

IN THE COURT OF THE SUB JUDGE, PALA

Present:- Sri. Mithun Gopi G.S, Sub Judge

Tuesday, the 31st day of March, 2026

10th day of Chaitram 1948

AS 49/2023

(Filed against the Judgment dated 01.08.2023 in OS No.149/2016 of Munsiff's

Court, Pala

Appellant:-

Titus Mathew, aged 57 years, S/o Mathew
Erattamakkil House, Monippally P O,
Monippally kara, Monippally village,
Meenachil Taluk, PIN- 686636.

By - Adv. Usha Menon

Respondent:-

Kuttiyamma George Alias Brijith, 55 years,
W/o George Kurian, Kaithakulath Nirappil
(Malayil) House, Monippally P O,
Monippally Kara, Monippally Village,
PIN- 686636

By- Adv. Mathew Mathai Muthukadan

Adv. Biju Zacharias Kolady

This appeal suit is came up for consideration on 28.03.2026 and
the court on 31.03.2026 deliverd the following.

JUDGMENT

The appellant is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 149/2016 before the Court of the Munsiff, Pala and the respondent is the defendant in the said suit.

2. The parties, namely the appellant and the respondent, will hereinafter be referred to as the “plaintiff” and the “defendant” as they are arrayed in the suit.

3. **The plaint averments, in brief, is as follows:** The plaint schedule property is in the absolute ownership and possession of the plaintiff and he is in residential occupation of the same. The plaint schedule property is well bounded by visible boundaries on all four sides. The defendant owns property on the southern side of the plaint schedule property and the plaint schedule property and the defendant's property are separated by a 6 feet high *kayyala*. The *Pullambra–Parudeesa* Panchayat Road passes through the western side of the plaint schedule property. A road having 6 feet width is cut open to the defendant's house from the above-said Panchayat Road. But, due to the terrain, it is difficult to take vehicles to the plaintiff's house. The defendant has been using a pathway through the western side of the plaint schedule property to reach her property. However, for transporting the rubber trees in her property, a new way has been constructed through the property of Sri. Joy Joseph. Now the defendant attempts to trespass upon the plaint schedule property and cut open a new road through it. The defendant has no right to do so. The defendant is to be restrained, by a decree of permanent prohibitory

injunction, from trespassing upon the plaint schedule property, traversing through it, cutting open new ways through it and from committing any acts of waste therein. Hence, the suit.

4. The defendant filed written statement contenting as follows:

The suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. The major portion of the property obtained by the plaintiff through a partition deed has been sold by him and only a small portion now remains. The plaintiff's property lies as two different parcels. The *Nirappupura–Velaserry–Irattamackil* public road, vested in the Panchayat and existing from time immemorial, bifurcates the plaintiff's property into two. The plaintiff's property is comprised in Re-survey Nos. 55/4 and 56/6. The said public road passes through the above said two survey numbers. Concealing this material fact, the plaintiff filed this suit. The said public road, starting from *Nirappupuram*, has a length of 2 km and a width of 3 metres and it continues even after the plaintiff's property and culminates at the *Pullambra–Parudeesa* Panchayat Road. Since the said public road has not been maintained and repaired, it is difficult for the smooth passage of vehicles. The plaintiff has fraudulently portrayed the portion of the public road near the *Pullambra–Parudeesa* road as a private road cut open to his house. The defendant has every right to use the *Nirappupuram–Velaserry–Irattamackil* Panchayat Road to reach her property, as revealed from the re-survey plan. For the convenience of transporting rubber trees, Sri. Joy Joseph, granted permission to take vehicles through his property and a new road was constructed. The defendant never attempted to construct a new way through the plaintiff's property. But the plaintiff is attempting to annex the portion

of the public road vested with the Panchayat to his property. Without impleading the actual owner of the public road, i.e., the Panchayat concerned and the State of Kerala, the plaintiff has no right to obtain an injunction in his favour. Thereafter, about 60 people who are the users of the disputed Panchayat Road made a complaint before the RDO. After due inspection, the RDO issued an order to the Secretary, Uzhavoor Grama Panchayat, to find out encroachments, if any. The plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant. The plaintiff is not entitled to get any of the reliefs sought for in the suit. Hence, the suit has to be dismissed with costs.

