nature and frustrating the plaintiff's rights. A complaint was lodged against defendants 3 and 4 before the Kotagiri Police Station. It is further stated that, without the intervention of this Court, the plaintiff would suffer grave hardship. Owing to the influence of defendants 3 and 4 and the imminent threat of construction or alteration of the property, the plaintiff seeks an order of ad interim injunction or status quo to prevent further unlawful interference.

Gist of Counter statement filed by the 4th Respondent and Adopted by the 3rd Respondent:

3. The respondents/defendants Nos. 3 and 4, in their counter statement opposing the petition, contend that the petition is false, frivolous, vexatious, and not



maintainable. At the outset, they submit that the application is ill-conceived and strategically timed to stall the proceedings of the Court after the petitioner's cross-examination exposed weaknesses in his case. During the cross-examination held on 10.02.2025 and 13.03.2025, the petitioner allegedly made several admissions, including acknowledging a dispute regarding title and confirming that respondents 3 and 4 are in possession of the suit property. The respondents further assert that they have clear title to their property purchased under Document No. 637 of 2022 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Kotagiri, and deny that the petitioner has any ownership or possessory rights over R.S. Nos. 624/1A1A and 624/2A, for which the respondents hold a separate patta in their names.

4. It is further contended that the petitioner deliberately refrained from seeking the relief of declaration of title. According to the respondents, this omission is fatal to the case, as such a relief would have implications regarding the valuation of the suit, payment of proper court fee, and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, the suit itself is stated to be not maintainable, and the petitioner is liable to be non-suited. The petitioner claims that the property situated in R.S. Nos. 270 and 273 of Kagguchi Village corresponds to R.S. Nos. 624/1A1A and 624/2A of the same village. However, according to the respondents, this claim is belied by the "A" Register Extracts. The petitioner has not produced any document or correlation certificate in support of such a claim. It is further stated that, by a pre-suit legal notice issued to the 1st defendant, the petitioner demanded rectification of the Sale Deed on the ground of incorrect resurvey numbers. However, no such relief has been sought in the present suit, nor has any separate suit for rectification been filed. The petitioner's claim of title is stated to be based upon an alleged oral partition, which, according to the 3rd respondent, is wholly unsubstantiated as no document has been produced to prove or corroborate the same.



5. It is further contended that the suit property was allegedly purchased for a sum of Rs.1,18,250/-. According to the respondents, such valuation places the suit beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, which is limited to cases where the subject matter is valued at Rs.1,00,000/- under the provisions of Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu City Civil Courts Act, 1873. It is further contended that the averments made by the petitioner in the affidavit regarding possession of the suit property are contrary to the statements made by him on oath. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4, being the rightful owners, claim to be in lawful possession of the property purchased by them under Document No. 637 of 2022, a fact which they allege has been admitted by the petitioner himself. The respondents deny the allegation of interference on 04.09.2025, stating that they were not present in the Nilgiris on that date. According to them, the 4th respondent is a resident of Gurgaon, Haryana, and is a practising Advocate before the Courts in the National Capital Region, while the 3rd respondent resides in the USA. It is further contended that the petitioner has failed to furnish any specific particulars regarding the alleged alteration or change in the nature of the suit property and that such allegations are merely imaginary.

6. The respondents further contend that the property sold to the plaintiff was never allotted to the 1st defendant in any oral partition after the death of the 1st defendant's father, K.B. Rangan. According to them, the petitioner's plea of an oral partition is false and unsupported by any documentary evidence. The manner in which the petitioner claims to have derived title is also stated to be incorrect and contrary to the registered Gift Deed executed in the year 2003, under which K.B. Rangan settled an extent of 1.83 acres in S. Nos. 183/1, 183/2, and 183/3 of Kagguchi Village. The plaint is further stated to be bereft of particulars regarding the date or circumstances of the alleged oral partition. According to the respondents, the plea is false and is a product of the fertile imagination of the petitioner. It is therefore



contended that the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience is not in his favour, and that no irreparable loss or injury would be caused to him. Hence, they pray for dismissal of the petition with exemplary costs.

7. Respondent No.1/Defendant No.1 remains exparte in the main suit itself and the Respondent No.2/Defendant No.2 remains exparte in this petition for not filing counter statement even after sufficient time is given.

Arguments on the Petitioner/Plaintiff's side:

8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/plaintiff submitted that the suit has been filed for declaration of title, declaration of the invalidity of subsequent documents, and consequential permanent injunction in respect of the suit schedule property measuring 43 cents of tea estate situated in Kagguchi Revenue Village, Udthagamandalam Taluk, The Nilgiris. He contended that the plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from the 1st defendant under a Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013, registered as Document No. 16 of 2013 before the office of the Sub-Registrar, Kotagiri. Ever since the purchase, the plaintiff has been in actual physical possession and has continued in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property. The learned counsel further submitted that the suit property originally formed part of S. No. 183/2 of Kagguchi Village and, upon resurvey, came to be assigned R.S. Nos. 270 and 273, which subsequently correspond to the present R.S. Nos. 624/1A1A and 624/2A. It is specifically pleaded that the resurvey merely changed the survey numbers and did not alter the identity, extent, boundaries, or physical location of the land.



9. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff has been cultivating tea over the entire extent of 43 cents continuously from the year 2013 till date and has been deriving his livelihood therefrom. The boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013 tally with the physical features on the ground and have never been altered or disputed at any point of time prior to the illegal acts complained of in the suit. During the period between June and August 2022, certain unknown persons were found measuring lands in and around the suit property. Upon enquiry, the plaintiff came to know that certain documents were being created with respect to lands allegedly belonging to late K.B. Rangan, the father of the 1st defendant. The plaintiff immediately caused a legal notice dated 18.06.2022 to be issued to the 1st defendant, calling upon him to rectify the survey number discrepancies in the Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013 and warning him not to deal with the suit property in any manner whatsoever. Although the 1st defendant received the said notice, he neither sent any reply nor took steps to rectify the discrepancies, thereby giving rise to serious apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff came to know that the 1st defendant, after having already sold the entire extent of 43 cents to the plaintiff in the year 2013, had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the 2nd defendant, purporting to deal with lands which no longer belonged to him. Acting upon the said General Power of Attorney, the 2nd defendant executed a Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022 bearing Document No. 637 of 2022 in favour of defendants 3 and 4, illegally including the plaintiff's already purchased and possessed 43 cents of tea estate.

10. The learned counsel further submitted that the 1st defendant had no subsisting right, title, or interest to execute the General Power of Attorney insofar as the plaintiff's 43 cents are concerned. Consequently, the General Power of Attorney and the subsequent Sale Deed are void, illegal, and non est in law to the extent of the



plaintiff's property. After the execution of the impugned documents, the defendants, who are total strangers to the suit property, attempted to interfere with the plaintiff's peaceful possession through their men and agents, taking advantage of the fact that the plaintiff resides at Coonoor, which is situated at some distance from the suit property. Attempts were allegedly made to trespass into the suit property, disturb cultivation activities, and create third-party interests, and such attempts were resisted only because of the plaintiff's timely intervention and the mediation of village elders. In view of the continuous threat of dispossession, attempted interference, and the real possibility of the defendants changing the nature and character of the suit property or alienating the same to third parties, the plaintiff was left with no other efficacious remedy except to approach this Court by filing the present Interlocutory Application seeking an order of interim injunction/status quo pending disposal of the suit.

11. The learned counsel further contended that the present Interlocutory Application is neither speculative nor vexatious but has been filed solely to preserve the subject matter of the suit, prevent multiplicity of proceedings, and ensure that the final decree of this Court, if granted, does not become illusory. The facts pleaded in the plaint and reiterated in the affidavit filed in support of the Interlocutory Application clearly demonstrate the plaintiff's long and settled possession from the year 2013, the absence of any lawful authority in the 1st defendant to convey the property once again, the imminent threat of interference by the defendants, and the absolute necessity for interim protection. The learned counsel further submitted that, at the interlocutory stage, this Court is not required to conduct a roving enquiry into title or render final findings. The Court is only required to ascertain whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, that is, whether the case raises serious triable issues and is not frivolous or vexatious. The plaintiff has placed before this Court a registered Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013 (Document No. 16 of 2013) executed



by the 1st defendant, under which the plaintiff was conveyed an extent of 43 cents of tea estate with definite and specific boundaries and was put in possession on the very same day. The execution of the said document is not denied by the defendants. The plaintiff's title and possession trace directly to the 1st defendant, and therefore defendants 3 and 4, who claim only through the subsequent General Power of Attorney and Sale Deed of the year 2022, cannot claim any higher or better right than that of the 1st defendant himself.

12. It is a settled principle of law that once a vendor has conveyed property by a registered Sale Deed, he is divested of all right, title, and interest, and any subsequent conveyance executed by him or through him is void to the extent of the earlier sale. The General Power of Attorney relied upon by the defendants was executed after the 1st defendant had already sold the entire extent of 43 cents in the year 2013. Therefore, the very foundation of the subsequent Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022 is legally unsustainable. This legal position stands conclusively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana*, (2012) 1 SCC 656, wherein it has been held that a Power of Attorney cannot be used as an instrument to convey title, and any transaction based on such authority without subsisting ownership is invalid in law. The plaintiff has further pleaded and demonstrated that the identity of the suit property stands clearly established through the fixed boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013, continuous physical possession and cultivation, and the resurvey records, which merely altered the survey numbers without changing the identity of the land. The defendants' contention regarding discrepancy in survey numbers does not dislodge the plaintiff's prima facie case. It is well settled that boundaries prevail over survey numbers and that resurvey or clerical changes do not defeat title or possession when the identity of the land is otherwise certain.



13. The Hon'ble Madras High Court has consistently held that a mere change or discrepancy in survey numbers pursuant to a resurvey does not affect title when the boundaries and possession are clearly established. Such issues are matters to be decided during trial and cannot constitute grounds for refusing interim protection. The plaintiff has also pleaded continuous, open, and settled possession from the year 2013 till the date of filing of the suit, cultivating tea over the entire extent of 43 cents. Such long and settled possession itself constitutes a strong prima facie right worthy of protection. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu*, (2004) 1 SCC 769, has categorically held that even a person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed except by due process of law, and such possession deserves protection by way of injunction. The counter statement seeks to rely upon certain alleged admissions said to have been made by the plaintiff during cross-examination. Such contentions are wholly misconceived at the interlocutory stage. It is settled law that stray answers elicited during cross-examination or disputed interpretations of testimony cannot be used to non-suit a plaintiff in an application seeking interim injunction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan*, (2006) 8 SCC 367, has held that, while considering an application for interim injunction, the Court must examine the pleadings and probabilities and should not conduct a mini-trial based upon the evidence.