5. From the above pleadings, the following issues were settled for consideration by the trial Court:

(1) Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for?

(2) Order as to costs?

6. The plaintiff's evidence in this case consists of the oral testimonies of PW1 and PW2 and Ext. A1 to Ext. A4 documents. The defendant's evidence consists of the oral testimonies of DW1 to DW3 and Ext. B1 and Ext. B2 documents. Ext. C1, Ext. C1(a), Ext. C2, Ext. C2(a), Ext. C3 and Ext. C3(a) were marked as Court exhibits.

7. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, dismissed the suit against the defendant and aggrieved by the same, the appeal has been filed by the plaintiff.

8. Grounds for appeal filed by the plaintiff are as follows: The decree and judgment passed by the trial Court are against law, facts and evidence on record. The trial Court failed to frame proper issues based on the contentions put forward by the parties and further failed to answer the issues framed in a proper and judicious manner. The trial Court also failed to properly appreciate the law and facts involved in the case. It ought to have found that the plaintiff had conclusively proved his right, absolute ownership and exclusive possession over the plaint schedule property through the evidence. The trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence regarding the existence of long-standing permanent boundaries of the plaint schedule property. It ought to have found that the property is clearly demarcated with old *kayyalas* and that the property within such boundaries is in the possession and ownership of the plaintiff. The trial Court erred in dismissing the suit by relying on the Ext. C2(a) survey plan, which is baseless and not duly proved. It ignored the established fact that no road exists through the plaint schedule property and instead relied on a mere pictorial representation to dismiss the suit. The trial Court ought to have found that a property without a specific survey number cannot be properly demarcated in a survey plan and therefore the plan relied upon is without any legal basis. The trial Court further erred in relying upon the asset register of the Panchayat, which has no evidentiary value in establishing title or right over the property. Inclusion of land in the asset register does not confer any right upon the Panchayat. The trial Court also ignored the settled principles of law that relinquishment of rights over property can be effected only in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, particularly under

Section 4. The Panchayat cannot include land in its asset register unless a formal order is passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer accepting such relinquishment. The trial Court ought to have found that the defendant failed to prove any valid surrender of the property or compliance with the statutory procedure. The trial Court also erred in accepting Ext. C3 report and Ext. C3(a) plan, which were prepared without any proper basis. It ought to have found that the defendant failed to prove the lie and existence of the alleged *Nirappupuram–Velasseri–Irattamakkil* road. The trial Court further erred in concluding that the said road passes through the plaint schedule property. It failed to properly appreciate the evidence and wrongly accepted the evidence adduced by the defendant. The finding that the advocate commissioner and surveyor identified the said Panchayat Road is incorrect and unsupported by reliable evidence. The trial Court ought to have found that the defendant failed to establish that the road shown in the asset register is the same as the one claimed. It should also have found that if a road is vested in the Panchayat, it must be identified by a separate survey number. The trial Court went wrong in dismissing the suit. It ought to have decreed the suit, as the plaintiff has successfully proved his right, title and possession over the plaint schedule property and the apprehension raised by the plaintiff is genuine.

9. Notice was issued to the respondent in the appeal and she appeared before the court through counsel and contested the same.

10. Heard the rival contentions across the bar. Perused records.

11. The following points arise for consideration in this appeal:

(1) Whether the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court is liable to be set aside, varied or modified?

(2) Relief and costs?

12. Point No. (1): The learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence and law and thereby erroneously dismissed the suit. It was therefore prayed that the appeal has to be allowed and the suit has to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the defendant argued that the trial Court had rightly concluded that the plaint schedule property was not properly identified and accordingly dismissed the suit. It was further contended that the plaintiff had attempted to mislead the trial Court by making untruthful statements and is continuing to do so before this Court by reiterating the same contentions. The defendant's counsel also submitted that the plaintiff has approached this Court with a false and misleading narrative. In response, the learned counsel for the plaintiff refuted these allegations, asserting that no false statements were made either before the trial Court or this Court.