14. The defence plea that the plaintiff ought to have sought a declaration earlier or that the suit is not maintainable raises mixed questions of law and fact, which can be adjudicated only during the course of trial. Such objections cannot defeat interim relief when the plaintiff has demonstrated possession and a genuine threat of interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy*, (2008) 4 SCC 594, has authoritatively held that where the plaintiff is in



possession and faces interference, a suit for injunction, or an application seeking interim protection, is maintainable even if title is disputed, leaving the question of title to be decided during trial. In the present case, the plaintiff has gone a step further by also seeking declaratory reliefs in the main suit, thereby fully complying with the principles laid down in the said judgment. Defendants 3 and 4 are admittedly subsequent purchasers pendente lite claiming through a disputed General Power of Attorney and Sale Deed. It is well settled that such purchasers stand in no better position than their vendor and take the property subject to the outcome of the suit. The plaintiff has clearly raised serious triable issues relating to the validity of the General Power of Attorney, the legality of the Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022, the extent and identity of the suit property, and his right to continue in peaceful possession. These issues cannot be summarily decided in an interlocutory application, but they undoubtedly establish a strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff warranting protection of the suit property until the disposal of the suit. Therefore, the plaintiff has successfully established a clear, bona fide, and legally sustainable prima facie case, satisfying the foremost requirement for the grant of an order of interim injunction/status quo.

15. The learned counsel further submitted that, in the present case, the plaintiff has been in long, continuous, and settled possession of the suit schedule property measuring 43 cents of tea estate from 04.01.2013 onwards, cultivating tea and deriving his livelihood therefrom. The plaintiff's possession is neither recent nor casual but is rooted in a registered conveyance followed by actual enjoyment for more than a decade. Defendants 3 and 4, on the other hand, claim rights only under a subsequent Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022, which itself is under serious challenge in the suit as being void and illegal. Their claim is not supported by any prior possession, cultivation, or enjoyment of the land. If an order of interim injunction/status quo is



granted, the defendants will not suffer any prejudice, as they will merely be restrained from interfering with the property pending trial while retaining full opportunity to establish their alleged rights during the course of the suit. No vested or irreversible right of the defendants will be affected by mere preservation of the status quo. On the contrary, if interim relief is refused, the plaintiff would face grave and irreversible consequences, including dispossession from agricultural land under cultivation, destruction or alteration of the tea plantation, alienation in favour of third parties leading to multiplicity of proceedings, and frustration of the final decree even if he ultimately succeeds.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh*, (1992) 1 SCC 719, has held that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the party who would suffer irreparable harm if relief is refused, particularly where property rights are under threat. The defendants contend that they are in possession of the suit property. This assertion is squarely contradicted by the pleadings and their conduct. The plaintiff has pleaded active cultivation, resistance to trespass, and mediation by village elders, none of which would have arisen if the defendants had already been in settled possession. Mere execution of a document does not confer possession, particularly when the vendor had already divested himself of title, the plaintiff continued in physical possession, and no lawful delivery of possession to the defendants has either been pleaded or proved. The balance of convenience must also be assessed in the light of the conduct of the parties. The 1st defendant, having sold the property in the year 2013, remained silent for nearly nine years and thereafter purported to deal with the very same property through a General Power of Attorney, clearly indicating lack of bona fides. Defendants 3 and 4 are purchasers pendente lite and, as such, stepped into the shoes of their vendor with constructive, if not actual,



notice of the existing rights and pending litigation. Equity does not favour such parties over a person who has remained in settled possession.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh*, (1973) 2 SCC 705, has held that equity leans in favour of maintaining possession and preventing disturbance pending adjudication. The contention of the defendants that the grant of injunction would deprive them of the lawful use of the property is misconceived. A temporary restraint pending adjudication is not a deprivation of rights but a judicial mechanism to ensure fairness and prevent a fait accompli. The Hon'ble Madras High Court has repeatedly held that where rival claims arise in respect of immovable property and one party is in settled possession, the balance of convenience lies in preserving such possession until final adjudication rather than permitting disturbance based upon disputed documents. The plaintiff's dependence upon the suit property for his livelihood further strengthens the balance of convenience in his favour. Dispossession would result not only in economic hardship but also in social and occupational injury, which are recognised by law as relevant considerations while granting equitable relief. The defendants have not demonstrated any pressing necessity or urgency to deal with or interfere with the property during the pendency of the suit. The absence of such necessity weighs heavily against them. It is also relevant that if third-party rights are created during the pendency of the suit, this Court would be burdened with avoidable litigation, thereby defeating judicial economy and orderly adjudication.

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal* (AIR 1962 SC 527) has recognised the inherent power of Civil Courts to grant interim relief to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice. Applying the above settled principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the



plaintiff stands to lose possession, livelihood, and the very subject matter of the suit if the relief is refused, whereas the defendants stand to lose nothing except the ability to interfere with the property during the pendency of the suit if the relief is granted. Therefore, the balance of convenience decisively and overwhelmingly tilts in favour of the plaintiff, warranting the grant of an order of interim injunction and maintenance of status quo pending disposal of the suit.

19. The learned counsel further contended that the third and most essential requirement for the grant of an interim injunction or an order of status quo is whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if such relief is refused. Irreparable injury does not mean an injury which is incapable of being repaired in the literal sense, but one which cannot be adequately compensated by damages or remedied at a later stage. In the present case, the suit schedule property is an immovable agricultural property consisting of a tea estate, which is unique in nature. The plaintiff has been cultivating tea over the entire extent of 43 cents continuously from the year 2013, and the land is not a vacant site or a commercial plot capable of easy monetary valuation. It is further pleaded that the defendants have attempted to interfere with the plaintiff's possession and that there exists a real and imminent threat of dispossession, destruction of tea plants, alteration of the physical features of the land, and creation of third-party interests. Any such acts, if permitted during the pendency of the suit, would cause permanent and irreversible damage to the plaintiff and render the final decree nugatory even if the plaintiff ultimately succeeds. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh*, (1992) 1 SCC 719, has clearly held that irreparable injury refers to an injury which cannot be adequately compensated by damages and that Courts must prevent such injury by timely intervention. The plaintiff's injury is, therefore, not merely proprietary but also occupational and economic, affecting his means of livelihood. Courts have consistently recognised that



such injury is irreparable in nature. On the other hand, the defendants would not suffer any irreparable injury if the injunction is granted, as they would merely be restrained from interfering with the property pending trial. If they ultimately succeed, they can always work out their rights in accordance with law.

20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan*, (2006) 8 SCC 367, has held that where refusal of injunction would lead to consequences that cannot subsequently be undone, Courts must lean in favour of granting interim protection. The defendants' contention that the plaintiff can be adequately compensated by damages is wholly misconceived. Loss of possession of immovable property, destruction of plantation, and creation of third-party rights are classic instances of irreparable injury consistently recognised by Courts. If alienation or encumbrance is permitted during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff would be compelled to institute multiple proceedings against third parties, leading to multiplicity of litigation, which itself constitutes irreparable prejudice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal* (AIR 1962 SC 527) has recognised the inherent power of Civil Courts to grant interim relief to prevent abuse of process and to ensure that the subject matter of the suit is preserved intact. The necessity to preserve the subject matter of the suit is particularly compelling in the present case, as the defendants claim under a subsequent and disputed document, and any further dealing with the property would only complicate the issues and frustrate effective adjudication. It is a settled principle that Courts must prevent a situation where one party, by unilateral acts during the pendency of the suit, places the other party in a position where even a favourable decree becomes meaningless.

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy*, (2008) 4 SCC 594, has emphasised that where possession is threatened, Courts must



step in to protect such possession until the rights of the parties are finally determined. In the present case, the plaintiff has demonstrated long and settled possession, an actual threat of interference, a likelihood of irreversible damage to the land and his livelihood, and the absence of any adequate alternative remedy. Refusal of interim relief would, therefore, cause grave injustice, whereas grant of injunction would merely maintain equilibrium between the parties pending trial. It is also relevant that the defendants have not shown any compelling urgency or necessity to interfere with or alienate the property during the pendency of the suit, which further strengthens the plaintiff's case for interim protection. The cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances clearly establishes that the plaintiff would suffer serious, irreversible, and irreparable injury if the defendants are not restrained at this stage. Therefore, the plaintiff has fully satisfied the third requirement for the grant of interim injunction/status quo, namely, irreparable injury, and the interests of justice demand immediate protection of the suit property.

22. The learned counsel further contended that the respondents/defendants have filed a counter affidavit opposing the present Interlocutory Application. At the outset, it was submitted that the counter is evasive, self-serving, and bereft of any material particulars capable of dislodging the plaintiff's prima facie case, the balance of convenience, or the irreparable injury pleaded by him. The counter does not deny the execution of the registered Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013 (Document No. 16 of 2013) in favour of the plaintiff. This admitted fact alone conclusively establishes that the 1st defendant had already divested himself of title over the suit property as early as the year 2013. The defence attempt to justify the subsequent General Power of Attorney and the Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022 is legally untenable. Once title had been conveyed, the 1st defendant could not have executed any General Power of Attorney or authorised any subsequent sale in respect of the very same property. The



defendants' plea that the suit property forms part of a larger extent or that there are discrepancies in the survey numbers is wholly misconceived. The plaintiff's claim is founded upon fixed and identifiable boundaries, continuous physical possession, and cultivation of tea over the entire suit extent. Survey numbers are merely descriptive identifiers and cannot override the physical identity and possession of the property. The contention that the plaintiff is not in possession is false and contrary to the record. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded long-standing possession and active cultivation, whereas the defendants have not produced any material to establish that possession was ever delivered to them pursuant to the Sale Deed of the year 2022.

23. The learned counsel further submitted that mere execution of a Sale Deed does not ipso facto confer possession, particularly when the vendor had no subsisting title, the plaintiff continued in physical possession, and no overt act of dispossession has either been pleaded or established. The defendants rely upon certain alleged admissions said to have been made by the plaintiff during cross-examination. It was submitted that such alleged admissions are disputed, require proper contextual appreciation, and constitute matters to be decided only at the final trial and not by way of summary determination in an Interlocutory Application. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan*, (2006) 8 SCC 367, has held that Courts should not conduct a mini-trial or base interlocutory orders upon selective appreciation of evidence. The plea of delay raised in the counter is equally untenable. The cause of action for filing the present Interlocutory Application arose only when the actual interference and threat of dispossession came to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It is well settled that delay by itself is not fatal to the grant of injunction, particularly where possession is threatened and the apprehended injury is irreparable. Courts have consistently held that, pending determination of jurisdictional issues, the subject matter of the suit must be preserved, lest the suit itself becomes infructuous.



The counter also fails to explain why the defendants, if they were truly bona fide purchasers, remained silent despite the plaintiff's decade-long possession and cultivation. Their conduct, according to the learned counsel, speaks volumes about their lack of bona fides.