13. The Honourable Apex Court in **Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. and Ors.** Reported in **(2013) 2 SCC 398** held that; *"It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties, as truth is the basis of the Justice Delivery System."* As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court will seriously engage in the journey of discovering the truth and no stone will be left unturned in its effort to uncover the truth in this case.

14. For better understanding of the ongoing discussions, the Court notes a brief description of the documents and witnesses examined before the trial Court. PW1 is the plaintiff and PW2 is the advocate commissioner who prepared Ext. C1 report and Ext. C1(a) rough sketch. PW1 produced Ext. A1 to Ext. A4, which include the certified copy of Partition Deed No. 654/1990 of *Kuravilangad* SRO, tax receipt from the *Monipally* Village Office, a copy of the plan (received through RTI) issued by the *Monipally* Village Officer and another copy of the plan (received through RTI) issued by the *Monipally* Village Officer. DW1 is the defendant, DW2 is the Ward Member of *Uzhavoor* Grama Panchayat and DW3 is the advocate commissioner who prepared Ext. C2 series and Ext. C3 series. Ext. C2(a) and Ext. C3(a) are the survey sketches prepared by the Taluk Surveyor. Ext. B1 is the certified copy of the 20th page of the Road Asset Register of the *Uzhavoor* Panchayat and Ext. B2 is the copy of the letter issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Panchayat Secretary, *Uzhavoor*.

15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the lower Court ought to have found that the plaintiff had conclusively established his right, absolute ownership and exclusive possession over the plaint schedule property through the oral testimonies of PW1 and PW2, as well as the documents produced on the plaintiff's side. The learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the plaint schedule property is in the absolute ownership and residential possession of the plaintiff, well bounded on all four sides and that the defendant's property lies to the south, separated by a 6 feet high *kayyala*. Though the defendant had been using a pathway along the western side of the

property, a separate route through Sri. Joy Joseph's property had already been constructed for transporting rubber trees. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had no right to trespass or open a new road through the plaint schedule property and the suit was instituted when she attempted to do so. The learned counsel submitted that the trial Court ought to have granted a permanent prohibitory injunction with costs in favour of the plaintiff.

16. The learned counsel for the defendant counter-argued that most of the property obtained by the plaintiff through Ext.A1 had been sold, leaving only a small portion in two separate parcels. The *Nirappupura-Velaserry-Irattamackil* public road, vested in the Panchayat and existing from time immemorial, bifurcates the property (Re-survey Nos. 55/4 and 56/6), a fact allegedly suppressed by the plaintiff. According to the defendant, the public road continues up to the *Pullambra-Parudeesa* Panchayat Road, which the defendant has a right to use. It was further contended that the plaintiff was attempting to annex a portion of the Panchayat Road to his property without impleading the Panchayat and the State of Kerala, rendering the suit not maintainable.

17. The defendant's main case is that a pathway already exists between the properties of the plaintiff in Re-survey Nos. 55/4 and 56/6. The deposition of PW1 clearly shows that PW1 was aware of this. The deposition of PW1 is as follows: "സർവ്വേ പ്ലാനിൽ നിങ്ങളുടെ വസ്തുവിന്റെ നടുക്കുകൂടിപോകുന്ന ഉഴവൂർ പഞ്ചായത്തിൽ നിക്ഷിപ്തമായ നിരപ്പുപുറം - വേളാശേരി - ഇരട്ടമാക്കിൽ റോഡ് അല്ലെ പ്ലാനിൽ കാണിച്ചിരിക്കുന്നത് (Q) അതെ (A) ഇതിൽ സർവ്വേ നമ്പർ 55/4 ലും 56/6 ന്റെയും ഇടയ്ക്കുകൂടിയല്ലെ പഞ്ചായത്ത് റോഡ് കാണിച്ചിരിക്കുന്നത് (Q) അതെ (A)." It can be seen that

PW1 categorically deposed about the panchayat road bifurcates his properties. But the said fact was not seen pleaded by PW1.

18. Ext.C2 series and the cross-examination of PW1 further confirm that the road existed, though PW1 stated he became aware of its precise location only in the year 2016. There is no record of any action taken by the plaintiff to correct this if it was a mistake. The learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that PW1, being an auto driver, may have erred in his deposition. However, such a contention cannot be sustained. It is well-settled in law that the credibility of a witness does not depend solely on his formal education or social status. A witness, irrespective of whether he is literate or illiterate, is competent to testify to facts within his personal knowledge. Moreover, PW1, who has categorically stated that he is residing in the plaint schedule property, would necessarily be well aware of the nature and lie of his property, including the existence and location of any pathway. In such circumstances, it can reasonably be inferred that he had knowledge of the precise location of the pathway. Consequently, the plea of ignorance put forward by the plaintiff is neither credible nor believable.

19. Ext.A3 which was of the year 1981 and Ext.A4 plans clearly show the Panchayat Road between the plaintiff's properties. Ext.B1 shows the road recorded in the *Uzhavoor* Grama Panchayat asset register and Ext.C2(a) confirms that the *Velassery-Irattamakkil-Pullambra-Parudeesa* road bisects the plaintiff's property. The Taluk Surveyor of Meenachil Taluk prepared Ext.C2(a) plan. Ext.B2 shows that the Revenue Divisional Officer, Pala, issued a letter on 10.08.2016 to the Panchayat to

act against encroachments, after the suit was filed on 19.05.2016. DW2, a ward member of *Uzhavoor* Grama Panchayat, deposed that the pathway existed before 1964. It is also submitted by both the learned counsels that DW1 is a family friend of both PW1 and DW2. The defendant contended that DW2 has deposed the true and actual facts before the Court. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, however, argued that DW2 is not on good terms with PW1 and on the contrary, maintains a cordial relationship with DW1. It is a settled principle of law that mere relationship with any of the parties is not, by itself, a ground to discard or discredit the testimony of a witness, provided that such testimony is otherwise found to be reliable and trustworthy. Hence, this Court is not inclined to disbelieve the testimony of DW2.

20. The learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the property has well-defined boundaries. The learned counsel for the defendant argued that the lower court found the resurvey numbers and extent of the property for which the appellant pays tax were more than pleaded and that the plaintiff had suppressed the same. The learned counsel for the plaintiff further argued that Exts.C1 and Ext.C1(a) show no pathway as alleged through the plaintiff's property. It was counter-argued by the learned counsel for the defendant that Ext. C1(a) is showing a pathway from *Pullambra-Parudeesa* Road through the plaintiff's property and the same is actually a public road. The plaintiff claimed the said road ends at his property and is known locally as *Irattamakkil* Road. It was further contended that the persons residing in the locality are commonly known as people from "*Irattamakkil*" and that the road has come to be referred to by that name on account of

such local usage. According to the plaintiff, the mere nomenclature or local description of the road does not, by itself, establish that it is a Panchayat Road.

21. However, PW1 has failed to substantiate the said contention before the trial Court with any cogent evidence. On the other hand, Ext.C2 series clearly indicates that the road extends beyond the plaintiff's property, thereby suggesting its continuity and public character. Further, Ext. B2 substantiates the position that the road in question is vested in the Panchayat. In such circumstances, the evidence on record probalises the case put forward by the defendant and militates against the version advanced by the plaintiff.

22. The learned counsel for the defendant argued that there was suppression of material facts by the plaintiff in the plaint and that the true facts were not properly pleaded. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the pleadings on record clearly establish the plaintiff's entitlement to the relief of injunction as prayed for. However, upon a careful scrutiny of the plaint, this Court finds that certain material facts have not been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff. There are also noticeable inconsistencies and anomalies in the description of the plaint schedule property. Further, the pleadings disclose instances of suppression of material facts, which goes to the root of the plaintiff's case. It is a settled principle that a party seeking the equitable relief of injunction must approach the Court with clean hands and must disclose all material facts fully and fairly. Any

suppression or misrepresentation of material particulars disentitles such a party from obtaining the discretionary relief of injunction.