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy*, (2008) 4 SCC 594, has clearly held that possession deserves protection even when title is disputed and that interference should be restrained pending adjudication. The counter affidavit does not plead any pressing necessity, public interest, or irreversible prejudice that would be caused to the defendants if an injunction is granted. Mere inconvenience cannot outweigh the plaintiff's risk of irreparable injury. The defence contention that damages would constitute an adequate remedy is wholly misconceived. Courts have repeatedly held that loss of possession of immovable property and destruction of cultivation constitute irreparable injuries. The counter also seeks to justify interference based upon revenue records. It is settled law that revenue records neither confer title nor displace settled possession, particularly when they stand contradicted by registered conveyances. In effect, the counter affidavit raises defences that may appropriately be decided during trial, but none of them furnish any valid ground for refusing interim protection. The objections are speculative and intended only to delay justice. Therefore, the defendants have failed to rebut the plaintiff's case, and the counter affidavit does not disclose any legally sustainable ground to deny the relief of interim injunction/status quo.

25. The learned counsel finally concluded that, from the facts pleaded in the plaint and the Interlocutory Application, as well as the materials placed before this Court, it is evident that the plaintiff has established all the three essential requirements for the grant of interim injunction/status quo, namely, a strong prima



facie case, the balance of convenience overwhelmingly in his favour, and the likelihood of irreparable injury if the relief is refused. The plaintiff's right flows from the registered Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013, followed by long, open, and continuous possession for more than a decade, during which he has cultivated tea over the entire suit extent. These foundational facts remain undisputed in the counter. The defendants' claim rests solely upon a subsequent General Power of Attorney and Sale Deed of the year 2022 executed by a person who had already divested himself of title. Such a claim, being prima facie defective, cannot be permitted to disturb the plaintiff's settled possession pending adjudication. The plaintiff has demonstrated a real, imminent, and continuing threat of interference, dispossession, alienation, and alteration of the nature of the suit property. If such acts are permitted during the pendency of the suit, the very subject matter of the litigation would be irreversibly altered, rendering the final decree ineffective.

26. It is a settled principle of law that Courts must prevent a party from taking advantage of the pendency of proceedings so as to create a fait accompli. Equity, justice, and good conscience require preservation of the property in status quo until the rights of the parties are finally adjudicated. Grant of interim injunction would not cause any prejudice to the defendants, whereas refusal of such relief would result in grave and irreversible injustice to the plaintiff. Under the above circumstances, the learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff prayed that I.A. No. 5 of 2025 in O.S. No. 150 of 2022 be allowed by granting an order of interim injunction/status quo restraining the respondents/defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property or from alienating, encumbering, altering, or changing the nature of the same pending disposal of the suit.

**Arguments on the third and fourth Respondents/Defendants' side:**

27. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for respondents/defendants 3 and 4 submitted that the present ill-conceived application has been filed only with collateral and sinister motives after the petitioner commenced his evidence and was cross-examined by the defendants, during the course of which he made several admissions disentitling him to any relief, either in the present Interlocutory Application or in the suit itself. It was further submitted that an injunction application in I.A. No. 02 of 2022 had already been filed by the petitioner/plaintiff along with the suit on similar untenable and baseless grounds. No order of injunction was granted at that time, and the petitioner thereafter did not press the said application for obvious reasons. The petitioner/plaintiff, in his deposition dated 13.03.2025, made the following categorical admission: "வழுக்கு சொத்தில் எனக்கு இருக்கும் உரிமையை நிராகரித்து 1 ஆம் பிரதிவாதி மற்றும் அவரது சகோதர சகோதரிகள் 3 மற்றும் 4 பிரதிவாதிகளுக்கு கிரையப்பத்திரம் ஏற்படுத்தி கொடுத்துள்ளார்கள் என்றும் அது செல்லத்தக்கது அல்ல என்றும் தான் இவ்வழுக்கை தாக்கல் செய்துள்ளேன்".

28. As a matter of fact, right from the inception, respondents 3 and 4 have consistently asserted title to the property purchased by them under Document No. 637 of 2022, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Kotagiri, and have consistently denied that the petitioner has even a semblance of ownership or possession in R.S. Nos. 624/1A1A and 624/2A, which resurvey numbers are separately covered by a patta standing in their names. According to the learned counsel, this itself raises a serious question regarding the maintainability of the suit, as there is an admitted cloud over the plaintiff's title and, consequently, he is required to seek the relief of



declaration. In **Annamalai v. Vasanthi and Others**, reported in **2025 INSC 1267**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

"25. A declaratory relief seeks to clear what is doubtful, and which is necessary to make it clear. If there is a doubt on the right of a Plaintiff, and without the doubt being cleared no further relief can be granted, a declaratory relief becomes essential because without such a declaration the consequential relief may not be available to the Plaintiff. For example, a doubt as to Plaintiff's title to a property may arise because of existence of an instrument relating to that property. If Plaintiff is privy to that instrument, Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables him to institute a suit for cancellation of the instrument which may be void or voidable qua him. If Plaintiff is not privy to the instrument, he may seek a declaration that the same is void or does not affect his rights. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same is not necessary as the same is non est in the eye of law, being a nullity. Therefore, in such a case, if Plaintiff is in possession of the property which is subject matter of such a void instrument, he may seek a declaration that the instrument is not binding on him. However, if he is not in possession, he may sue for possession and the limitation period applicable would be that as applicable Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on a suit for possession. Rationale of the aforesaid principle is that a void instrument/transaction can be ignored by a court while granting the main relief based on a subsisting right. But, where the Plaintiff's right falls under a cloud, then a declaration affirming the right of the Plaintiff may be necessary for grant of a consequential relief. However, whether such a declaration is required for the



consequential relief sought is to be assessed on a case-to-case basis, dependent on its facts."