23. The Honourable Apex Court in **A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam Represented by Its President and Ors.** reported in 2012 INSC 193 held that; *“The pleadings must set-forth sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward a false or exaggerated claim or defence. The pleadings must inspire confidence and credibility. If false averments, evasive denials or false denials are introduced, then the Court must carefully look into it while deciding a case and insist that those who approach the Court must approach it with clean hands.”*

24. It is also a well-established principle that in order to obtain any relief, the plaintiff has a duty to present true, complete and candid pleadings before the Court.

25. The plaintiff relies on Ext. A1 as the foundational document for the suit. The learned counsel for the defendant contended that the portions of the property obtained under Ext. A1 had been sold and that the remaining extent is wrongly described in the plaint schedule. Be that as it may, a reading of the plaint shows that there is no averment regarding any such alienation after the execution of Ext.A1. It was also admitted by the plaintiff that subsequent to Ext.A1, certain portions of the property were sold. As per Ext.A1, the plaintiff had acquired 31 Ares and 16 square meters of property in the year 1990. Yet, the plaint contains no details about any such transfers, including the extent of land conveyed or the dates of those transactions.

26. What is pleaded in the plaint is as follows: “അടിയിൽ പട്ടികയിൽ വിവരം പറയുന്ന വസ്തു വാദി വകയും വാദിക്ക് കുറവിലങ്ങാട് സബ് രജിസ്റ്ററിൽ 1990 ലെ 654-ാം നമ്പർ ഭാഗഉടമ്പടിയിലെ സി പട്ടിക പ്രകാരം സിദ്ധിച്ച് വാദി കൈവശംവെച്ച് ദേഹണ്ഡങ്ങൾ ചെയ്ത് നിരാക്ഷേപമായി അനുഭവിച്ചുവരുന്നതാണ്. പട്ടികവസ്തുവിൽ റബ്ബർ, തെങ്ങ്, കാപ്പി മുതലായവ കൃഷി ചെയ്തിരിക്കുന്നു. പട്ടികവസ്തു കിഴക്കുനിന്നും പടിഞ്ഞാറ് ചരിവായി ഇടക്കയ്യാലകളാൽ തിരിഞ്ഞാണ് കിടക്കുന്നത്. പട്ടികവസ്തുവിലുള്ള വീട്ടിലാണ് വാദി കുടുംബസമേതം താമസിക്കുന്നത്.” After the sale of portions of the property, the boundaries could have undergone changes, but this aspect is not pleaded by the plaintiff.

27. The learned counsel for the defendant argued that Exts.C2 series and Ext.C3 series are more reliable, as they indicate the exact nature and lie of the plaint schedule property. The learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the lower court failed to properly appreciate the evidence regarding the long-standing and permanent boundaries of the plaint schedule property. But no evidence is seen adduced by the plaintiff before the trial Court. It was contended that the property is clearly demarcated by old *kayyalas* and that the land within those boundaries is in the plaintiff’s possession and ownership. The learned counsel also argued that the court ignored the established fact that no road exists through the plaint schedule property and instead relied on a mere depiction in the plan to reject the claim.

28. The description in the plaint schedule is as follows: “3 ഏക്കർ 8 സെന്റ് സ്ഥലത്തിന്റെ പടിഞ്ഞാറടുത്ത് തെക്കുവടക്കെത്തി സർവ്വേ 104/2 ഡിയിൽ പെട്ട 77 സെന്റിന് 31 ആർ 16 ച.മീറ്റർ സ്ഥലത്തുനിന്നും വടക്കുഭാഗം തീർപോയതുനീക്കി 15 ആർ 51 ച.മീറ്റർ സ്ഥലവും വൃക്ഷാദികളുമാകുന്നു. (ടി വസ്തു ബ്ലോക്ക് നമ്പർ 3 ൽ റീസർവ്വേ 55/4, 56/6 ൽപ്പെടുവരുന്നതാണ്.)” The phrase