"31. From the aforesaid decisions what is clear is that though a plea regarding maintainability of the suit, even if not raised in the written statement, may be raised in appeal, particularly when no new facts or evidence is required to address the same, the issue whether a declaratory relief is essential or not would have to be addressed on the facts of each case."

"32. In our view, a declaratory relief would be required where a doubt or a cloud is there on the right of the plaintiff and grant of relief to the plaintiff is dependent on removal of that doubt or cloud. However, whether there is a doubt or cloud on the right of the plaintiff to seek consequential relief, the same is to be determined on the facts of each case. For example, a contract may give right to the parties, or any one of the parties, to terminate the contract on existence of certain conditions. In terms thereof, the contract is terminated, a doubt over subsistence of the contract is created and, therefore, without seeking a declaration that termination is bad in law, a decree for specific performance may not be available. However, where there is no such right conferred on any party to terminate the contract, or the right so conferred is waived, yet the contract is terminated unilaterally, such termination may be taken as a breach of contract by repudiation and the party aggrieved may, by treating the contract as subsisting, sue for specific performance without seeking a declaratory relief qua validity of such termination."

29. The learned counsel further submitted that the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Madras, in **P. Suresh v. R. Rangasamy and Others**, reported in 2021



(1) CTC 320, while dealing with the issue of seeking only an enabling relief without seeking the substantial relief, has held as follows: **"Plaintiff sought only declaration that Decree passed against him in earlier Suit is void - Declaration of his right in Suit property not sought - Decree declaring earlier Decree as void is mere enabling Decree, which enables Court to declare right of Plaintiff - Held, Suit, where only enabling relief sought but substantial relief omitted, not maintainable."** It was further submitted that if such a declaration had been sought, the suit ought to have been valued under Section 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, which would take the suit beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court in view of Section 12 of the Tamil Nadu City Civil Courts Act, 1873. Even according to the petitioner himself, the suit property was purchased for a consideration of **Rs.1,18,250/- (Rupees One Lakh Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty only)**, which exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of **Rs.1,00,000/-** vested in this Court. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the suit itself is not maintainable and, consequently, the application seeking injunction is also not maintainable. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (Deceased) through L.Rs. v. Maniben Jagmalbhai (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others**, MANU/SC/0272/2022.

30. The Hon'ble Apex Court in **Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (Deceased) through L.Rs. v. Maniben Jagmalbhai (Deceased) through L.Rs. and Others**, MANU/SC/0272/2022, has held as follows: **"An injunction is a consequential relief and in a suit for declaration with a consequential relief of injunction, it is not a suit for declaration simpliciter, it is a suit for declaration with a further relief. Whether the further relief claimed has, in a particular case, as consequential upon a declaration, is adequate must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Where once a suit is held not maintainable,**



no relief of injunction can be granted. Injunction may be granted even against the true owner of the property, only when the person seeking the relief is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property and also legally entitled to be in possession, not to dispossess him except in due process of law." The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner/plaintiff himself has admitted in his deposition dated 10.02.2025 that respondents 3 and 4 are in possession of the suit property, which reads as follows: "இன்றைய தேதியில் 3 மற்றும் 4 பிரதிவாதிகள் தான் வழக்கு சொத்தின் ஸ்வாதீனத்தில் உள்ளார்கள். நான் ஸ்வாதீனத்தில் இருந்ததை பிரதிவாதிகள் காவல் நிலையத்தில் புகார் கொடுத்து தற்போது என்னை வெளியேற்றி விட்டார்கள்" According to the learned counsel, possession being the primary requirement for the grant of injunction, the above admission alone is sufficient to dismiss the present application.

31. The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Others v. Praveen Kumar Singh**, MANU/SC/0940/2006, wherein it has been held as follows: "**Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not have been passed and any such order passed would be one without jurisdiction.**" The learned counsel further submitted that the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the present application are in direct contradiction to the statements made by the petitioner/plaintiff on oath during his deposition and, therefore, amount to perjury. Respondents 3 and 4, being the rightful owners, are in lawful possession of the property purchased under Document No. 637 of 2022, registered before the Sub-Registrar, Kotagiri, which fact, according to the respondents, has been admitted by the petitioner himself. The allegation that respondents 3 and 4 interfered with the



petitioner's alleged possession is wholly baseless. It was also submitted that the 4th respondent is a resident of Gurgaon, Haryana, and is a practising Advocate before the Courts in the National Capital Region, including the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, while the 3rd respondent is residing in the United States of America. Therefore, neither of them was present in the Nilgiris on **04.09.2025**, the alleged date of interference. According to the learned counsel, these circumstances, coupled with the contradictions between the petitioner's sworn testimony and the affidavit filed in support of the present application, clearly expose the meritless nature of the petitioner's claim and demonstrate that the alleged apprehension is nothing but a figment of his imagination.

32. The learned counsel further submitted that, as per the pleadings contained in paragraph No. 4 of the plaint, the petitioner's title relates to the property situated in R.S. Nos. 270 and 273 of Kagguchi Village, which is also reflected in the Sale Deed marked as Exhibit A-1. Without any basis or tangible proof, the petitioner has attempted to contend that R.S. Nos. 270 and 273 of Kagguchi Village correspond to R.S. Nos. 624/1A1A and 624/2A of the same village. According to the learned counsel, this contention is clearly belied by the "A" Register Extracts. The untenability of this claim is further demonstrated by the fact that, even prior to the institution of the suit, the petitioner had issued a legal notice to the 1st respondent calling upon him to rectify the Sale Deed on the ground that the resurvey numbers mentioned therein were incorrect. The entire claim of title projected by the petitioner is founded upon an alleged oral partition under which, according to him, the suit property had fallen to the share of the 1st respondent. In this regard, the petitioner himself has deposed as follows: "எனது வாதுரை மற்றும் எனது ஆவணங்களிலும் 1 ஆம் பிரதிவாதியின் தந்தை ரங்கன் வழக்கு சொத்தை கிரையம் பெற்றதாலும் அதன் பின்பு அவர் இறப்பிற்கு பின்பு 1 ஆம்



பிரதிவாதிக்கு வாய் மொழி பாகப்பிரிவினை மூலம் இவ்வழக்கு சொத்து கிடைக்கப்பெற்றதாகவும் குறிப்பிட்டுள்ளேன் என்றால் சரிதான்" The learned counsel further submitted that there was, in fact, no oral partition, nor could there have been one. He drew the attention of the Court to the registered Gift Deed dated 05.12.2003 bearing Document No. 1521 of 2003, executed by Shri K.B. Rangan, the father of the 1st respondent. Under the said Gift Deed, Shri K.B. Rangan settled an extent of 1.83 acres comprised in Survey Nos. 183/1, 183/2, and 183/3 of Kagguchi Village, which had been acquired by him under various prior sale deeds, including Document No. 367 of 1990, upon his wife, Smt. Lakshmiammal @ Lakshmi. The donee accepted the said settlement, and from that date onwards she became the absolute owner of the property. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the plea of an oral partition is wholly false and contrary to the documentary evidence.

33. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaint is completely bereft of particulars regarding the alleged oral partition. It does not disclose when the alleged partition took place, who the parties to such partition were, how the properties were divided among them, or on what basis the suit property is alleged to have fallen to the share of the 1st respondent. In the absence of any semblance of title and in view of the petitioner's own admission that he is not in possession of the suit property, the petitioner has failed to establish even a prima facie case. Consequently, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of respondents 3 and 4, who are in possession of their property. It was further submitted that there is absolutely no question of irreparable injury, as the petitioner himself has failed to specifically explain how the alleged acts of respondents 3 and 4 have affected his rights. Having failed to satisfy the three essential requirements for the grant of interim relief, namely, a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, the present application is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.

**Points for consideration:**

34. This Court considered the elaborate arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/plaintiff and the learned counsel appearing for respondents/defendants 3 and 4. The petition, counter statement, oral and documentary evidence available on record, and the entire case records were carefully perused. The point that arises for consideration in this petition is: **"Whether the petitioner/plaintiff has established a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury so as to entitle him to an order of ad-interim injunction/status quo restraining the respondents/defendants from altering or changing the nature of the suit property pending disposal of the suit?"**

Discussion:

35. The case of the petitioner/plaintiff is that he purchased the suit schedule property under a registered Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013 executed by the first defendant and has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same ever since. According to him, during the pendency of the suit, respondents/defendants 3 and 4 attempted to trespass into the suit property, uprooted tea plants and attempted to alter the physical features of the property and therefore an order of ad-interim injunction/status quo is necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit. On the other hand, respondents/defendants 3 and 4 contend that they are the lawful purchasers under the registered Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022, that they are in possession of the property, that the plaintiff himself admitted during his cross-examination that respondents 3 and 4 are in possession, that there is a serious dispute regarding title, identity and possession of the suit property, and that the present application has been filed only after the completion of the plaintiff's evidence with an intention to overcome the admissions made during trial.



36. The records reveal that the suit was instituted on 07.11.2022. Issues were framed on 24.01.2024. Trial commenced on 24.10.2024. The cross-examination of PW-1 was completed on 13.03.2025. Thereafter PW-2 was examined in chief on 08.07.2025 and cross-examined in full on 05.08.2025. PW-3 was examined and cross-examined on 18.11.2025. The plaintiff's side evidence was closed on 25.11.2025 and the matter was posted for defendants' evidence. DW-1 was examined in chief on 01.12.2025 and cross-examined on 03.02.2026. Thus, the present application has been filed after nearly three years from the institution of the suit and after substantial completion of the trial. Therefore, while considering the present application, this Court cannot ignore the evidence already recorded during the course of trial.

37. It is a settled principle of law that while considering an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has to examine whether the applicant has established (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable injury. These three requirements must coexist. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh*, (1992) 1 SCC 719, has held that mere existence of a prima facie case is not sufficient and that the Court should be satisfied regarding all the three ingredients before granting temporary injunction. The same principle has been reiterated in *Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co.*, (1995) 5 SCC 545.

38. The principal allegation made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition is that on 04.09.2025 the respondents attempted to interfere with the suit property and altered its physical features by uprooting tea plants. In support of the said allegation, the petitioner has produced a Community Service Register (C.S.R.) receipt stated to have been issued by the Kotagiri Police Station dated 04.09.2025.



However, the said document was never marked as an exhibit during the enquiry of this petition. Apart from that, this Court finds that the case number mentioned in the said C.S.R. is O.S. No.150 of 2023, whereas the present suit is O.S. No.150 of 2022. Thus, the document itself contains a discrepancy regarding the very case in respect of which the complaint is alleged to have been given. Since the said C.S.R. has not been marked as an exhibit in accordance with law, this Court cannot rely upon or consider the same while deciding the present interlocutory application.