“തീര് പോയതുകൊണ്ട്” assumes significance in the context of the case. Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have clearly stated where the property was sold and the failure to do so amounts to misleading the Court and suppression of material facts. The deliberate suppression of material facts is a serious matter and must be viewed with due gravity by this Court. The Honourable Apex Court in **Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.** reported in **(2019)14 SCC 761** held in paragraph 11 that; *“It is trite that every litigant has to approach the Court with clean hands. A litigant who indulges in suppression of facts and misrepresentation is not entitled for any relief.”*

29. It is settled law that pleadings must be specific and for granting an injunction, there must be clear identification of the property. Although Ext.A1 partition deed was produced before the court, the subsequent documents were not placed on record. Had those documents been produced, this Court would have had an opportunity to verify the actual property description of the plaint schedule property. In the absence of these essential particulars, the plaint schedule does not present a clear and accurate account of the property currently held by the plaintiff. The omission of these facts from the pleadings remains unexplained.

30. The learned counsel for the defendant argued that the trial Court’s finding that the appellant’s property is not identifiable from the disputed Panchayat Road is absolutely correct. It was further contended that since the Panchayat or the State of Kerala was not impleaded, the plaintiff is not entitled to the injunction. It was argued

by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that such an issue was not framed by the trial Court, so the respondent cannot raise it at this stage. It is true that no such issue was formally framed by the trial Court. However, the trial Court discussed the same in the judgment. The suit was ultimately dismissed for non-impleadment of the Panchayat or the State and for non-identifiability of the plaint schedule property from the Panchayat Road. On perusal of the plaint, the cause of action is stated as 08.05.2016, when the respondent allegedly, along with her son and others, attempted to construct a new pathway and destroy the existing access. But no witnesses were examined by the plaintiff to substantiate this incident. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant attempted to trespass on the property and the suit sought to restrain the defendant from trespassing and erecting a new pathway. However, the actual nature of the alleged trespass and the events of that day were neither pleaded or proved by PW1.

31. The plaint and the Ext.A1 and Ext.A2 reveal discrepancies in the survey numbers and property extent. The plaint schedule describes 15 Ares and 51 sq. metres after sale, which does not align with the original property extent. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the plaint schedule property is not identifiable is correct. Regarding the Panchayat or State non-impleadment, the evidence on record including the asset register of *Uzhavoor* Grama Panchayat shows the existence of a Panchayat Road between the plaintiff's properties. The plaintiff's contention that the pathway belongs to the Panchayat without documentation is incorrect. Injunction being an equitable relief, the appellant should have approached the court with clean hands. On

review of the entire evidence on record, it is evident that the appellant suppressed material facts and the pleadings were incomplete.

32. The necessary ingredients for the grant of a permanent injunction were laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in **Nagar Palika Raisinghnagar v. Rameshwar Lal and Ors.** reported in 2017(9) SCC 618. It was held that; *“the plaintiff has to make out all the three necessary ingredients for grant of permanent injunction with the aid of evidence, namely, the prima facie case, the balance of convenience and the irreparable loss and injury, if the injunction is not granted to him.”*

33. But from the evidence on record, it can be seen that said ingredients were not seen proved by the plaintiff.

34. Upon meaningful examination of the pleadings and evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff, through *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi* and by selective drafting, attempted to create an illusion of a cause of action against the defendant. Furthermore, I find no infirmity, illegality or perversity in the judgment and decree passed by the trial court dismissing the suit. The findings of the trial court are reasoned and supported by the evidence on record and do not warrant any interference by this Court. Consequently, the judgment and decree of the trial Court are hereby confirmed. Accordingly, this point is answered against the plaintiff.

35. **Point No 2:** In light of the discussions in the foregoing point, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs under this appeal and the appeal is only liable to be dismissed.

In the result:

(a) The appeal is dismissed.

(b) Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.

(Dictated to the Confidential Assistant, transcribed and typed by her, corrected by me and pronounced in open court on this the 31st day of March, 2026).

Sd/-
Mithun Gopi G.S
Sub Judge

APPENDIX: Nil

Id/
Sub Judge

Typed by: Manju
Compd by: Sini

Mithun Gopi G.S
Sub Judge