39. The petitioner has also produced four photographs along with a Compact Disc (CD) containing a video footage of about 2 minutes and 50 seconds. The photographs depict a tea garden, certain uprooted tea plants and two unidentified persons standing at the place. Likewise, the video footage shows a tea plantation, certain buildings and some uprooted tea plants. However, neither the photographs nor the video disclose the identity of the place where they were taken. There is absolutely no material to identify the persons shown in the photographs. There is also no evidence as to who took the photographs, who recorded the video, on what date they were taken or whether the place shown therein is in fact the suit property.

40. The petitioner has also filed a certificate purportedly under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act in support of the electronic records. However, on careful scrutiny, this Court finds that the said certificate does not satisfy the mandatory requirements contemplated under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act. The certificate does not disclose the date on which the photographs or video were recorded, the device by which they were captured, the particulars of the electronic device, the manner in which the electronic records were produced or copied, nor does it contain the necessary particulars required for certification of electronic evidence.



Therefore, the certificate cannot be treated as a valid certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

41. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal*, (2020) 7 SCC 1, has categorically held that compliance with Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act is mandatory for admissibility of electronic evidence unless the original electronic device itself is produced before the Court. The Supreme Court has further held that electronic evidence which is not accompanied by a valid certificate under Section 65-B is ordinarily inadmissible in evidence. The same principle has been consistently followed thereafter.

42. In the present case, not only is the certificate defective and incomplete, but the photographs, Compact Disc and the certificate have also not been marked as exhibits during the enquiry of this petition. Consequently, those materials cannot be looked into or relied upon while deciding the present interlocutory application. It is a settled principle that documents which have not been admitted in evidence cannot form the basis for grant of discretionary relief.

43. Except the unmarked C.S.R., the unmarked photographs, the Compact Disc and the defective certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, there is absolutely no reliable material placed before this Court to establish that respondents/defendants 3 and 4 entered into the suit property, disturbed the possession of the plaintiff or uprooted the tea plants as alleged in the affidavit. Mere allegations in the affidavit, unsupported by legally admissible evidence, cannot constitute sufficient proof for granting an order of ad-interim injunction, particularly when the application has been filed after substantial completion of the trial.



44. This Court further finds that there exists a serious dispute regarding title, identity and possession of the suit property. The plaintiff claims title under the Sale Deed dated 04.01.2013, whereas respondents 3 and 4 claim title under the Sale Deed dated 09.03.2022. The respondents have also disputed the identity of the property by contending that the survey numbers relied upon by the plaintiff do not correspond to the property purchased by them. Whether the property claimed by the plaintiff is identical to the property claimed by respondents 3 and 4 is a matter which can be decided only after appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence at the time of final disposal of the suit.

45. The respondents have also relied upon the evidence of PW-1 and contended that the plaintiff himself admitted that respondents 3 and 4 are in possession of the suit property. Whether such admissions are conclusive or whether they require explanation is a matter which has to be considered at the time of final disposal of the suit. Nevertheless, when an interlocutory application is filed after completion of substantial evidence, the Court is entitled to take into consideration the stage of the proceedings and the evidence already recorded while considering the discretionary relief.

46. In *M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan*, (2006) 8 SCC 367, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that although the Court should not conduct a mini trial while deciding an application for temporary injunction, it must examine the available materials to ascertain whether a bona fide prima facie case exists. Similarly, in *Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra*, (2009) 10 SCC 388, it has been held that grant of injunction is an equitable and discretionary relief and the Court has to consider the entire circumstances of the case before exercising such discretion.



47. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs.*, (2008) 4 SCC 594, has held that where serious questions relating to title and possession arise, such questions have to be decided after full-fledged trial. In the present case, the rival claims regarding title, survey numbers, identity of the property and possession require appreciation of the entire evidence and cannot be finally determined at the interlocutory stage.

48. Having regard to the advanced stage of the suit, the absence of legally admissible evidence to establish the alleged interference on 04.09.2025, the fact that the C.S.R., photographs, Compact Disc and Section 65-B certificate have not been marked as exhibits, the defective nature of the certificate produced under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, and the existence of serious disputed questions regarding title and possession, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case warranting grant of an ad-interim injunction.

49. Likewise, the balance of convenience also does not lie in favour of granting the relief sought. Granting an order of status quo or ad-interim injunction at this advanced stage of the suit, in the absence of legally admissible evidence regarding the alleged acts of interference, would virtually amount to granting a substantial part of the relief sought in the suit itself. Since the suit has already reached the stage of defendants' evidence, the rights of the parties can be adjudicated finally within a reasonable time.

50. This Court is also not satisfied that the petitioner has established any irreparable injury warranting exercise of the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. In the absence of any reliable evidence to establish that the respondents actually disturbed the suit property or uprooted the tea



plants as alleged, this Court cannot presume the existence of irreparable injury. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to satisfy all the three essential requirements for grant of temporary injunction.

51. Accordingly, this Court holds that the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. *Hence, the point for consideration is answered against the petitioner.*

Result:

52. *In the result, this Interlocutory Application is dismissed. No order as to costs.*

This order dictated by me to the steno typist, transcribed by her, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this 22nd day of July 2026.

**District Munsif,
Udhagamandalam**

Draft/ Fair Order:

**I.A. No. 05/2025
in
O.S. No. 150/2022**

Dated: 22.07.2026

**District Munsif,
Udhagamandalam.**